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Abstract 
A laboratory study of the factors of that influence the propensity of organisations 
to copy the strategic decisions of others, based around the BRANDMAPS 
simulation, investigated the effects of contingencies relating to the environment, 
the decision and the firm itself, in the absence of binding resource constraints 
and legal pressures. 
The proportion of isomorphic decisions diminished with industry age: isomorphic 
behaviour did not become institutionalised. It was positively associated with 
industry dynamism 
- 
isomorphism was possibly used for risk reduction. No 
association with industry concentration was found: field structuration did not 
affect isomorphic behaviour. 
Pressures to imitate their peers, as perceived by participants, appeared 
unrelated to firms' performance or socio-cultural characteristics other than team 
diversity. Isomorphic behaviour was unrelated to isomorphic pressures, 
suggesting that unconscious rationality in managerial behaviour. 
Knowledge of opponents' decisions was associated with isomorphic behaviour, 
indicating that isomorphism was not simply a response to the task environment. 
However, the association was positive for some decisions and negative for 
others, inconsistent with common explanations of isomorphism as deriving from 
a desire for legitimation. Rather, isomorphic behaviour results from managers 
making efficient use of available information on competitors' practices. 
Combinatorially complex bundles of decisions were not isomorphic between 
firms that had taken similar individual decisions. There was no evidence of an 
"iron cage" constraining them to become more similar. 
Isomorphism between firms is not necessarily linked to institutionalisation or 
stimulated by causes 
- 
notably legitimation 
- 
suggested by institutional theory. 
A model of isomorphic behaviour in firms is proposed, based on the perceived 
value of the practice being copied, the nature of the decision, contingent 
properties of the business environment and of the organisational field and the 
situation and internal properties of the firm. The implications for managerial 
praxis are explored. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
The research in this thesis focuses upon the question: " nich factors influence the 
propensity oforganisations to copy the strategic decisions ofolhers? " 
Isomorphism has been observed in many kinds of decision, both strategic (for 
example structural and market entry decisions) and operational 
- 
see Chapter 3 for a 
listing. A decision by a firm'sl managers to emulate the decisions of another firm may 
come about for a number of reasons. It may be accidental imitation, in which decision- 
makers, subject to similar environmental stimuli to those experienced by their 
counterparts at another organisation, independently reach similar conclusions and 
initiate similar actions. Contingent properties of that environment, such as its degree of 
turbulence and industry concentration, may thus affect the likelihood that different sets 
of boundedly rational managers will arrive at similar conclusions. The age of the 
industry may affect the extent to which firms within it have developed or absorbed 
common institutions (Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987) or recipes (Spender, 1989). 
Emulation may, on the other hand, be a deliberate decision. It may be a direct, 
economically rational (or at least boundedly rational) reaction to the firm's competitive 
position, perhaps an expression of the desire to replicate the benefits a competitor might 
have obtained from a given course of action. Firms may use emulation in order to learn 
the value of a strategic move while reducing search costs and delays within the 
decision-making process. They may also wish to reduce the cost, and improve the 
availability, of capital and other resources by impressing the stakeholders that control 
them. The weight given to such factors in the firm's decision-making may depend upon 
the same contingent properties of the environment mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
It may also be related to the organisation's situation 
- 
for example, firms may copy the 
decisions of their successful peers (Haveman, 1993; Bums and Wholey, 1993). 
Deliberate emulation may not, however, have a true economic rationale. It is widely 
held to be based upon the desire of those same decision-makers to achieve legitimation 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977) within their peer group. Whether the underlying motivation 
1 In this thesis, I use the words "firm" and "organisation" interchangeably. Distinctions between profit- 
making and not-for-profit organisations are not germane to the present research. 
is 
is economic or social, the degree of isomorphic pressure perceived by those decision- 
makers will depend, not only upon contingent external variables, but also upon social 
and cultural factors within the organisation. These will affect the dominant logic 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and knowledge structures (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992) which 
govern the manner in which the environment, and indeed the 6rganisation's own 
situation, is interpreted by decision-makers (Weick, 1979; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
Finally, the nature of the decision may itself affect the extent to which isomorphism, is 
to be expected. Complexity or ambiguity in a decision may alter the value that decision- 
makers derive from emulating the practices of other firms. 
As I shall explore in Chapter 3, there are unresolved questions of why and through 
what mechanism isomorphism occurs. It is unclear which, out of the desire for 
legitimation, resource dependency, inertia, the desire to replicate economic benefits 
perceived elsewhere or common reaction to shared environmental stimuli, is the 
dominant cause of isomorphic decisions, and whether perceived isomorphic pressures 
actually translate into isomorphic decisions. Through my examination of the influence 
of environmental, internal and decision-level contingencies on the incidence of 
isomorphic decisions, I shall attempt to cast some light upon these fundamental 
theoretical questions. 
1.2 Evolution of Research 
This thesis is the end point of a picaresque journey through the theory of organisations 
and strategic management, which began several years ago with a desire to investigate 
the linkages between an organisation's strategic intent and the resulting core 
competences. This developed, as I probed further, into a more general desire to 
understand the processes and stimuli that underlay strategic decisions2 in organisations 
and linked them to the resulting outcomes. 
It became clear that Gary Hamel was right when, in his introductory address to the 
1996 Strategic Management Society Conference, he spoke of "Strategy's dirty little 
secret... that we lack a deep theory of strategy creation within organisations. " More 
precisely, we do not understand the links between stimuli, from inside and outside an 
2 In this thesis, I use the term "decision" as shorthand for the endpoint of the individual and communal 
psychological, social and political processes that lead an organisation to a given course of action rather 
than another (or none). It may or may not be the outcome ofa deliberate or logical process. 
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organisation, and the reactions of decision-makers within it. Neither do we understand 
the linkages between what decision-makers think, say and do and the way in which 
strategies change, or fail to change, within organisations (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). 
Substantial and, in many cases overlapping, literatures probe strategic decision-making 
(Mintzberg, Raisinghi and Thdoret, 1976; Quinn, 1980; Shrivastava and Grant, 1985; 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; March, 1996; Dean and Sharfman, 1993,1996; Miller, 
1997; Hendry, 2000; Nutt, 2001,2002), strategy formulation (Naryanan and Fahey, 
1982; Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury, 1994; Liedtka, 2001), strategy implementation 
(Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984), strategic persistence (Lant, Milliken and Batra, 1992; 
Audia, Locke and Smith, 2000), strategic change (Johnson, 1987,1990; Pettigrew and 
Whipp, 1991; Hellgren and Melin, 1993; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997; Lindell, 
Ericson and Melin, 1998) and the management of change (Beer, Eisenstat and Spector, 
1990; Kotter, 1995; Hardy, 1996). It is, in my view, unarguable that these are all aspects 
of a single phenomenon, one that might be termed "strategy development" and that 
strategic management theory would be by far the richer if they could be linked together. 
Such an aim is, most probably, beyond the scope of a single thesis, and perhaps of a 
single lifetime. When I embarked upon the laboratory study that lies at the heart of the 
research on which I report here, I intended merely to understand more closely these 
links between stimulus, decision and action (or inaction). As my research progressed, it 
became apparent that by far the most interesting patterns related to isomorphism 
between the decisions of the different players. 
I had been introduced to institutional theory at an EDEN Doctoral Seminar in 1998 
and had reacted viscerally against the notion that such an "anti-management" 
(Donaldson, 1995) paradigm might have anything serious to say about strategy 
development. The momentum in the strategy field was at that stage fin-rily behind the 
resource-based view (RBV), which of course focuses on the differences between firms. 
However, Deephouse (1999) has pointed out the importance of balance between 
conformity and difference in an organisation's strategy, and in the end I came to share 
with him, and with DiMaggio and Powell (1983) the feeling that the similarities 
between organisations were at least as interesting as the differences, and that the study 
of such similarities and their origin was both important (Chen and Hambrick, 1995) and 
likely to yield interesting new insights. 
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There was a well developed body of neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1996) relating to the stimuli for such decisions, notably the desire for legitimation. In 
my laboratory environment, actions were clearly observable and measurable, although 
further analysis, detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, revealed hidden complications. By 
generating insights regarding the decision processes involved, hitherto little 
investigated, I believed I could contribute to the understanding, specifically of 
isomorphic behaviour in organisations but also more generally of the stimulus- 
decision-action/inaction linkage. 
1.3 Distinctive Contribution 
As research associated with the neo-institutional school (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) has gathered momentum, the variety of organisational 
practices deemed susceptible to capture in DiMaggio and Powell's "iron cage" has 
expanded. Although, as Oliver (1988: 558) has commented, "isomorphic forces may 
operate with varying effect on different organizational attributes, " the extent to which 
different types of decision are more or less likely to be emulated has hitherto received 
little attention, and the incorporation of this dimension represents one of the distinctive 
contributions of my research. 
As well as testing the universality of isomorphic forces, this research examines 
empirically, two other little-researched propositions emanating from neo-institutional 
theory: the effect of field structuration on isomorphic behaviour and the extent to which 
such behaviour can be attributed to managers' desire for legitimation, rather than some 
other cause. It also tests the strength of the link, implicitly assumed by theory, between 
isomorphic pressures perceived by decision-makers and isomorphic decisions 
implemented within their organisation. The results of these investigations, although not 
yet definitive, lend support to the suggestion, which I first raise in my review of the 
literature in Chapter 3, that institutionalisation and isomorphism, hitherto widely 
regarded and studied as intrinsically linked, may in fact be largely separate phenomena. 
A further distinctive element of this research lies in its approach to two key variables: 
isomorphic forces/pressures and decision-makers' knowledge of the practices that they 
are emulating. Researchers hitherto have tended to infer the extent of both pressures and 
knowledge from the degree of an organisation's or decision-maker's embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985) in organisational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In this study, 
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both are measured directly, the first through the administration of questionnaires and the 
second by capturing precisely the knowledge that decision-makers command of their 
competitors' actions. 
This latter measurement is made possible by the final distinctive dimension of this 
research, its employment of laboratory methods, hitherto little used in the study of 
isomorphism. This has a number of benefits, allowing the researcher to observe directly 
the links between situation, perception, knowledge and decision, and to discover how 
isomorphism unfolds in an environment uncontaminated with pre-existing institutions 
and where resource dependency is not an issue. It also avoids a number of 
methodological issues relating to the measurement of isomorphism, which I discuss in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
I start, in Chapter 2, with a review of the literature relating to strategic decision-making 
and of the likely sources of variation in such decisions. 
In Chapter 3,1 review the theory and the empirical evidence relating to isomorphism. 
in organisational practices. I develop a model of isomorphism in strategic decision- 
making, summarised in Figure 1.1 (overleaf), and identify methodological issues and 
unresolved questions. In Chapter 41 develop hypotheses and show how, through testing 
them, I shall throw light upon those unresolved questions. Chapter 5 develops and 
justifies the laboratory-based methodology that I use to test the hypotheses; the results 
are set out in Chapter 6. 
In Chapter 7,1 discuss the implications of these results for the proposed model of the 
influences on isomorphism in strategic decision-making. I examine the implications for 
theory, in particular neo-institutional theory and the theory of strategic decision-making, 
and for management praxis. I discuss the limitations of this study and make 
recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Strategic decision-making: a review of the literature 
Decisions to imitate the strategies of another organisation constitute a sub-class of 
strategic decisions. Their importance derives from the difficulty that attaches to 
achieving an appropriate strategic balance between sameness and difference, and the 
considerable performance implications of so doing (Deephouse, 1999). Too great a 
similarity in organisations' positions risks a situation approaching perfect competition. 
In the absence of oligopoly structures and barriers to entry sufficiently high to sustain 
them, only a degree of differentiation allows for the earning of rents and the building of 
sustainable positions that generate profits (Collis, 1996; Deephouse, 1999). 
Even in an oligopoly, "herding" around a set of perceived industry best practices may 
severely erode profit margins (Nattermann, 2000), and too high a degree of strategic 
similarity may render firms vulnerable to new entrants with innovative products and 
processes if barriers to entry suddenly disappear. The successful assumption of 
leadership in the vacuum cleaner industry by a new entrant, Dyson, which deployed 
innovative product technologies and distribution strategies to circumvent barriers to 
entry that incumbents had erected through their command of distribution channels, is 
one case in point. The successful entry of low-cost airlines, in the wake of the removal 
of regulatory barriers to entry, into a business previously dominated by largely 
homogeneous full service carriers is another. 
In this chapter, I review the theory of strategic decision-making (SDM), examining 
the role played in decision-making by decision-makers' cognitive processes, by learning 
and by politics and bargaining. I identify the main sources of variation in such 
decisions, as a prelude, in Chapter 3, to identifying the factors that might affect the 
incidence of isomorphism in them. But I begin with a brief examination of what is 
understood by a strategic decision. 
2.1 Strategic decisions 
Strategic decisions are most often characterised in terms of their impact on an 
organisation. They are decisions that determine the overall direction of the firm (Quinn, 
1980) or of some significant portion of it (Haberberg and Rieple, 2001). They commit 
(Ghemawat, 1991) the organisation's resources to a particular and significant action or 
inaction, and cannot be easily reversed without some cost in terms of financial 
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resources, management time or reputation. Internally, some of these commitments take 
the form of precedents (Mintzberg, Raisinghi and Thdoret, 1976) that will necessitate 
effort to unwind. They are complex (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Schwenk, 1988), and 
this complexity has methodological implications for researchers that I review in section 
3.6.3.1. 
Although there is a notable lack of uniformity in the scope of the decisions that have 
featured in studies of strategic decisions (Table 2.1), there seems to be little difficulty in 
identifying them in practice. Managers can recognize strategic decisions when they 
encounter them (Dean and Sharfman, 1996: 380), as seems to be the case also for 
researchers: one study of the airline industry reported total inter-coder agreement in 
classifying moves as strategic or tactical (Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996). 
Tahle ZI 
- 
Strate-vic decisions studied hv researchers 
Mintzberg, Raisinghi and Dean and Shar/man, 1996 Miller, 1997 
Theor6t, 1976 (examples from sample of 
52 decisions) 
Change of retirement age Shut down major part of Building a water treatment 
policy in small electronics steel business works for water utility 
firm 
Acquisition of distribution Close overseas electronics Installation of CADD 
agency by marketing board manufacturing plant system for water utility 
Institution of new form of Adopt steel-toed athletic Installation of new 
treatment in hospital shoe in footwear company computer systems for two 
mail order firms 
Purchase of seat on stock Adopt manufacturing cell Building of new warehouse 
exchange controller in electronics for mail order firm 
company 
Firing of radio announcer Create divisional structure Development of new 
in lighting company transport and distribution 
system for chemicals firm 
Merger of consulting firm Adopt state-of-the-art Installation of a new 
scanning equipment in computer system for 
publishing company chemicals firm 
Acquisition of jet aircraft Adopt advanced Building of university and 
for regional airline information system in campus 
I chemical company II 
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Table 2.1 (conid). 
Mintzberg, Raisinghi and Dean and Sharfman, 1996 Miller, 1997 
Thioret, 1976 
Purchase of new radiology Establish private-label Installation of heating and 
equipment for hospital business in clothing energy management system 
company for university 
Purchase of new switching Emphasise new market Formation of private 
equipment for telecomms segment in publishing chemicals company 
company company 
Purchase of new DP Paint company moves into Merger of two divisions of 
system for municipality Latin American market chemicals firm 
Purchase of new DP Lighting company creates 
system for firm European office 
Development of new TV Electronics company moves 
programme into photolithography 
Development of new beer Chemical company 
for brewery constructs new plant 
Development of bid in new Lighting company 
industrial market constructs Caribbean plant 
Development of Adopt new compensation 
promotional programme system in electronics 
for racetrack company 
Development of new Company-wide worker 
supper club in hotel involvement programme in 
paint company 
Development of new Develop total quality effort 
container terminal in port in chemicals company 
Development of new 
market for deodorant 
Development of urban 
renewal programme 
Development of new 
runway for airport 
Development of new 
building for college 
Development of new 
laboratory for university 
Development of new plant 
for small firm 
Development of new HQ 
building for bank 
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2.2 Strategic decision-making processes 
- 
an overview 
our understanding of the making of strategic decisions is informed by a number of 
literatures relating to strategy processes (e. g. Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury, 1994; 
Bailey and Johnson, 1995), strategic decision making (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992), 
strategic change (Rajagopolan and Spreitzer, 1997) and strategic persistence (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992; Audia, Locke and Smith, 2000). As I argued in my 
Introduction (Chapter 1), these are essentially different aspects of a single phenomenon. 
Changes to a strategy are the outcomes of strategic decisions, and are shaped by 
managerial routines and by the cognitive processes of participants (Hellgren and Melin, 
1993; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997; Lindell, Ericson and Melin, 1998). Persisting 
with a strategy, whether by calculation or by default, is equally a strategic decision 
- 
it 
embodies commitments (Ghemawat, 1991) and has long-term consequences. The 
literature on strategy processes investigates the generic organisational processes 
undergone when arriving at strategic decisions and, in some cases, integrating different 
sub-decisions into a coherent whole. 
All of these literatures draw upon a common base of concepts relating to how 
decisions are reached: rationality and bounded rationality in decision-making, 
managerial cognition, managerial learning and political bargaining. These are the 
concepts that form the main substance of this chapter. 
Strategic decisions are a collective response, on the part of an organisation's 
members, to the firm's environment and to its perceived situation within that 
environment, requiring participants in the decision-making process to make sense of 
conditions inside and outside the organisation, of changes in those conditions and of the 
results of past decisions (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997). 
In some strategy processes, participation is largely limited to dominant chief 
executives or top management teams, whereas others involve a broader degree of 
participation within the organisation, be it through formal planning systems, less 
formalised internal learning processes, political bargaining or individual initiatives 
(Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Shrivastava and Grant, 1985; Hart, 1992; Hart and 
Banbury, 1994; Bailey and Johnson, 1995). Different varieties of these processes may 
co-exist within a given organisation (Hart and Banbury, 1994; Bailey and Johnson, 
1995; Brews and Hunt, 1999). In the discussion that follows, I therefore refer generally 
to "decision-makers" who may hold any position within the organisation, rather than 
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limiting my discussion to "managers" or "executives", as is common in the field (e. g. 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
The starting point for most models of strategic decision making is the accumulation 
of information regarding the organisation and its environment through a process of 
scanning (Hambrick, 1981; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Thomas, Clark and Gioia, 
1993). Such activities may account for a substantial part of top managers' time 
(Mintzberg, 1973a; EI-Sawy, 1984). However, cognitive biases and other human 
imperfections on the part of participants serve to limit the scope of this scanning, cause 
certain observations to be downplayed while others are given undue weight, and place 
bounds upon the number and types of options that are considered (Cyert and March, 
1963; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Ocasio, 1997; 
Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002). 1 review these cognitive phenomena, together with 
their considerable implications for SDM in general and isomorphic strategic decisions 
in particular, at greater length in section 2.2.1. 
Figure ZIA model of strategic decision-making in organisations 
culture 
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The internal cultural characteristics of the firm influence decision-making in two 
ways: by affecting the cognitive structures, and hence biases, of decision-making 
participants, and by shaping the interactions between those participants - for example, 
the degree of learning or political bargaining that occurs within the decision process. 
Learning interactions determine the extent to which individual views become shared 
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within an organisation, so that decisions are based upon consensus. Political bargaining 
may be an alternative mechanism for forging a consensus between parties with 
divergent views or, alternatively, a mechanism whereby one set of views comes to 
prevail in the absence of consensus. The underlying model of decision making is shown 
in Figure 2.1. 
In the sections that follow, therefore, I review three key elements of SDM: 
managerial cognition, learning and political bargaining, and then elaborate the principal 
sources of influence on each of these factors, which in the following chapter are 
elaborated into a model of isomorphic decision-making. 
2.2.1 Rationality, bounded rationality and individual cognition 
Early theories of strategic management (e. g. Ansoff, 1965) either prescribed or assumed 
that strategic decisions, and indeed decisions in general, would lend themselves to a 
sequential process of rational analysis: goals would be set, the situation of the 
organisation be subjected to comprehensive analysis, appropriate strategies developed 
and then the performance of the organisation monitored, furnishing inputs to the next 
round of analysis (Bourgeois, 1980). Rational models of this kind still inform the 
behaviour of many decision-makers (Mintzberg, 1973b; Mintzberg and Westley, 2001) 
and planning processes based upon them remain as inputs to strategy formulation in a 
substantial number of organisations (Hart and Banbury, 1994; Bailey and Johnson, 
1995). 
However, not all strategic choices lend themselves to rational analysis, which is best 
suited (Nutt, 2001,2002) to non-developmental decisions (i. e. those that do not require 
a radical change in the arenas in which an organisation does business, or in its business 
practices), where both goals and the means for achieving them are known or easily 
discoverable. Strategic decisions, since they are complex and imply radical change in 
both the scope and the mode of operation of a business, do not always fit these criteria. 
Decision participants therefore supplement analysis with judgement and intuition 
(Thompson, 1967; Khatri and Ng, 2000; Nutt, 2002). 
After a review of 21 field and laboratory studies of strategic decision-making over the 
period 1963-1992, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) concluded that, in fact, it was now 
almost universally accepted that decision-makers act in a fashion that is boundedly 
(Cyert and March, 1963) rather than fully rational. This is reinforced by findings that 
that models of innovation diffusion based on bounded rationality in decision-making 
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lead to more realistic results than those which assume full rationality; the latter contain 
a greater bias in favour of innovation than is observed in real life (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1993). 
Bounded rationality results from constraints on decision-makers' time and attention, 
so that they are unable to absorb and fully process all relevant information, leading them 
to simplify the decision problem in a number of ways (Cyert and March, 1992). They 
satisfice against what they regard as achievable targets, rather than seeking optimal 
solutions. They use decision rules 
- 
heuristics and standard procedures 
- 
rather than 
attempting to treat each problem individually. Such heuristics may be substantially 
flawed: experimental research (Sterman, 1987,1989a, 1989b; Paich and Sterman, 1993; 
Diehl and Sterman, 1995) has shown how even highly educated decision makers, fully 
briefed and informed regarding the internal dynamics of a system, rely upon heuristics 
that embody misperceptions of feedback effects, with potentially costly results. 
Further departures from rational decision-making occur because decision makers 
operate on mental representations of the world 
- 
"schemata" or (Hellgren and Melin, 
1993) "ways of seeing" 
- 
which they "enact", using them as the basis for classifying 
phenomena, assessing their salience and formulating solutions (Weick, 1979; Kiesler 
and Sproull, 1982). These schemata may not incorporate the latest information 
regarding the environment. 
Moreover, decision-makers are liable to discount information that conflicts with a 
course of action to which they are heavily committed, choosing to notice more 
ambiguous information or information that presents them or their past decisions in a 
favourable light. Errors are also likely in the attribution of causes to effects: managers 
may overestimate the strength of a cause if strong inhibitory factors have been present, 
discount the importance of other factors if one plausible cause is present, mistakenly 
conclude that unrelated events are correlated if they appear similar or are encountered in 
the same context, and falsely believe that phenomena which have captured their 
attention have a causal relationship with events that occur at approximately the same 
time (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). 
When it comes to formulating the solutions to problems, managers have been shown 
to be prone to framing bias: managerial attitudes and the consequent decisions are 
affected by the manner in which a situation is framed as favourable or unfavourable 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Greve, 1998b; 
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Hodgkinson et al, 1999). Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman 
and Lovallo, 1993) holds that, in situations perceived as favourable, people favour less 
risky solutions than those adopted in situations portrayed as unfavourable, where they 
may take greater risks in order to retrieve the position. There is some evidence that this 
behavioural pattern translates from individual to corporate attitudes to risk (Greve, 
1998b). 
All of the above, in summary, conspire to limit the degree of rationality that informs 
decisions in organisations. Decision processes in some contexts have even been 
modelled as a garbage can in which ideas, issues and individuals combine in random 
fashion (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972), although the garbage-can model appears to 
lack explanatory power in real-life situations (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). 
The implications of the above for isomorphism in SDM are as follows. Firstly, the 
strategies observed in competitors or suggested by key stakeholders are likely, in many 
organisations, to be considered salient information, and the emulation of such strategies 
is clearly a candidate heuristic to be used in certain situations. For example, for much of 
the 1980s, the merchandising strategy of Tesco, a UK supermarket chain, explicitly 
mimicked that of the market leader of the time, Sainsbury (Bell, 2003). Imitation of 
another organisation may also be a rational strategy for economising on search costs and 
minimising potential risks associated with delay. Any contingent factors internal and 
external to the organisation, or contingent properties of the decision, which might affect 
the adoption of such heuristics or the weight given to search costs or risk, are thus likely 
to affect the incidence of isomorphic decision-making. 
Decision-makers may also assess the advantages of adopting a practice in terms of 
their personal utility, alongside or instead of the benefits to the organisation. If it saves 
them effort, or frees up time for some more attractive or important activity, they may be 
tempted to adopt a practice even if it offers no overall benefit to their firm. Any factor, 
such as corporate culture, that affects the manner in which individuals weigh their 
personal utility in relation to that of their employer may also therefore impinge on the 
frequency of isomorphic decisions. 
Secondly, any contingencies that affect the salience of the information received 
regarding the practices of competitors or other potential role models are likely to 
influence the extent to which such information is absorbed and hence the likelihood of 
the practices being adopted. Similarly, any factors that affect the degree to which the 
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practice is likely to be perceived as a cause of success or failure will influence the 
likelihood of its adoption. 
Such factors may include elements of the organisation's situation, such as good or 
0 poor past performance. These, together with the extent to which it is committed to 
I strategies that are compatible or incompatible with the practice observed elsewhere, 
may affect the likelihood of isomorphic practices being adopted. 
2.2.2 SDM and learning 
Organisational learning and strategic management are strongly complementary activities 
(Leavy, 1998; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002). On the one hand, strategies are seen as 
having a pivotal role in the process of organisational. learning, being the means whereby 
theories of action are tested against reality (Hedberg, 1981). On the other, learning is 
increasingly seen as a desirable outcome of strategy. Particularly since the advent of the 
knowledge-based theory of the firm (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996; 
Spender, 1996) organisational learning has become identified as a source of competitive 
success and core capability (Senge, 1990; Schein, 1993; Nevis, DiBella and Gould, 
1995; DiBella, Nevis and Gould, 1996) and a means whereby organisations; acquire and 
enhance their competences (Sanchez and Heene, 1997). 
Strategy processes where incremental earning activities are a principal element have 
been observed (Hart and Banbury; 1994; Rajagopolan and Spreitzer, 1997) as both an 
alternative (Quinn, 1989, Mintzberg, 1994) and a complement (de Geus, 1988; Brews 
and Hunt, 1999) to traditional rational planning. In such processes, "strategy is crafted 
based upon an ongoing dialogue with key stakeholders 
- 
employees, suppliers, 
customers, governments and regulators" (Hart, 1992: 338). Learning processes thus 
furnish a conduit whereby pressures for isomorphic decisions may be introduced into 
the strategy process. They may either stimulate isomorphism or, since the challenging 
of received assumptions is inherent to organisational learning (Senge, 1990), may play a 
part to its eventual rejection. 
The relationship between learning and isomorphism. is bidirectional with isomorphic 
decisions potentially playing a part in the strategic learning process. If the decision- 
makers believe that they can derive predictable and acceptable results from the 
emulation of practices observed elsewhere, then they may decide to adopt a number of 
isomorphic practices to avoid uncertainty in some areas, thus obtaining leeway to 
experiment with other elements of the strategy. Alternatively, they may adopt 
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isomorphic practices with a view to searching for incremental improvements in them. 
Such behaviour would accord with the principles of uncertainty avoidance and simple- 
minded search in the neighbourhood of existing alternatives, which have been identified 
(Cyert and March, 1963) as guiding managerial decisions. 
2.2.3 Politics and bargaining 
Organisations; exist as coalitions of individuals whose goals may well conflict. Such 
conflicts may remain latent but, when they surface, some means for their resolution of 
must be found (Cyert and March, 1963). Political manoeuvring and bargaining between 
individuals and groups is one such means, and politics and power have long (Pettigrew, 
1973; Narayanan and Fahey, 1982; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Schwenk, 1989, Pfeffer 
1992; Dean and Sharfman, 1993) been identified as factors that shape the manner in 
which strategic decisions occur in organisations. In fact politics are "common in 
strategic choice" (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992: 26); and prevalent in the strategy 
processes of some organisations (Bailey and Johnson, 1995), with the views of those 
stakeholders that control key resources being likely to prevail (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1974; Christensen, 1997). 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) review 14 studies and isolate two, conflicting views 
of politics in organisations. The first view holds that political behaviour is an essential 
G(system. requirement" for the creation of effective organisational. change and adaptation 
(Quinn, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981,1992). Certain types of strategic decision, in which the 
alternative means of moving forward are known but the eventual goals have yet to be 
agreed between stakeholders, lend themselves to resolution by bargaining of this kind 
(Nutt, 2002). 
The second view is that political behaviour represents a dysfunctional and time- 
wasting activity that people adopt only as a last resort (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988), using established networks of allies (Pettigrew, 1973; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988), and that it diminishes the effectiveness of strategic decisions (Dean and 
Sharfman, 1996). 
Isomorphic decisions may represent a means of furthering the goals of some 
stakeholders or of placating powerful resource holders, a topic which is discussed in 
greater depth in Chapter 3. Equally, they may represent a means of abbreviating 
dysfunctional conflict by offering a plausible solution that has been legitimated by 
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adoption elsewhere. The degree of political behaviour observed in an organisation may 
plausibly affect the extent to isomorphic decisions are contemplated and adopted. 
2.3 Five sources of variation in strategic decision content 
Within the preceding discussions of the role of rationality, cognition, leaming, politics 
and bargaining in strategic-decision making, a number of possible sources of influence 
on each factor have emerged. Each of these constitutes potential sources of variation in 
the content of strategic decisions. I review them in turn, along with the empirical 
evidence, where it exists, regarding their influence on SDM. 
The organisation's business environment furnishes stimuli, some or all of which 
may elicit strategic responses or varying degrees of rationality (Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer, 1997). Decision-makers respond to their organisation's enactment of that 
environment, which is only an imperfect representation of the real world, but is 
nonetheless influenced by it and may contain some of its salient elements, which will 
then influence strategic decisions. The munificence of the environment may regulate the 
influence of political processes on SDM 
- 
where resources are abundant, individual 
resource holders exercise less power, and political bargaining may hold less sway. 
The environment is, in fact, frequently cited as a major influence on an organisation's 
performance (Porter, 1980) and behaviour (Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). Estimates for the proportion of variation in US company profits 
explained by industry factors range from 8% (Rumelt, 1991) to 18.7% (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997). Theoretical insights into the link between environment and an 
organisation! s strategy come from the well-known structure-conduct-performance model 
from industrial economics, and from life-cycle models, which postulate links between 
the age and degree of maturity of the industry and its members' strategies (Hofer, 1975; 
Porter, 1980) prevailing mode of operations (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979; St John, 
Pouder and Cannon, 2003) and structure (Greiner, 1972; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). 
A particular subset of the firm's environment, the organisational field, (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) plays a special role in decision making. It constitutes the social 
network (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997) of peers within which decision makers are 
embedded and from which they draw information. Information deriving from these 
sources may be regarded as more salient than that from elsewhere, so that the properties 
of the field may influence the cognitive processes whereby decisions are reached. The 
density or cultural characteristics of the field may influence the flow if information into 
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the organisation, and hence the learning processes with SDM. The members of the field 
may wield political power within the organisation by virtue of their influence over its 
resources. They may confer power disproportionately upon particular individuals by 
giving them privileged access to information or influence over resources (Pfeffer, 
1982). 
In some cases, an organisation's entire strategy may be largely dictated by pressures 
from within the organisation's field (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; Bailey and Johnson, 
1995). There is a substantial literature on the effect of the organisational field on 
isomorphic decision-making, which I review in Chapter 3. 
The salience of the information relating to a particular decision will also be 
influenced by the perceived value of the practice to which the decision relates. 
Politically, association with a valuable practice may be expected confer power or 
influence upon a decision-maker. Cognitively, the plausibility of a practice as a source 
of benefits has been shown, as I have already (2.2.1) mentioned, to influence the 
importance attributed to it (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). Rationally, the more valuable a 
practice appears to be, the more attractive its adoption, whether the value resides in 
expected economic returns or in the extent to which adoption is likely to win favour 
with influential or resource-rich members of the organisation's field. Variations in the 
strength, but also in the type of value (e. g. economic or political) attributed to a practice 
may plausibly influence the outcome of a strategic decision. There is a considerable 
literature on, in particular, the manner in which expectations of legitimacy (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995) affect decision-making; I 
review this in chapter 3. 
it is quite plausible that perceptions of the value of that practice may be moderated by 
certain properties of the decision itself, such as complexity or ambiguity. The more 
complex a decision or the greater the degree of ambiguity as to cause-effect 
relationships, the more likely it appears that decision-makers will fall back on 
established heuristics where available, or on incremental decision, which permit of 
learning, where they are not. 
However, potential differences in the nature of the decision receive little attention in 
either the theory or in empirical studies of strategic decision making (Nutt, 2001). SDM 
studies tend to be at pains to emphasise the complexity of all types of strategic decision 
rather than to differentiate between them. It has been argued that different types of 
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decision call for different decision processes (Nutt, 2001,2002; Sagie and Aycan, 2003) 
and require different decision support systems (Wijnberg, Van den Ende and de Wit, 
2002). Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) have discussed how managers' attitudes to risk 
may differ for small and large decisions. But neither Mintzberg et al (1976) nor Dean 
and Sharfman (1996) controlled for the attributes of the decision in their studies, 
although, as I remarked in section 2.1, those studies embraced a wide range of different 
types of decision. An investigation of these issues therefore is a potential distinctive 
feature of the present research. 
The final source of variation in strategic decisions comes from internal factors with 
an organisation. Organisations are idiosyncratic cultures at whose heart lies their 
paradigm (Johnson, 1987) or dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Bettis and 
Prahalad, 1995), a set of shared, mental models that shape the cognitive processes of 
most of their members. The history of the organisation, the national culture that plays 
host to the firm, the recipes (Spender, 1989) prevalent within the industries in which it 
operates and the personal backgrounds of top managers and leaders will shape these 
mental models (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Drennan, 1992). 
The rituals, routines and power structures to be observed in a firm are expressions of 
the paradigm (Johnson, 1987). The degree to which decision making routines feature 
learning behaviours, politics or bargaining can thus be traced back to the paradigm and 
is therefore a cultural phenomenon. Only a small proportion of firms, for example, 
develop mental models and routines of a kind that enable them to be characterised as 
"learning organisations" (Senge, 1990; Garvin, 1993). Entrepreneurial organisations 
similarly feature unusual, informal working practices that are manifestations of the 
personalities of their founders and employees (Rieple, Gander and Haberberg 2002). 
Thus an organisation's idiosyncratic culture determines the cognitive, learning and 
political processes to be found within it, and these in turn moderate the effects on SDM 
of the environment, the organisational field and the value of the practice and the type of 
the decision. For example, the extent to which schemata have been developed for 
handling radical or rapid change will influence the likelihood that major environmental 
changes will be ignored (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). The strength of the linkages 
between the mental models to be found in different parts of a firm will govern the ease 
with which that firm adapts to environmental change and the extent to which it favours 
stability over innovation and diversity over focus (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). 
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The effects of these culturally based factors will be further attenuated by the firm's 
situation, as mentioned in section 2.2.1: decision makers' reactions to environmental 
and decision/practice-specific contingencies: decisions are affected by the manner in 
which the decision context is framed as favourable or unfavourable, and by the extent to 
which the organisation is already committed to courses of action that are similar or 
dissimilar to those implied by the decision. 
2.4 Conclusions 
-a model of decision-making 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the theory of strategic decision-making and examined 
the key underlying factors: managerial cognition 
- 
and its implications for the 
rationality or bounded rationality of decisions 
- 
learning, and politics. I have identified 
five possible causes of variation in the incidence of isomorphism in organisations' 
strategic decisions, showing how each of these might affect managerial cognition and 
the extent to which learning and politics feature in decision processes. 
These five factors are summarised in the model shown in Figure 2.2 (overleaf). In the 
following chapter (section 3.6), 1 use these same five headings as the basis for a model 
of isomorphism in strategic decision-making. 
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Figure 2.2 Influences on strategic decision-making 
Value of the 
practice 
Business Strategic 
environment decision 
Properties of 
the decision 
Properties of 
organisationa 
/ field 
35 
Adrian Haberberg 
Chapter 3 
PhD Thesis 
Isomorphism in Organisational Decisions 
-A Review of 
the Literature 
3.1 The debate regarding isomorphism 
That organisations periodically copy one another is not in doubt. The innovation 
diffusion literature charts how innovations in both products and practices spread from 
one organisation to another. Institutional theorists, from a different perspective, analyse 
the spread of structural forms and organisational practices between organisations. Some 
such practices assume the status of fads or fashions, commonly cited examples 
including quality circles (Abrahamson, 1996; Strang and Macy, 2001), total quality 
management (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997) and business process re-engineering. 
The cyclical nature of merger and acquisition activity has also been frequently remarked 
(e. g. Langford and Brown, 2004) with the implication that this activity too may be 
prone to fads. In highly competitive business environments, strategies may converge 
around a limited set of industry best practices (Nattermann, 2000). In the market place, 
the prices of computers and other consumer goods cluster around price points such as 
E99 or E999. 
In this chapter, I start with an overview of the strong empirical links found between 
the properties of the organisational field and isomorphism in organisational decisions 
and practices. I then examine the theoretical explanations that have been advanced for 
such isomorphism, commencing with those under the umbrella of neo-institutional 
theory, and showing the extent to which each is supported by empirical findings. I 
proceed with a review of the state of knowledge relating to each of the five possible 
influences on isomorphic strategic decisions that were introduced at the conclusion to 
Chapter 2.1 identify several unresolved theoretical and empirical questions that form 
the basis of the research agenda that I pursue in this thesis. I also draw attention to two 
important- underlying theoretical questions on which I intend to throw light in this 
research: how pervasive a phenomenon is isomorphism, and what are the links between 
isomorphism and institutionalisation. 
3.2 Isomorphism 
- 
the influence of field properties 
Table 3.1 (see page 70, at the end of this chapter) summarises the substantial body of 
empirical work on the spread of isomorphic, practices between organisations. I omit 
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some well-known studies (e. g Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002) 
which focus upon the spread of practices within a single organisation, since these do not 
address the research question. 
One clear conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that the spread of a 
decision or practice is influenced by properties of the field through which it is 
disseminated. Professionalisation of a field promotes the spread of practices approved 
of within the relevant profession (Baron, Dobbin and Jennings, 1986; Dobbin, Sutton, 
Meyer and Scott, 1993; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002). Researchers have 
repeatedly validated the importance of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) within an 
organisational field as a factor encouraging the dissemination of practices between 
organisations. This factor has been studied alongside theories relating to economics 
(Fligstein, 1985; Mezias, 1990; Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993), population ecology 
(Fligstein, 1985; Oliver, 1988; Haveman, 1993), CEO background (Fligstein, 1985; 
Palmer et al, 1993) and politics and power (Palmer et al, 1993). 
Almost without exception, these studies show that the incorporation of measures of 
embeddedness increases the explanatory power of models based on economic and other 
theories. Higher densities of local ties (Greve, 1998a), social ties (Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman, 1989; Westphal et al, 1997), board-level contacts and the numbers of 
shared directors between organisations (Haunschild, 1993; Davis and Greve, 1997) have 
all been found to be associated with an increased degree of isomorphism in 
organisational practices. 
However, Oliver (1988) found little support for embeddedness as a factor in 
explaining isomorphism in the strategies of voluntary organisations in Toronto. She 
concluded that any similarities were the result of strategic choice (Child, 1972). The 
importance of this result has, I believe, been underplayed in the literature; I hypothesise 
that it provides evidence for the influence of the properties of the decision type on the 
degree of isomorphism to be expected between firms, a point to which I return in 
section 3.6.5 below. Nonetheless, it cannot be held to undermine the validity of the link 
between field properties and isomorphism. 
There is, however, no firm theoretical consensus, however, on why embeddedness 
promotes isomorphism. The most influential theories relate to the properties of the 
practice, such as the extent to which its adoption might bring economic benefits or 
legitimacy, or avoid resource penalties or legal sanctions. I now review these different 
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explanations, commencing with the most influential, those advanced by institutional 
theory. 
3.3 Institutional theory and isomorphism 
3.3.1 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory (Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1996; Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002) is an increasingly influential body 
of theories relating to institutions and of the processes, known as 'institutionalisation", 
whereby they become embedded within organisations and shared between them. 
Institutions are generally regarded as sets of behaviours or activities 
- 
"organisational 
forms and practices" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148) 
- 
that are "stable, repetitive and 
enduring" (Oliver, 1992: 563). Institutional theory, however, encompasses a variety of 
strands and there is a lack of consensus as to what does and does not qualify as an 
institution (Scott, 1987; Donaldson, 1995; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
This is partly because notions of institution have changed considerably since the 
term's early coinage by sociologists (Hughes, 1936,1939; Parsons, 1951; Selznick, 
1949,1957) who have been retrospectively (Scott, 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) 
termed the 'old institutionalists. ' These early theorists viewed institutions as symbolic 
manifestations of an organisation's culture, grounded in its 'values, norms, rules, beliefs 
and taken for granted assumptions' (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). They were held to be 
adopted for their symbolic value, either through an emergent process, as described by 
Selznick in his earlier writings, or as a deliberate attempt to disseminate and perpetuate 
the organisation's mission and values, as advocated in his later works. Under this view, 
institutions were shaped by managers who, even in highly political environments, 
functioned as rational actors, building coalitions in order to circumvent barriers to 
achieving their chosen goals (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
More recently, the so-called new institutionalism has gained increasing prominence 
amongst organisation theorists (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; 
Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002) and kindred ideas have been adopted (see Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991 for a review) by economists (e. g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; North, 
1987,1991,1992) and political scientists. It embodies a view of institutions as 
consisting of "taken-for-granted scripts, rules and classifications" (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991: 15). Scripts (Barley, 1986; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Johnson, Smith 
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and Codling, 2000) are "observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction 
characteristic of a particular setting" (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 98). 
Such institutions arise as a response to limitations (see section 2.2.1) in managers' 
attention structures and the consequent need for routines and heuristics as means of 
reducing uncertainty within decision-making processes (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This, cognitive, explanation of the 
formation of institutions is the major factor distinguishing the new institutionalism from 
the old (Powell and DiMaggio, 199 1). 
3.3.2 Institutionalisation 
There is a further strand within institutional theory that has been less concerned with the 
nature of institutions than the process of institutionalisation. Institutions are defined 
- 
by inference, since no concrete definition of the noun is offered 
- 
as, in essence, any 
practice that can be institutionalised. Such a notion of institution can be observed in the 
early work of Zucker (1977,1987) and her associates (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). They 
see the process of institutionalisation as a pathway along which reality becomes socially 
constructed within an organisation and, more strongly, as a mechanism whereby 
accepted patterns of behaviour are laid down so that participants learn to conform to 
them. Such properties as recurrence, endurance and symbolic resonance are not 
necessary. 
For example, in an early experiment, Zucker (1977) looked at her subjects' ability to 
judge the distance that a beam of light had moved in a given time. The emphasis was on 
demonstrating that these judgments became more entrenched within individuals if they 
were imparted in what the participants were told was a teamworking context, and even 
more so in an organisational one. Institutionalisation occurred as new subjects used the 
judgments of those whom they believed to be more experienced to calibrate their own 
notions of how far the light beam had travelled. There was no suggestion that subjects 
were exchanging any techniques for improving their judgement, that the activity was 
embedded in any deeper structures, that it had any symbolic importance to the 
(6organisatioW' in question or that it would ever be repeated, although for some subjects 
it eventually was. 
Tolbert and Zucker have recently (1996) espoused a more conventional view of 
institutions as recurrent processes, and have identified three stages in their emergence: 
habitualization, objectification and sedimentation. The pre-institutional stage of 
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habitualization involves the generation of practices, at the level of the individual 
organization, to deal with a given problem. The semi-institutional stage of 
objectification is the stage at which a practice acquires sufficient perceived value, 
whether symbolic or economic, for it to spread between organisations through a process 
of conscious imitation. An older view of institutions, deriving from Selznick's early 
writing, sees precisely this objectification as both their distinguishing feature and raison 
d'etre. At the final stage, sedimentation, practices have spread almost universally 
"within the group of actors theorized as potential adopters" (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996: 
184), have been sustained for a substantial period and can thus be regarded as fully 
institutionalised. 
3.3.3 Institutional theories of isomorphism 
Tolbert and Zucker's exposition of "sedimentation" implies that some measure of 
isomorphism between organisations is intrinsic to institutionalisation 
- 
indeed, that a 
practice cannot be deemed institutionalised without it. However, the most commonly 
cited institutional predictions regarding isomorphism are somewhat stronger than this. 
They date from the publication of DiMaggio and Powell's seminal (1983) neo- 
institutional paper in which the authors, proceeding from an observation that the degree 
of institutional similarity between organisations was notable, postulated that such 
similarities were bound to increase, using Weber's metaphor of the "iron cage" to 
describe the inexorability of the process. 
Drawing upon earlier pioneering work by Meyer and Rowan (1977), they postulated 
that the search by organisations' members for legitimacy, within their peer group and in 
the eyes of the bodies that controlled an organisation's access to valuable resources, was 
the fundamental force driving organisations to become isomorphic with others in their 
organisational field. Three mechanisms were identified for the spread of isomorphic 
practices: response to the demands of powerful external stakeholders such as regulators 
and corporate parents (coercive isomorphism), the imitation of successful peers 
(mimetic isomorphism), whether directly or through intermediaries such as consultants, 
and the establishment of norms of managerial behaviour (normative isomorphism) 
through common professional training and professional networks. 
Although the detenninism inherent in their view has been criticised (Whittington, 
1992), and idiosyncrasies have in fact been found to persist in firms' practices, even in 
such highly structured environments as the Taiwanese PC industry, (Hung and 
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Whittington, 1997), the impact of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) neo-institutional 
manifesto has been enormous. It has, until recently, dominated both the study of 
isomorphism and the study of institutional theory: it is a rare paper relating to 
0 
isomorphism that does not refer to it, and the majority of empirical papers published 
regarding isomorphic behaviour in organisations have been conceived as tests of the 
theories set out within it. 
Institutional researchers, for their part, have largely focused their efforts on large- 
sample statistical studies of "the persistence and homogeneity of phenomena, " (Dacin, 
Goodstein and Scott, 2002; 45). There has, however, been a recent trend towards studies 
which, as advocated by Barley and Tolbert (1997), utilise a more ethnographic approach 
to study processes of institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation. This trend 
culminated in a special issue of the Academy of Management Journal in which little 
allusion was made to isomorphism (Dacin et al, 2002). This may indicate a decoupling 
of the concepts of isomorphism and institutionalisation, an issue to which I shall return 
later in this chapter and thesis. 
3.4 Causes of isomorphism 
- 
the institutional and resource 
dependency views 
In this section, I shall examine in more detail the causes for isomorphic behaviour 
advanced by institutional theorists, and appraise the extent to which they are supported 
by empirical evidence. 
Institutional theorists hold that, if an organisation is to survive and thrive, it must 
achieve legitimacy through conforming to the rules and expectations from its 
, institutional environment' 
-a broad term embracing any body that has the power to 
confer such legitimacy, but typically including governments, regulators and pressure 
groups (Oliver, 1997a). The demands of the institutional environment may conflict 
with, and take priority over, those of the 'task environment', which embraces the 
industries and markets in which firms operate and from which pressures emanate to 
optimise economic performance (Scott, 1987). 
Historical analyses show that national level macro-institutions have a major influence 
upon the manner in which organisations and individuals are able to organise 
transactions, and thus upon their economic behaviour (North, 1991,1992). Lam (2000) 
goes ftirther, positing that certain elements of the institutional macro-environment, 
namely labour markets and systems of education and training, by shaping the manner in 
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which organisation members think and act, influence firm-level institutions. In 
particular, she holds that the prevalent form of labour market and of education/training 
-systems within a given society or industry will together combine to dictate which 
organisational. form a firm is likely to adopt and hence the manner 
- 
tacit or explicit, 
individual or collective 
- 
in which it holds and manages knowledge. Finns, in their turn, 
may be the source of institutions which, as they spread across interorganisational 
networks, may exert a substantial influence on national macro-cultures (Abrahamson 
and Fornbrun, 1992). 
These generic linkages between macro- and micro-level institutions have, however, 
yet to be substantiated by empirical researchers, who have preferred to examine cases 
where specific and more easily identifiable factors within the institutional environment 
exert a clear influence, through rewards and sanctions, upon organisational behaviour. 
There is thus empirical evidence of organisations' practices' being influenced by a 
variety of elements of that environment: unions and governments (Baron et al, 1986); 
professional associations (Baron et al, 1986; Dobbin et al, 1993; Greenwood et al, 
2002); local government agencies and local bodies such as schools and churches (Baum 
and Oliver 1991,1992,1996; and elite families (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Although 
these empirical studies have tended to focus disproportionately on mimetic 
isomorphism (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999), they together support the existence of all three 
of the types of isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983): mimetic, 
coercive and normative. 
The rewards and sanctions for adoption or non-adoption of a given practice can be 
placed in three categories: legal and regulatory pressures; resource penalties and 
incentives; and legitimacy. I examine the empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
each of these on organisations' propensity to adopt isomorphic practices. It should be 
noted that the borders between the task and institutional environments are not clear-cut, 
so that some of these rewards and sanctions may be within the gift of organisations 
other than those mentioned in the previous paragraph. For example, suppliers, 
customers and even competitors may confer legitimacy (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; 
Christensen, 1997; Sherer and Lee, 2002) and influence the availability of resources, as 
well as determining the factors needed for economic success in a given industry or task 
environment. 
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I also examine the evidence for a further institutional explanation of isomorphism, 
inertia, which derives from a property of the environment rather than of the practice. 
3.4.1 Legal and State Pressures 
Studies of the dissemination of personnel practices (Baron et al, 1986; Dobbin et al, 
1993) have clearly demonstrated that the state, through its ability to promulgate and 
enforce legislation regarding a practice, and the courts, through their willingness to 
respond to suits from unions and other pressure groups, can be a powerful forces for the 
adoption of isomorphic practices within a field. 
3.4.2 Resource penalties and incentives 
Resource dependency theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Christensen, 1997; Toms 
and Filatotchev, 2004) hold that the twin needs, on the one hand to confonn to the 
requirements of stakeholders that control access to key resources and on the other hand 
to reduce such dependency, are major determinants of an organisation's strategy. Such 
resource dependency may be one of the levers whereby the state (section 3.4.1) 
promotes acceptance of its desired institutions, and the threat of withdrawal of resources 
is also one of the reasons why organisations may favour policies that they believe will 
legitimate them in the eyes of such stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). 
Resource dependency arguments are thus frequently intertwined with neo- 
institutional explanations of the emergence and persistence of phenomena (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991) since they clearly have a role in coercive isomorphism. I thus consider 
them here alongside institutional explanations, although they are conceptually distinct 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1996): true institutional theories focus on the capacity of entities 
such as states to shape rule systems and institutions, and on the symbolic value of those 
institutions, rather than on the more economically rational calculations of resource 
availability, cost and benefit. 
Resource dependency theory has itself been characterised, along with institutional 
theory, as being deterministic and anti-managerial (Donaldson, 1995), on the basis that 
both theories suggest that managers will necessarily be drawn towards "irrational" 
decisions that diminish their organisation's efficiency, and hence its economic welfare. 
However behaviour driven by resource dependency may have a clear economic 
rationale. If an organisation's goal is to maximise the return upon its invested capital, 
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then behaviour that reduces the cost of such capital, or that makes available resources 
controlled by external stakeholders that can be combined with valuable internal 
resources in order to facilitate expansion (Penrose, 1959) is no less rational than 
behaviours aimed at increasing economic efficiency (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
Resource dependency considerations may affect not only managers' willingness to 
mimic another firm's decision, but also the haste with which they do so in order to 
avoid any possible penalties from delay. The last corporate boards to adopt poison pills 
or other takeover defences find themselves disproportionately likely to suffer a hostile 
bid (Davis and Greve, 1997). The last company to find a strategic alliance partner in an 
emerging market may find that all the attractive firms are spoken for, and the option of 
entering that market has effectively gone. Such delays may also damage the firm's or 
the manager's reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and hence their legitimacy. 
Resource dependency has been shown to be a factor in the pre-institutional adoption 
of practices by firms, including the setting up of structures to ensure access to funding 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and to access new product technology (White, 2000). It has 
also been shown to influence the persistence of strategies in firms and organisational. 
fields (Christensen, 1997; Toms and Filatotchev, 2004), and the rejection of practices 
disliked by dominant sources of funding (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). 
There have been few explicit studies of how resource penalties and incentives 
influence isomorphic firm behaviour. Union threats of labour withdrawals were 
highlighted as a factor in the spread of bureaucratised personnel management practices 
in the US (Baron et al, 1986). Firms were shown to be more likely to adopt M-form 
structures if they were dependent for financial resources on firms that had done so 
(Palmer et al, 1993). Resource linkages, evidenced by federal contractor status, were 
found by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) to be significantly associated with the spread of 
equal opportunities in internal labour market practices, although Dobbin et al (1993) 
found that such effects were not significant in multi-variate models that also 
incorporated the effects of legal changes. On balance, however, there appears to be 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the presence of resource incentives or penalties for 
the adoption or non-adoption of a practice is significant in explaining isomorphism in 
firm practices. 
44 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
3.4.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574). It is given or sought in three 
main forms (Suchman, 1995): pragmatic, moral and cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy 
derives from calculated assessments of the benefits 
- 
resources or influence 
- 
to be 
accrued from a relationship with an entity, and thus overlaps with the resource 
dependency considerations reviewed in the previous sub-section. Moral legitimacy 
comes from doing, or appearing to do, the "right thing" to enhance social welfare in the 
context of the social system in which that entity is located. To achieve cognitive 
legitimacy, an entity must act in accordance with the belief systems and taken-for 
granted assumptions of that social system. 
The neo-institutional pioneers (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) believed that early adopters of a practice would do so in a calculated fashion, in 
order to enhance the efficiency or effectiveness of their organisation, and perhaps also 
its influence and command of resources, and thus its pragmatic legitimacy. This 
corresponds to Tolbert and Zucker's (1996) pre-institutionalisation phase in a practice's 
adoption. Later adopters of a practice that has been institutionalised would be 
influenced mainly by the desire to avoid the erosion of pragmatic legitimacy and 
achieve, in particular, cognitive legitimacy. They would thus reap the personal and 
organisational rewards of legitimation: improved survival prospects for the organisation 
(Singh, Tucker and House, 1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991,1992); enhanced status for its 
members; and enhanced access to resources for both (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
It should be noted that perceptions as the degree to which adoption of a particular 
practice might confer, in particular, moral and cognitive legitimacy will be subject to 
personal interpretation by the organisation's members. The extent to which a given 
member or group within an organisation will perceive what I term "isomorphic 
pressures" 
- 
constraints to imitate others within their organisational field 
- 
is thus likely 
to vary, for reasons discussed in section 2.2.1, according to the experiences and 
professional and social backgrounds of the persons concerned. It is not self-evident that 
persons in different countries or regions, or different functional areas, will perceive the 
same, or any, isomorphic pressures. Although institutional theory tacitly assumes that 
such pressures will translate unambiguously into organisational action, it is quite 
possible that, after political bargaining between interest groups, some or all of them may 
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be ignored as determinants of organisational action. I return to this point in section 
3.6.5. 
Although a large number of empirical studies have set out to test DiMaggio and 
Powell's theories regarding isomorphic behaviour, none has clearly established that 
legitimation is in fact a driver of it. In fact, of the statistical studies in Table 3.1, only 
those by Deephouse (1996) and Westphal et al (1997) have operationalised a direct 
measure of legitimation 
-I review their findings below. 
Most scholars have chosen as their independent variable the extent of an 
organisation's embeddedness in a field of adopters of similar practices; I have 
summarised the empirical findings of these studies in section 3.2 above. Typically, 
having found an association between embeddedness and isomorphism, researchers have 
concluded that neo-institutional theory's predictions with respect to mimetic 
isomorphism are supported. However, embeddedness within a field does not necessarily 
imply that a desire for legitimation from its members is the main, or indeed an active, 
motive for an organisation's action 
- 
the main alternative explanation is discussed in 
section 3.5.2. 
Westphal et al (1997) did find a trade-off for late adopters of TQM between 
efficiency and legitimacy, as predicted by neo-institutional theory. However, their 
measure of legitimacy for US hospitals was also the measure used by the authorities to 
allocate Medicare funding, and hospitals that sought a high score on it may well have 
done so as much to avoid resource penalties as to seek legitimacy. This highlights the 
problems for empirical researchers in separating legitimation from resource dependency 
effects. Baum and Oliver (1991) did examine how resource dependency differed in its 
effects from legitimacy, and concluded that the difference was insubstantial, but their 
research related to the effects of legitimation on survival, not on isomorphism. Davis 
and Greve (1997) ascribed the variation between the adoption rates of different forms of 
takeover defence to the fact that poison pills, in order to be adopted, required only 
cognitive legitimacy, whereas golden parachutes had to await moral legitimacy in the 
eyes of the media and general public. However, this was a post hoc rationalisation of the 
findings 
- 
legitimation variables were not actually tested during the study. 
There are some empirical findings that clearly link legitimation and isomorphism. 
Deephouse (1996) has demonstrated that legitimation may result from isomorphism, but 
did not examine the reverse causality. Ethnographic and historical studies have 
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demonstrated that strategic and personnel practices may be adopted more widely once 
they have been legitimised by professional bodies or prestigious competitors (Baron et 
al, 1986; Greenwood et al, 2002; Sherer and Lee, 2002). The size and profitability of a 
a 
firm, and thus by inference its prestige, are positively associated with the likelihood that 
its strategies will be copied (Haveman, 1993; Greve, 2000). 
However, there are also contrary findings. The absence of legitimation did not inhibit 
a large number of US liberal arts colleges from offering professional courses spurned by 
their more prestigious peers (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Kraatz and Moore, 2002). The 
imitators of large firms may be other large firms (Haveman, 1993), and such imitation 
may be as much motivated by a desire to replicate their economic success as by a wish 
for cognitive legitimacy. 
The "hard-line" neo-institutional idea that legitimation effects will dominate others is 
thus seen less often in recent writings (e. g. Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). It is not 
inherent to institutional theories (Whittington, 1992) and entails a highly prescriptive 
view of individuals, of the kind criticised by Granovetter (1985), as creatures whose 
actions are constrained by their social environment and who are unable to exert free 
will. There are contexts in which this idea is inherently paradoxical: in creative 
industries, legitimation comes from asserting one's differences from one's peers 
(Rieple, Gander and Haberberg, 2002), whilst in other cases, legitimation may come 
from success within the task environment, which invariably implies a degree of 
difference in either market positions or working practices (Deephouse, 1999). 
3.4.4 Inertia 
Organisations display inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985; Hardy 1996), which leads to the persistence of strategies (Lant el al, 1992), 
institutions and structures (Oliver, 1992; Orton, 1996). Solutions developed for 
individual problems become enshrined as heuristics for the addressing of similar 
problems (Cyeq and March, 1963) leading to the development of sticky routines 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and persistent causal maps (Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 1992; 
Orton, 1996). The resulting taken-for-granted assumptions may become shared at the 
level of the industry (Spender, 1989), strategic group (Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller, 
1989) or national culture 3 (Hofstede, 1980,1991; Hampden-Tumer and Trompenaars, 
3 Scott (1987) refers to these national cultural communities as "societal spheres". 
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1993; Albert, 1993), and also within networks of buyers, suppliers and other external 
constituencies (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). 
This results in behavioural convergence between organisations over time, particularly 
as deviant organisations are culled from the population (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) 
through a process of competitive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Vested 
interests in the status quo on the part of customers and other key resource holders may 
further inhibit organisations from pursuing policies or strategies that deviate from 
accepted norms (Christensen, 1997; Toms and Filatotchev, 2004). 
Eisenhardt (1988) demonstrated that inertia played a significant role in perpetuating 
unfashionable compensation practices in US clothing retailers. This was in a situation in 
which there were unusually few pressures from the task environment to modify those 
practices, and may not be generalisable to less stable business environments. 
This inertia-based explanation of isomorphism, is compatible with theories that 
conceive of institutions as taken-for-granted assumptions (Zucker, 1977,1987). 
However, while it may account for the perpetuation of practices that have already 
converged between organisations, it offers only an incomplete account of how they 
came to converge in the first place. It makes no assumptions as to the symbolic or other 
value of practices that are copied - rather, it implies that a whole range of practices may 
with the passage of time, become entrenched and isomorphic within a population of like 
organisations. In particular, it implies that isomorphism is a correlate of an 
environmental property, industry maturity. 
Unlike the perspectives examined in the previous sub-sections, it does not explain 
why new practices, adopted by one or more pioneer organisations in response to 
changes in their task environment, come to be adopted by its peers. However, it does 
imply that the act of mimesis will over time become a taken-for-granted institution in its 
own right, for which proposition there is some limited empirical support (Westphal, 
Seidel and Stewart, 2001). 
3.5 Non-institutional explanations for isomorphism 
I conclude that, of the four explanations for isomorphism examined in the previous 
section, there is clear evidence for the influence of legal and state pressures and of 
resource penalties and incentives. The evidence of the effects of legitimation is more 
ambiguous, with recent studies seeming to show it as more of an enabler of isomorphic 
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behaviour than as a prime driving force. There is isolated evidence for the effect of 
inertia on isomorphism, but the extent of that effect requires further research. I now 
review explanations for isomorphic decisions advanced from outside the realm of 
institutional and resource dependency theories: simultaneous reaction to a common task 
environment; and the desire to replicate the economic benefits achieved by others. 
3.5.1 Common reaction to the task environment 
- 
accidental 
imitation 
Institutional theory (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) allows that at the earliest stage of 
institutionalisation, a practice may be simultaneously adopted by several sets of 
managers unknowingly responding, in identical fashion, to similar perceptions of the 
task environment. This pre-institutional phenomenon, which I term accidental imitation, 
differs from normative or mimetic isomorphism, which are deliberate processes that 
become possible at the habitualisation stage, when the practices of one organisation 
have become known to others or when behavioural norms have become established 
within a field. However, even at the habitualisation stage, when a practice has become 
visible, it is possible that adopters are motivated by their own assessments of the 
economic benefits as well as by a desire to conform to emerging norms. 
Empirical research has supported the notion that there is an association between task 
environment and isomorphism which co-exists with that of the institutional 
environment. Sometimes the two environments exert conflicting pressures: Haveman 
found (1993: 624) that "The pull of imitation, on which institutional theory depends, is 
balanced by the brake of crowded markets. " In other instances, they have been found to 
be complementary: economic factors co-existed with institutional ones in determining 
adoption of formal personnel practices (Baron et al, 1988) and M-form organisation 
structures, even for late-stage adopters, for whom institutional pressures might be 
expected to predominate (Palmer et al, 1993). 
The potential for confusing accidental with normative or mimetic isomorphism or, as 
it is sometimes expressed, the challenge of discriminating between the effects of the 
task and institutional environment, is well understood by theorists (Scott, 1987). 
However, there have as yet been no direct tests as to which out of the task environment 
and the institutional environment is more significant in determining organisational 
action, although Oliver (1997a), in a pioneering study, has investigated their relative 
impact on success. She found that, while firms' relationships with both task 
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environment (bodies controlling the supply of land, labour and other critical factors of 
production) and institutional environment (state, regulatory and professional bodies) 
were significant in determining organisational performance, the task environment had 
the greater influence, except where regulatory or institutional pressures were 
particularly intense. 
3.5.2 Replication of economic benefits 
Rather than developing independent assessments of the value of a practice, managers 
may consciously imitate the action of a competitor or some other organisation within its 
field, in the sincere, albeit boundedly rational, belief that it will reap similar economic 
benefits to those claimed by the first mover. Managers may use information relating to 
other organisations' use of a practice to estimate the value of that practice and determine 
whether to adopt it themselves. Such information has been found to take several forms 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997): that large numbers of other organisations have adopted a 
practice, leading to frequency-based imitation; that organisations with certain attributes 
- 
large, successful, respected, prestigious or similar to the emulator 
- 
have done so, 
leading to trait-based imitation; or that certain organisations have reaped performance 
benefits from such adoption, resulting in outcome-based imitation. 
Such deliberate mimetic behaviours, cannot be deemed rational under all 
circumstances, but are likely to be moderated by the structure of the industry. Following 
Greve (1998a), Baretto (2000) argues that mimetic adoption is easily explained when 
the value of a practice increases with the number of adopters, as with technical 
standards under increasing returns (Arthur, 1996). Where, on the other hand, the value 
of a practice decreases with the number of adopters, and this decrease is known to the 
decision-makers, then mimetic adoption appears less rational. Greve holds that entry 
into new market positions falls into this latter category, although Kay (1993) uses the 
example of ice-cream sellers on the beach to demonstrate that precise imitation of an 
incumbent market position may be the most rational stance for a new entrant, since it 
will thus maximise its potential share of the available rents even as it reduces the 
quantity of rents available. It may also be that the incomer has, or believes it has, 
superior production efficiencies that enable it to operate profitably in emulation of an 
existing market position. 
Isomorphism derived from the desire to replicate economic benefits is likely to be 
particularly prevalent where the true worth of a practice or its adoption is unclear 
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(Greve, 1998a; Baretto, 2000), so that the value of information regarding its adoption 
elsewhere is enhanced. Simulations have shown that when the benefits of adoption are 
real but difficult to realise and of minor importance, the result of mimetic behaviour 
may be a management fad (Strang and Macy, 2001). As further sets of managers decide 
to imitate the initial emulators, an informational cascade (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch, 1992; Davis and Greve, 1997) may lead to widespread adoption of a practice in 
the belief that it will bring benefits, followed by its equally widespread abandonment 
should those benefits turn out to be ephemeral or illusory (Bikhchandani et al, 1992; 
Rao, Greve and Davis, 2001; Strang and Macy, 2001). 
It has proved difficult to discriminate empirically between isomorphic behaviour 
based on replication of economic benefits and those based on legitimation. Both 
theories assume that imitation of a practice will depend on contact between 
organisations, and the prediction that large and highly visible organisations will be the 
most imitated is common to both economic benefit-based (Greve, 1998,2000) and 
legitimation-based (Bums and Wholey, 1993; Haveman, 1993; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; 
Westphal et al, 1997) theories. Indeed, Table 3.2 shows a number of instances where the 
two influences appear to co-exist within the same organisational field and exert 
complementary pressures upon decision-makers within it. 
However, Haunschild has found evidence that, in some instances at least, it is the 
desire to replicate benefits that appears to be the stronger influence. She (Haunschild, 
1993; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998) demonstrated that information about the benefits 
of different types of acquisition does pass between organisations as the result of 
interlocking directorates, and that such private information is significant in explaining 
isomorphism in the types of acquisition made, whereas she found (1993) no support for 
i nstitutional explanations. It remains to be demonstrated whether this conclusion can be 
generalised to other forms of practice and inter-organisational contact. 
3.6 Unresolved questions regarding isomorphism in strategic 
decisions 
Returning to the framework for the examination of isomorphism in strategic decision 
making that I laid out at the end of Chapter 2, it can be seen, in the light of the 
preceding discussion, that strong empirical associations have been established between 
the incidence of isomorphism in adoption of a practice and both the value of the practice 
a nd the properties of the field in which it is disseminated. However, little is known 
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about the precise effects on isomorphic decisions of the business environment, the 
organisation's situation and internal properties and the properties of the decision. In 
some cases, relevant hypotheses and conjectures have been advanced by existing 
theorists. I summarise the state of knowledge under each of these five headings, 
preserving the order in which they were addressed in Chapter 2. 
3.6.1 The effect of the business environment 
As I established in section 2.3, the nature of an organisation's environment has long 
been recognised as an important influence upon its actions. However, its impact upon 
managers' propensities to take isomorphic decisions has not been investigated. Of the 
few studies that spanned more than one industry (Fligstein, 1985; Dobbin et al, 1993; 
Haunschild, 1993; Palmer at al, 1993) none investigated the impact of differential 
industry characteristics on patterns of isomorphism. 
Since the debate as to whether isomorphic decisions are the result of strategic choice 
(Oliver, 1988; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) or of some more deterministic factors 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is still a live one, it would be of interest to establish 
whether there are any associations between isomorphic behaviour and the environment 
that might be deterministic. The nature and root causes of such associations, should they 
be shown to exist, could then be the subject of fin-ther research. 
Business environments can be analysed along three dimensions (Dess and Beard, 
1984): munificence, complexity and dynamism. In munificent environments, where 
firms are not under great pressure to conform and have resources to devote to 
developing their own solutions, resource dependency theory clearly implies that 
isomorphic decisions would be less frequent. 
However, the implications of changes along the other two dimensions are less clear. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) believed that isomorphism would be more common in 
situations of environmental uncertainty. This conjecture can be traced back to the notion 
(see section 3.3.1) that institutions are mechanisms for reducing uncertainty in decision- 
taking. 
However, managers in uncertain environments may continue to take risks if they have 
developed (or believe they have developed) routines designed to manage the effects of 
environmental uncertainty (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Courtney, Kirkland and 
Viguerie, 1997). Moreover, DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) proposition that 
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isomorphism is a function of structuration 
- 
specifically, they hypothesise that 
isomorphism will be more prevalent in highly concentrated industries than in 
fragmented ones 
- 
implies that in some cases isomorphism might be associated with a 
a reduction 
in complexity. 
I Little empirical testing of these relationships has been undertaken, and all would 
warrant ftuther investigation. 
Although the age of an industry is widely believed to have implications for the 
behaviour of firms in it (e. g. Greiner, 1972; Hofer, 1975; Porter, 1980) and for their 
mortality rates (e. g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977), there has been little research into its 
implications for isomorphic behaviour, with few studies either comparing industries of 
different ages or degree of maturity, or examining longitudinal patterns other than 
differences between early and late adopters. For example, although Haveman (1993) 
controlled for organisational age, finding no significant relationships, she did not look at 
how isomorphic behaviour changed over the ten years covered by her study of market 
entry. 
However, Kraatz and Moore (2002) incorporated time as a control variable in their 
twenty year study of the adoption of professional programmes by American liberal arts 
colleges, finding no significant relationships, Haunschild (1993) did take a more 
explicitly longitudinal perspective, finding little support in her data for the evolution of 
patterns of isomorphism based on the evolving of taken-for-granted assumptions. This 
latter line of research is worthy of being pursued further, since as well as throwing 
further light on the effects of industry age on organisational behaviour, it can help 
determine the validity of explanations for isomorphism based on inertia. 
3.6.2 The effects of the properties of the field 
It is clear, as shown in section 3.2, that the properties of the organisational field such as 
the degree of professionalisation a d the density of linkages within it have a profound 
effect on the extent to which practices are disseminated between organisations. For the 
purposes of the current research, these influences are therefore taken as established 
facts, although there is scope for further research on whether certain types of linkage, 
such as interlocking directorates, have a greater effect than others. 
It should be noted, however, that almost all this evidence is indirect; with few 
exceptions (Levitt and Nass, 1989; Kraatz and Moore, 2002), studies of isomorphism to 
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date, both within the neo-institutional paradigm and outside it, have not observed or 
produced direct evidence of conscious emulation of one firm by another. Rather, they 
have inferred that closeness of contact between organisations implied both knowledge 
of each others' practices and pressure to emulate them. 
Yet, particularly when, as is the case in many studies, the organisational field being 
investigated is a single industry, managers within it will be subject to similar pressures 
from the task environment, to a greater degree than those outside the field. It remains 
possible, therefore, that in some cases phenomena that have been interpreted as 
emulation of practices observed in peer firms may in fact have been accidental 
isomorphism in reaction to this common task environment. 
Decision-makers in different firms may, of course, have different backgrounds, 
experiences and hence cognitive processes, which may lead them to enact their common 
environment (Weick, 1979) in different ways, and hence take different actions. The 
resource-based (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986,1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Peteraf, 1993) and knowledge-based (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996) views of the firm rest 
upon the premise that such inter-firm differences will predominate. But it does not 
follow that any similarities between firms' strategies are, therefore, necessarily 
attributable to the institutional environment, or to conscious reaction to some 
information received regarding the economic value of the practice. Theorists working in 
this area (e. g. Scott, 1987) recognise that extent to which isomorphism is deliberate 
rather than accidental could usefully be tested further. 
The influence of two specific field properties also warrants further investigation. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that isomorphism between firms in a field was a 
function of the degree of structuration of that field. They also hypothesised that 
isomorphism will be more common in fields where organisations transact with agencies 
of the state. Remarkably, given the body of research that has grown up around their 
theories, little testing has been undertaken of these or of a number of other hypotheses 
put forward in the same paper, perhaps because of the difficulty in operationalising the 
relevant constructs in field studies, although the observed effect of professionalisation is 
consistent with their hypothesis regarding the influence of structuration. 
3.6.3 The perceived value of the precise practice 
It has already been shown, in sections 3.4 and 3.5 that a considerable amount of 
empirical evidence exists that managers' assessment of the value of a practice, along 
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various dimensions, influences their decision whether or not to copy it. In this section, 
therefore, I address a methodological reservation regarding this body of studies, arising 
from possible definitional problems as to what constitutes isomorphism, which in turn 
emanate from certain ambiguities inherent to strategic decisions. I also highlight an 
unresolved question as to the relative importance to managers' isomorphic decisions of 
legitimation vis-A-vis the desire to reap economic benefits perceived elsewhere. 
3.63.1 Fractality, temporal ambiguity, causal ambiguity and isomorphism 
A strategic decision is typically fractal: it entails a stream of more minor decisions 
(Mintzberg et al, 1976) which may be "sporadic" 
- 
spread out over time (Hardy, 1985; 
Hickson et al, 1986; Pettigrew, 1990) 
- 
and may themselves comprise a range of sub- 
decisions. These may be the result of continuous processes 
, 
of judgment that 
intermittently manifest themselves as choices (Kleirununtz and Thomas, 1987). 
I take as an example, the market entry decisions of Californian thrifts' following the 
loosening, in 1980, of regulations inhibiting their competition with banks (Haveman, 
1993). A number of high-profile institutions led the way as thrifts diversified rapidly 
away from their core business, lending secured on residential property, into activities 
such as commercial lending, consumer finance and real estate development. Such 
diversification decisions comprised not merely decisions about which markets to enter, 
but ancillary decisions as to pricing, positioning and other elements of the marketing 
mix, location of offices and other facilities and quantities of personnel, funds and other 
resources to be committed. If there were changes to other ficets of the thrift's strategy, 
for example a move to a greater market orientation, in tandem with the diversification, 
then these would have been likely to entail changes to its institutions 
- 
roles and 
structures (Whittington, McNulty and Whipp, 1994). 
Observing such a move to a greater market orientation (hereinafter "the 
reorientation") retrospectively, however, it would not necessarily be clear whether the 
diversification decision, or the concomitant sub-decisions, preceded or followed it. It 
may be that the reorientation decision had been taken deliberately by the thrift's 
managers as part of a wide-ranging repositioning of the firm in its newly deregulated 
market place. 
However, it is equally plausible that this reorientation might have occurred 
piecemeal, with the first sub-decision being taken without heed to its broader strategic 
consequences. A new branch might have been opened several years earlier in a hitherto 
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unexploited locality, and-staffed by a keen young manager with new ideas for marketing 
the firm's products. His success might then have attracted the attention of head office 
managers, some of whom began to press for the more widespread adoption of his 
methods and listened sympathetically to his plea for different styles of loan, better 
tailored for the needs of his customer base. As the implications of each sub-decision 
unfolded over time, associated sub-decisions would have become increasingly 
attractive: as the new products attracted a more affluent clientele than the firm's 
previous core products, the thrift might have restyled certain branches to suit their 
tastes. When deregulation came, under this imagined scenario, it was not the trigger for 
a reorientation of the organisation's strategy, as it might have appeared to an outsider, 
but rather the removal of an obstacle to the implementation of a reorientation that had 
been set in train some time before. 
The reorientation is thus discernable, not as a clear-cut decision taken in its own right 
at a specific point in time, but as a pattern that emerges from a stream of other decisions 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1982,1985). An outside observer would have difficulty, unless 
they had watched the process unfold, in determining retrospectively the order of events 
in the thrift's reorientation and diversification, and which of them was the cause, and 
which the consequence. 
Strategic decisions thus display temporal ambiguity and causal ambiguity: neither the 
order of events, nor the direction of cause and effect, is easily discemable. Temporal 
ambiguities can in some cases be resolved by real-time observation or from the 
examination of documentary evidence, but causal ambiguities are less tractable. It is 
still, after much painstaking research, unclear whether the launch of Honda's small 
motorcycles in the US, retrospectively regarded as the trigger for its global success in 
the motorcycle industry, was a deliberate or an emergent strategy (Boston Consulting 
Group, 1975; Pascale, 1990; Mair, 1999). 
Moreover, the strategic repercussions, or indeed the strategic nature, of a decision 
may become apparent only long after the event. Burgelman's celebrated (1994,1996) 
study of Intel's exit from the production of memory, its original core business, and its 
recasting as a microprocessor firm, shows how radical change in strategy can come 
about with no greater top managerial intervention than the design of general decision 
rules of no original strategic import. 
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Even the fact that an organisation's top managers have endorsed a strategic decision 
does not necessarily imply that they were involved in it. Burgelman (1996) recounts 
how Intel's strategic change was legitimised by its top managers only after protracted 
debate. The same author's (1983,1988) studies of internal corporate venturing show 
new ventures originating as initiatives by operational managers, then being adopted by 
middle managers and, if successful, retrospectively rationalized by corporate managers 
as part of the organisation's strategy concept. 
Such are the difficulties in ascertaining the authorship, content and timing of 
decisions that some scholars prefer in their researches to identify actions, which are 
easier to observe and less ambiguous (Mintzberg and Waters, 1990; Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer, 1997). 
The foregoing has two significant implications for the investigation of isomorphism 
in strategic decisions. Firstly, the fractal nature of such decisions implies that there may 
be differences in the degree to which isomorphism is observable between them. 
Decisions which appear similar at a highly aggregated level of analysis 
- 
for example, 
decisions to diversify or to invest in new technology 
- 
may differ when one comes to 
examine details, such as the precise nature of the markets entered, the positioning 
adopted in those markets and the allocation of resources to different technologies. Such 
differences may prove to be substantive. 
It is not obvious that the major decision is a more appropriate object of study than the 
concomitant minor ones, and it is equally unclear what degree of similarity among the 
minor elements is required in order for the strategic decision to count as isomorphic. 
Thus, in order to gain a complete picture of isomorphism in strategic decisions, 
researchers hould examine both major decisions of a clearly strategic nature and the 
constituent minor decisions. They need also to be cognisant of the possible need to 
measure the degree of isomorphism between strategic decisions, rather than simply to 
observe isomorphism's absence or presence. 
Secondly, the existence of temporal ambiguity implies that care must be taken in 
observing and comparing strategic decisions. It is possible that an organisation may 
have committed itself, de facto, to a course of strategic action, and have implemented 
some of the crucial sub-decisions, before announcing the strategy or before the nature of 
the strategic gestalt becomes apparent to an observer. If this eventuality is not taken into 
account, it is possible that the degree of isomorphism between two strategies may be 
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underestimated, if one is observed when it is still different from, but in the process of 
converging upon, the other, or overestimated, if the two strategies are observed at a 
point of similarity when they are in the process of diverging. 
Researchers to date do not always appear to have appreciated, or responded to, these 
methodological challenges. There is no theoretical consensus, and no uniformity 
amongst empirical researchers, as to how alike organisational forms and practices need 
to be in order to qualify as isomorphic. On the one hand, Westphal et al (1997) chose to 
study the spread of TQM, rather than quality management systems in general. On the 
other hand, many identified instances of isomorphism have been at a highly aggregated 
level of analysis. Fligstein (1985) observed isomorphism in adoption of the M-form 
structure, but did not look at different implementations of that structure, although 
differences in the type of divisional structure adopted, for example whether the 
divisions relate to products, geographic markets or vertical markets, are of major 
strategic significance. Palmer et al (1993) simplified four categories of organisational 
form down to two in their own study of M-form adoption. 
Haunschild (1993), in her study of acquisitions, did discriminate between vertical, 
horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions, and found in all three cases that there was 
clear evidence of isomorphism, and that the style of acquisition adopted by the imitators 
was identical to, and limited to, that adopted by the focal firm. But she did not 
discriminate further as to the strategic purpose of the acquisition, although there are 
many different purposes served by acquisitions (Hapeslagh and Jemison, 1986; Bower, 
2001) and these differences are now known to lead to differences in the degree of 
legitimation accorded to acquirers by stock markets (Bieshaar, Knight and van 
Wassenaer, 2001). 
There thus appears to be a need for finer-grained studies of isomorphism and of 
whether it can be observed simultaneously across a set of related practices, such as 
those involved in market positioning. 
3.63.2 The status oflegitimation as a drivingforcefor isomorphism 
With this methodological caveat, it can be concluded that researchers have validated the 
influence of two aspects of a practice's value on isomorphism in organisations' 
decisions: legal and state pressures and resource penalties and incentives. The evidence 
for the influence of legitimation, as against the desire for economic benefits, however, is 
less clear. Although legitimation is widely adduced as a major driving force for 
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isomorphic decisions, Table 3.2 shows no case in which it has been identified a cause of 
such decisions independently of legal, resource or economic considerations. In the case 
of US clothing retailers (Eisenhardt, 1988), it was inertia that influenced the 
a 
continuation of isomorphism. A desire for continued legitimation may have contributed 
to this, but this was never investigated during Eisenhardt's research, and but since the 
practices in question did not conflict with the economic needs of the firms investigated, 
this could be cited as an example of legitimation leading to the adoption of practices 
with poor economic rationale, as suggested by neo-institutional theorists. Even in the 
case of US civil service reforms (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), where profits were not an 
issue, the threat of resource removal through electoral defeat must have been a factor, 
alongside legitimacy, in the spread of practices between administrations. 
On the other hand, it has been shown (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) that economic 
considerations can lead to isomorphism, not merely in the absence of legitimation 
pressures, but despite their strong presence, and newer ethnographic evidence 
(Greenwood et al, 2002; Sherer and Lee, 2002) promotes a view of legitimation as an 
enabler in the spread of a practice for which there are persuasive economic 
justifications, rather than a driving force in its own right. There is no ethnographic 
evidence of practices being emulated on a wide scale primarily to gain legitimacy. 
The proponents of models of imitation that are based around managers' desire to 
emulate economic benefits seen elsewhere, principally Eric Abrahamson, Heinrich 
Greve and their respective collaborators (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993,1997; 
Abrahamson, 1996; Davis and Greve, 1997; Greve, 1998a, 2000; Rao et al, 2001), have 
forborne to criticise the neo-institutionalists, preferring to incorporate neo-institutional 
explanations alongside their own. But it is fair to ask, therefore: what, precisely, was 
being communicated within the organisational fields investigated in the studies listed in 
Table 3.1? Was it simply information as to the value of a practice, was it the "myth and 
ceremony" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) associated with that practice, or was it some 
combination of the two? 
This question warrants further investigation, since it has both theoretical and practical 
ramifications. I have already mentioned (3-4-3) that the primacy accorded to 
legitimation effects in the early neo-institutional publications is seen by some theorists 
(Whittington, 1992; Donaldson, 1995) as unduly deterministic and anti-managerial. A 
clarification of its actual importance relative to other motivating forces would advance 
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understanding of the degree of determinism inherent in managerial decision making. 
Practically, it would also assist those seeking to encourage the dissemination of a 
practice to know whether to emphasise legitimacy or economic benefits in their 
approaches to potential adopters. 
3.6.4 The effects of the properties of the decision 
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the effects of differences in the nature of the decision 
have received little attention from scholars of strategic decision making (SDM), and this 
same gap is apparent in the theoretical and empirical research relating to isomorphism. 
Studies of isomorphism invariably focus on a single type of decision, and there have 
been no meta-studies comparing different types. 
Evidence regarding the effects of different decision types is contradictory. One the 
one hand, there is a remarkable uniformity in the findings regarding isomorphism, 
across a wide range of decisions. On the other hand, there is a single outlier study that 
examined decisions with significantly different attributes to those scrutinised by other 
researchers. Paradoxically, both of these sets of research, which I now review in turn, 
pose questions for the prevailing, institutional view of isomorphism. 
3.64.1 What types ofdecision are subject to isomorphism 
A glance at Table 3.1 shows that the range of "innovations" and "institutions" for which 
isomorphism has been investigated is indeed broad. The types of decision copied range 
from top-level decisions relating to organisational form, corporate-level strategy, 
corporate governance and corporate finance, through market-entry and other business 
strategy decisions and practices, to low-level operational practices. They encompass 
practices at every stage of Tolbert and Zucker's (1996) model of institutionalisation: 
isolated pre-institutional practices, objectified "transitions" and sedimented, "routine- 
based" institutions. 
The earliest empirical tests of the predictions of neo-institutional theory, in particular 
focussed upon the spread of fully sedimented, "routine-based" institutions. Such 
research has examined the degree of isomorphism. between organisations' personnel 
practices (Baron et al, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1988; Dobbin et al, 1993), forms of 
organisation (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer et al, 1993; Bums and Wholey, 1993) and quality 
systems (Westphal et al, 1997). 
There have been a number of empirical studies of isomorphism. in phenomena that 
appear only to have reached the previous, objectification stage of institutionalisation, 
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the point at which otherwise merely instrumental structures become imbued with value 
and intrinsic worth. Diversifications by hitherto sleepy savings institutions (Haveman, 
1993), the adoption of acquisition as a mode of business development (Haunschild, 
1993) or the espousal of anti-takeover defences (Davis and Greve, 1997) all send strong 
symbolic messages to organisations' stakeholders regarding the organisation's culture 
and changes thereto. Such phenomena 
- 
product launches, market entries, acquisitions 
and new facilities 
- 
have been termed transitions (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Routine-based institutions pass through the objectification stage prior to 
sedimentation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) and thus acquire symbolic value. For 
example, it has been argued that both matrix structures (Bums and Wholey, 1993) and 
TQM (Westphal et al, 1997) are adopted as much on symbolic as efficiency grounds. 
The phenomena I have listed in the previous paragraph, however, do not imply 
behavioural change in an organisation and field in question and have therefore not 
passed on to the sedimentation stage. Some transitions are in fact one-off decisions that 
may have few ramifications for the organisation itself, and be largely enacted for the 
benefit of an audience outside the organisation, as is the case with poison-pill defences 
and new market entry. 
While transitions may lead to deep-seated change to scripts as the organisation adapts 
to their aftermath 
- 
for example, as a newly-acquired subsidiary is integrated with the 
parent 
- 
they do not necessarily involve them at the point of adoption. An d even after 
adoption, it is equally possible that the post-transition situation can be handled within 
pre-transition structures with only marginal changes to scripts: new markets handled 
alongside old, acquired firms integrated smoothly into the parent. Neither do these 
transitions themselves represent activities that are "stable or repetitive" 
- 
while some 
firms will make indeed make them a consistent element of their strategy, and develop 
institutions for activities such as acquisition search and post-merger integration, others, 
possibly to their detriment, view such transitions as one-off events'and fail to develop 
any enduring routine-based institutions to deal with them (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Frick and Torres, 2002). 
A number of empirical studies of isomorphism have embraced isolated decisions that 
appear to be at the very earliest stages of institutionalisation. These include: choices of 
recipient of charitable contribution or investment banker (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 
1989; Haunschild and Miner, 1997); adoption of anti-takeover defences (Davis and 
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Greve, 1997); and precise market or product choices (Haveman, 1993; Haunschild, 
1993; Greve, 1998a, 2000; Rao, Greve and Davis, 2001). The Haveman and the 
Haunschild (1993) studies spanned this stage of institutionalisation and the later one 
discussed above. They examined both the spread of generic practices 
- 
respectively, 
diversification and acquisition 
- 
and the degree of isomorphism in the precise outcomes 
from such practices: the extent to which organisations respectively entered the same 
markets, and made the same kinds of acquisition. 
The precise choices of product, market or adviser rarely have the symbolic resonance 
that, as I argued in the previous section, attaches to higher profile choices, such as the 
decision to diversify or to become acquisitive. Equally, decisions of this nature are 
devoid of the repetitive element of routine-based institutions 
- 
very rarely will one enter 
the same market or acquire the same firm twice. 
Two unresolved questions emerge from these observations. The first relates to the 
nature of the link between institutionalisation and isomorphism: whether isomorphism 
can be regarded as an institutional phenomenon when it occurs for practices at such 
different stages of institutionalisation. The second relates to the existence of limits to 
the phenomenon of isomorphism: specifically, whether there exist classes of practice for 
which the natural impulse of the boundedly rational manager is to seek difference rather 
than sameness, and which are therefore less susceptible than other to imitation. 
3.64.2 The possible effects of visibility, complexity and ambiguity 
If a practice is complex to devise, implement or understand, or if it is difficult to tell a 
priori whether it offers any true benefits, or which variant of a practice is likely to work 
best in given circumstances, then, under bounded rationality, the temptation to mimic an 
organisation perceived as similar, or as a good role model, may be the greater. 
Similarly, the incentive to use an established solution as a basis for learning about a 
practice, rather than develop something de novo, will be greater. Absent such 
complexity or ambiguity, the firm may be more disposed to develop or retain a solution 
of its own. 
A strong indication that the properties of the decision may indeed influence 
isomorphism in decision-making comes from Oliver's (1988) study of isomorphism in 
the strategies of voluntary organisations in Toronto, In her conclusion to this study, 
which I highlighted in section 3.2 as the one outlier in a raft of research confirming the 
connection between isomorphism and embeddedness, he writes (1988: 588): 
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"... isomorphic forces may operate with varying effect on different 
organizational attributes. The principle of isomorphism predicts a unilateral 
imposition of environmental constraints on organizations as a whole within any 
niche, but selection processes may operate through the differential selection of 
specific predictable characteristics of organizations rather than organizations in 
their entirety. " 
One striking point regarding her research was that the decisions she examined were 
less visible and measurable than those in any of the other studies. It is possible to 
conceive of a senior manager poring over the organisation chart to decide the correct 
allocation of operations and functions between divisions, or calling a subordinate into 
their office for an update on the progress of the TQM programme (Westphal et al, 
1997), or a discussion of which format to use for reporting of income tax credits 
(Mezias, 1990). It is less likely that they would discuss whether they had achieved the 
same degree of goal multiplexity, internal specialization, centralization or formalization 
as a neighbouring organisation. These, the elements of strategy studied by Oliver, are, 
however, socially constructed and routine-based, and some institutional theorists 
(Zucker, 1977,1987) might expect these attributes to stimulate a degree of migration 
within an organisational field. 
A second aspect of the decisions studied by Oliver is the unusual degree of outcome 
ambiguity. As Table 3.2 (page 73 at the end of this chapter) shows, in almost all the 
other studies, there was a clear reason why a bounded rational decision-maker might 
believe, however erroneously, that the practice to be adopted would bring economic 
benefit at the organisational or personal level, be it through access to resources, 
improved efficiency or market opportunities. However, there are simply no received 
recipes within the voluntary sector as to the "right" levels of goal multiplexity, 
formalization, and so on, in managing large groups of volunteers (Drucker, 1995; 
Farmer and Fedor, 1999). Since this implies that the adoption of one particular decision 
conferred little by way of legitimation, it is possible to rationalise the results of this 
study within a neo-institutional view of isomorphism. However, the very lack of 
received wisdom would heighten the value of information, gleaned from informal 
contacts, about other organisation's practices and might be expected to lead to trait- 
based imitation. 
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One reading of Oliver's findings is therefore that ambiguity and/or lack of visibility 
have reduced isomorphic activity otherwise associated with embeddedness. This would 
support the proposition (Greve, 1998a) that it is the most easily observable practices 
that will be emulated. On the other hand, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) believe that 
ambiguity, either in firm objectives or in the relationship between ends and means in a 
given environment, might increase the incidence of isomorphism, and this conjecture 
might logically be extended to encompass ambiguity inherent in a class of decision. 
The final attribute of the decision that might affect the extent to which it is copied is 
its complexity. As I pointed out in section 3.6.3.1, it is unclear whether complex 
decisions with an array of component parts, such as a strategy, are as susceptible to 
copying as one of their component elements, such as market entry (Haveman, 1993; 
Greve, 1998a, 2000). Managers may imitate their peers in some decision elements, and 
develop their own methods in others. Or, different models may apply for different 
elements of behaviour (Haunschild and Miner, 1997): accounting or remuneration 
practices may be those adopted by the majority of firms in the country or industry, 
organisational forms may be based on those of prestigious role models, while marketing 
practices may be influenced by those that a new entrant is using successfully. 
Since little research in general has been conducted into the impacts of decision 
attributes on decision-making, all these topics warrant investigation. The complexity 
issue could be tackled from two directions. One would be to take apparently isomorphic 
major decisions and inspect the degree of isomorphism to be found within the 
constituent sub-decisions. The second would be to take groups of related sub-decisions 
and assess the extent to which they aggregate into isomorphic major decisions. It is the 
latter approach that I shall be following in the present research. 
3.6.5 The effects of the organisation's situation and internal 
properties 
Cultural and other idiosyncratic internal factors may affect the extent to which a firm 
seeks out or avoids isomorphic decisions. Firms with strong strategic intent (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1989,1994) may be more likely to favour methods and policies they have 
developed themselves over those observed elsewhere. Some strategy processes are 
driven by dominant leaders (Hart and Banbury, 1994; Bailey and Johnson, 1995) who 
may impose their own ways-of-thinking even when these challenge the received 
industry wisdom (Hellgren and Melin, 1993). Entrepreneurs are less likely than non- 
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entrepreneurs to seek legitimacy from outside sources, and so firms with highly 
entrepreneurial leaders or cultures may be less open to pressures to imitate practices 
found elsewhere. 
0 Most studies of isomorphic behaviour have however taken place at the level of the 
organisational field, using large populations of organisations. While such studies 
typically control for certain attributes of individual firms, such as size, profitability and 
prestige, there is room for a greater degree of understanding of the effect of firm-level 
contingencies on isomorphic decision-making. 
Researchers have established that organisations perceived as successful are often 
imitated (Haveman, 1993; Bums and Wholey, 1993; Westphal et al, 1997), although not 
invariably (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). However, it is not clear that the reverse is true 
- 
that it is unsuccessful organisations that do the most imitating. It may be profitable 
firms that imitate other profitable firms (Haveman, 1993). If, moreover, as DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) imply, isomorphic behaviour is founded in part on the avoidance of 
risk, then prospect theory (see section 2.2.1) suggests it may actually be less frequent 
amongst poorly, or very poorly, performing firms. 
There is also scope for a greater understanding of the internal characteristics that 
distinguish those firms that imitate a given practice from those that do not. There are 
well-established bodies of theory, some with empirical support, that link a firm's 
strategic direction to the demographic characteristics and tenure of the top management 
team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Organizational tenure of TMT members has been 
found to be strongly associated with strategic persistence, (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Grimm and Smith, 1991; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), indicating that it may 
contribute to institutionalisation and to isomorphism based on inertia. Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1990) found that conformity of firms to industry norms along six dimensions 
of strategy - advertising intensity, R&D intensity, plant and equipment newness, non- 
production overheads, inventory levels and debt/equity ratios 
- 
increased with the 
length of TMT tenure, indicating a measure of mimetic or normative isomorphism. This 
may be attributable to inertia, to increased importance being attached to legitimacy in 
the eyes of industry peers, suppliers, etc, as the TMT becomes more established within 
that community, or to increased availability of information as the TMT acquires a 
denser network of contacts within the organisational field. 
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SDM is also influenced, as discussed in Chapter 2, by characteristics of an 
organisation's culture, such as its degree of politicisation (Pettigrew, 1973; Dean and 
Sharman, 1993,1996), and the strength of its mission and strategic intent. Each of these 
might therefore plausibly influence its managers' sensitivity to isomorphic pressures; I 
formulate precise hypotheses regarding the nature of such influences in Chapter 4. 
I have already (section 3.4.3) mentioned that, although neo-institutional theory 
implicitly assumes that isomorphic pressures perceived by individuals will translate into 
specific organisational action, there are grounds for questioning that assumption. 
Research into strategic decision-making (sections 3.6.3.1 and 2.2.3) has shown how the 
relationship between stimulus and action may be obscure, even to the decision-makers 
themselves, until after action is taken (Weick, 1979; Mintzberg and Waters, 1990), and 
that considerations of power and politics may insert themselves between individual 
intention and organisational action. Westphal and Zajac's (2001) study of stock 
repurchase programmes has shown empirically that institutional pressures can indeed be 
counteracted by local power and political structures, particularly where the majority of 
legitimation benefits can be gained from announcing practices that in fact are not 
implemented in practice. 
The degree and manner in which isomorphic pressures influence strategic decision- 
making, and vice versa, have been little studied, and there is a need to validate the 
assumption that pressures perceived by decision-makers to copy another firm's practices 
will actually result in such imitation. 
3.7 Summaty and topics for further research 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature relating to isomorphic behaviour by 
organisations. The findings are summarised in figure 3.1, which is a development of the 
Figure 2.1 with which I concluded the previous chapter. 
I have shown there is substantial empirical evidence demonstrating that the properties 
of the organisational. field within which a practice is disseminated, notably degree of 
professionalisation and density of inter-organisational. linkages, influence the degree of 
isomorphism in the adoption of the practice. There is also considerable evidence to 
show that the value of the practice, in terms of the legal and state pressures for its 
adoption and the resource rewards and penalties attached to adoption or rejection, also 
affects the prevalence of isomorphism. 
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Figure 3.1 A model of isomorphic strategic decision-making 
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The legitimacy that attaches to a practice is widely cited as a motive for its adoption, 
but this connection has not been demonstrated. It is possible that decision-makers give 
greater weight to the economic benefits that they believe can be derived from emulating 
practices observed elsewhere. Earlier research has not been designed in a way that 
discriminates successfully between these two factors in the absence of resource 
dependency considerations. This question will be addressed in the present study. 
Although the task environment has been shown to affect the degree of isomorphism 
in practice adoption, the precise attributes of the environment that induce this effect 
have not been investigated. It has been proposed (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that 
highly concentrated industries, as examples of highly structured organisational fields, 
and industries where there is a high degree of uncertainty will demonstrate higher 
incidences of isomorphism than, respectively, less concentrated ones and those more 
clarity as to the relationship between ends and means. These hypotheses will be 
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investigated during the current research. The effect on isomorphic behaviour of industry 
maturity, which may be related to earlier findings in respect of inertia, will also be 
investigated. The effect of environmental munificence in reducing isomorphism is 
deduced from resource dependency theory, which for the purpose of this thesis is treated 
as established fact; this effect will not be investigated further. 
There has been hardly any prior research into links between the nature of the decision 
and decision-making processes or outcomes, whether isomorphic or not. Drawing on an 
earlier, anomalous, empirical result regarding isomorphism in organisational strategies 
(Oliver, 1988) 1 have argued that it is possible that the visibility or a decision, the 
degree of ambiguity in the decision outcomes and the complexity of the decision are all 
potential influences on the extent to which isomorphism can be expected between firms 
for decisions of that kind. 
There has been little investigation of the contingent effects of the organisation's 
situation and internal properties on isomorphism in its decision-making. There are 
plausible associations between the proclivity of an organisation to emulate strategies 
seen elsewhere and its past performance, the degree of politicisation of its decision 
processes and the strength of its strategic intent. I shall elaborate fin-ther on these links 
when I draw specific hypotheses in Chapter 4. 
Two, more general underlying themes, which I alluded to in section 3.6.5.1 above, 
have emerged from this review of the research: the pervasiveness of isomorphism and 
its linkage to institutionalisation. 
Isomorphism is only one of a number of possible responses to institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991) and there are conflicting, concurrent pressures for isomorphism and 
difference (Deephouse, 1999). One question that arises is whether any classes of 
practice exist for which isomorphism is not the norm: for which, once informed of the 
policies of their peers or opponents, most managers would deliberately opt for 
difference rather than for imitation. It is quite conceivable that there is such a class of 
practices, but it has yet to be identified, and there is no published evidence that it has 
ever been sought. In section 3.6.3.11 highlighted a methodological problem: a lack of 
uniformity in the degree of similarity that researchers have sought in pronouncing two 
organisations' practices to be isomorphic. By studying isomorphism in a range of 
practices simultaneously, as will be necessary in order to address the questions 
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regarding the effect of the nature of the decision, and operationalising tight definitions 
of the criteria for isomorphism, I intend to throw light upon this question. 
Isomorphism was brought to prominence as a research topic by institutional theorists, 
and most empirical investigations have used that theoretical lens. No practice can be 
regarded as fully institutionalised unless it has spread broadly within a field of adopters. 
However, this does not mean that all instances of widespread adoption of a practice are 
evidence of institutionalisation, and the association between institutional theory and 
isomorphism is open to doubt on a number of grounds. Isomorphism is manifested in 
similar patterns, with similar sensitivity to embeddedness variables, for practices at 
quite different stages of institutionalisation; can it then be regarded as an institutional 
phenomenon? The evidence for legitimation as an important antecedent for 
isomorphism is not yet persuasive, indicating that isomorphism may be driven by 
resource dependency or the desire to emulate economic benefits. By investigating how 
patterns of isomorphism in a population develop over time, and discriminating between 
legitimation and other potential motivations for isomorphic decisions, I intend to extend 
our understanding of the link between institutionalisation and isomorphism. 
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Table 3.1 
- 
EmDirical studies of isomorph ism 
PhD Thesis 
Study Context/sample Methodology I Main Findings 
Coercivelosmotic read of institutions as res It of environmental pressures 
Tolbert and Adoption of civil service Review of Demographic characteristics of city 
Zucker, 1983 reforms in US cities, historical explain rate of adoption in early 
1880-1935 archives periods, but not in later periods, 
when reforms have become 
institutional i sed 
Baron, Dobbin Adoption of scientific Review of Considerations of scale and control 
and Jennings, management and historical insufficient to explain adoption. 
1986 bureaucratization of statistical Influence of unions, government 
personnel practices by surveys and professionalisation of personnel 
US firms, 1927-1946 function also important. 
Dobbin, Sutton, Adoption of formalized Statistical based Legal pressures, existence of public 
Meyer and internal labour markets on retrospective sector models and 
Scott, 1993 by US firms questionnaires. professionalisation of personnel 
function have far greater impact 
than factors such is scale in 
explaining spread of practices. 
lsomorphism in anisationalform 
Fligstein, 1985 Adoption of M-form by Statistical (logit) Adoption of M-form influenced by 
top 100 US industrial product strategy, background of 
firms CEO, mimetic isomorphisin (but 
not by ecology or transaction costs) 
Palmer, Late adoption of M-forin Statistical Adoption of M-form influenced by 
Jennings and by 105 large US economic factors, CEO background, 
Zhou, 1993 industrial firms in 1960s no. of firms in the industry using 
M-forin (mimetic), debt levels 
(coercive) and CEO attendance at 
elite B-school (normative 
isomorphism) 
Bums and Adoption and Statistical Opinion leaders adopt on technical 
Wholey, 1993 abandonment of matrix grounds but followers largely 
management by US motivated by normative 
hospitals considerations. 
Thornton, 2002 Adoption of M-form in Retrospective M-form adoption driven by 
higher education interviews, replacement of "editorial" business 
publishing review of prior logic by market-driven logic 
research, event- 
history 
1somorpNsm in corporate-level strategy 
Haveman, 1993 Diversification into new Statistical 
- 
Large organizations follow other 
markets by Californian organizational large organizations into new 
thrifts ecology markets. Profitable organizations 
serve as role models for all types of 
organization. 
Haunschild, Acquisitions by 327 US Statistical 
-tobit Firms more likely to make 
1993 firms in 4 industries acquisitions if firms with which 
they have directors in common do; 
also make same type of acqýisition. 
Greenwood, Diversification by Archival analysis Multidisciplinary business advisory 
Suddaby and accounting firms in + retrospective practices originated by Big Five 
Hinings, 2002 Alberta, 1977-97 interviews firms, adopted more widely after 
I I I legitimation by professional bodies 
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Tahl, p 3.1 (continued) 
PhD Thesis 
Isomorphism in business-level strategy 
Oliver, 1988 Degree of goal Network analysis Isomorphism, is the result of 
multiplexity, internal strategic choice. Little support for 
specialization, institutional and population ecology 
centralization, explanations. 
formalization in 
voluntary organizations 
in Toronto 
Kraatz and Offering of professional Statistical + Many colleges willing to implement 
Zajac, 1996 courses by US liberal discrete 
- 
time "illegitimate" change and do not 
arts colleges event 
- 
history suffer performance penalties 
thereby. Less prestigious colleges 
do not imitate more prestigious. 
Global and local environment better 
predictor of strategic change than 
institutional factors. 
Westphal, Adoption of TQM in US Statistical Embeddedness in social networks 
Gulati and hospitals (Heckman improved ability of early adopters 
Shortell, 1997 sample selection to tailor TQM to their needs, but 
two-stage enhances likelihood that late 
regression) adopters will yield to normative 
pressures to adopt standard model. 
Late adopters traded off efficiency 
against legitimacy. 
Deephouse, Allocation of assets by Statistical 
- 
tobit Firms more likely to be ranked 
1996 commercial banks in highly by regulators and more 
Minneapolis-St Paul likely to gain favourable press 
coverage if their asset allocation 
strategies conform closely to 
industry mean 
Greve, 1998a Adoption and Event-history Entry into new market positions can 
abandonment of new with some be modelled as diffusion process 
formats by US radio interviews driven by imitation of early 
stations adopters. Imitation more likely of 
firms within same region, in 
similar-sized markets and 
competing with SBU's in same 
corporation, and of sister SBUs. 
Greve, 2000 Location of bank Statistical 
- 
logit Decisions of large firms imitated. 
branches in Tokyo, 
1894-1936 
Kraatz and Offering of professional Discrete - time Colleges 70% more likely to adopt 
Moore, 2002 courses by US liberal event 
- 
history professional course if president has 
arts colleges recently migrated from institution 
offering same programme 
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Tahle 3-1 (continued) 
PhD Thesis 
Top level practic s 
Galaskiewicz Choice of recipient of Statistical Importance of boundary-spanning 
and Wasserman, charitable contributions personnel. Firms more likely to 
1989. by business corporations support non-profits supported by 
in Minneapolis-St Paul other firms with whom CEOs had 
area social ties. Non-profits more likely 
to get funding from firms that 
supported other non-profits with 
whom they shared directors. 
Mezias, 1990 Reporting of income tax Statistical Inclusion of institutional factors 
credits by Fortune 200 substantially increases explanatory 
power of models based on applied 
economics. 
Davis and Adoption of poison pills Statistical Poison pills spread rapidly through 
Greve, 1997 and golden parachutes influence of shared directors. 
by US corporations Parachutes spread more slowly 
through geographic networks 
Haunschild and Choice of investment Statistical (logit) Evidence of simultaneous 
Miner, 1997 bank adviser by US frequency-, trait and outcome-based 
acquirers, 1988-93 imitation. Frequency of outcome- 
based imitation affected by salience 
of outcomes. High uncertainty 
associated with frequency-based 
imitation. 
Westphal and Stock repurchase Statistical Firms more likely to fail to 
Zajac, 2001 programmes by 412 implement formally adopted stock 
medium-large US firms repurchase programmes if CEO 
powerful enough to resist 
institutional pressures 
Glynn and 1,600 name changes by Statistical Attributes of new name likely to 
Abzug, 2002 US firms, 1800-2000 conform to practice in firm's new 
institutional environment 
Operational pra ices 
Eisenhardt, Compensation policies Statistical Institutional (inertia) and agency 
1988 in 54 US speciality complemented perspectives complementary in 
retailers, 1980-81 by qualitative explaining choice of compensation 
interviews policy 
Levitt and Nass, Imitative behaviour by Statistical Although publishing conforms to 
1989 textbook publishers analysis of book garbage-can choice models, the 
content and outputs of different publishers in 
sequencing. the same field are isomorphic. 
Some ethno- Effect most pronounced in 
graphic data. disciplines with mature paradigms. 
Lounsbury, Adoption of recycling Ethnographic Larger and more selective schools 
2001 practices at Great Lakes more likely to seek legitimation 
colleges and universities with student body through higher 
profile programmes with dedicated 
co-ordinators 
Rao, Greve and Initiation and Statistical (logit) Adoption decisions occur as part of 
Davis, 2001 abandonment of firm an information cascade underpinned 
coverage by Wall Street by an "heuristic of social proof' 
analysts which reduces search costs but 
leads to post-decision regret. 
Sherer and Lee, Introduction of non- Discrete event Change driven by resource scarcity 
(2002) partner-track promotion history. in supply of partner-track lawyers. 
and recruitment in large Early adopters, prestigious firms, 
US law firms, 1987 legitimised practice for others. 
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Tahle 3.2 
- 
Competine exvlanations for isomorDhism 
PhD Thesis 
Study Context/sample State/legal or Possible economic, 
legitimacy causes resource dependency or 
adduced for other justification 
isomorphism 
CoercNelosmotic spread of institutions as res It Qfenvironmental pressures 
Tolbert and Adoption of civil service Osmosis of taken- Fear of electoral change 
Zucker, 1983 reforms in US cities, for-granted leading to resource 
1880-1935 behaviours. penalties for incumbents 
Baron, Dobbin Adoption of scientific Government and Considerations of scale 
and Jennings, management and union normative and control shown to be 
1986 bureaucratization of and coercive insufficient to explain 
personnel practices by pressure; normative adoption. Fear of strikes 
US firms, 1927-1946 pressure from and withdrawal of 
professionalisation government contracts a 
of HR function possible factor. 
Dobbin, Sutton, Adoption of formalized Normative spread Threat of crippling 
Meyer and internal labour markets of public sector best lawsuits and loss of 
Scott, 1993 by US firms, practice moderated government contracts. 
by HR 
professionals 
Isomorphism J*n anisationalform 
Fligstein, 1985 Adoption of M-form. by Mimetic and Desire to replicate 
top 100 US industrial normative economic benefits of 
firms isomorphism strategic fit of M-form. 
Palmer, Late adoption of M-form Coercive, mimetic Fear of share price falls 
Jennings and by 105 
-large US and normative and consequent resource 
Zhou, 1993 industrial firms in 1960s isomorphism constraints 
Burns and Adoption and Normative mimesis Desire to replicate 
Wholey, 1993 abandonment of matrix by followers (uncertain) economic 
management by US benefits of matrix 
hospitals management 
Thornton, 2002 Adoption of M-forin in None hypothesised "Institutional logic" that 
higher education (mimetic effects M-form superior for 
publishing controlled for, not extracting marketing 
significant) synergies. 
Isomorphism in corporate-level stratejZy 
Haveman, 1993 Diversification into new Mimetic and Replication of economic 
markets by Californian normative benefits from growth 
thrifts isomorphism. opportunities as result of 
industry deregulation. 
Limited growth 
opportunities in existing 
markets. 
Haunschild, Acquisitions by 327 US Mimetic and Economic case ambiguous: 
1993 firms in 4 industries normative potential economies of 
isomorphism scale but risk of failure 
already well documented 
(Porter, 1987). But fear of 
being "left ouf' of 
economic benefits 
Greenwood, Diversification by Legitimation by Market opportunity in task 
Suddaby and accounting firms in professional body environment 
Hinings, 2002 Alberta, 1977-97 as enabler of 
change in field 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
PhD Thesis 
Isomorphism in business-level strategy 
Oliver, 1988 Degree of goal None found Strategic choice relative to 
multiplexity, internal task environment. No clear 
specialization, economic advantage 
centralization, conferred by any one 
formalization in configuration over others 
voluntary organizations 
in Toronto 
Kraatz and Offering of professional None found Strategic choice relative to 
Zajac, 1996 courses by US liberal task environment: break 
arts colleges with norms offered income 
generation opportunities 
Westphal, Adoption of TQM in US Legitimation and Fear of loss of Medicare 
Gulati and hospitals normative accreditation. Replication 
Shortell, 1997 isomorphism of economic benefits 
Deephouse, Allocation of assets by Legitimation Favourable treatment by 
1996 commercial banks in resulted but not regulators and press 
- 
cost 
Minneapolis-St Paul adduced as cause savings and marketing 
benefits. Low marginal 
cost of isomorphism. 
Greve, 1998a Adoption and None Market opportunities. 
abandonment of new Replication of economic 
formats by US radio benefits. 
stations 
Greve, 2000 Location of bank None adduced Market opportunities. 
branches in Tokyo, Replication of economic 
1894-1936 benefits. 
Kraatz and Offering of professional Normative Strategic choice relative to 
Moore, 2002 courses by US liberal isomorphism. within task environment as in 
arts colleges adopter sub- up Kraatz and Zajac, 1996 
Top level practi s 
Galaskiewicz Choice of recipient of Mimetic Reduction of search costs 
and Wasserman, charitable contributions isomorphism on item of high public 
1989. by business corporations visibility but low strategic 
in Minneapolis-St Paul importance 
area 
Mezias, 1990 Reporting of income tax Conformance to Various. Institutional 
credits by Fortune 200 accounting and variables improve power 
regulatory of economic-based models, 
standards confers but reverse effect not 
legitimacy tested. 
Davis and Adoption of poison pills None adduced Personal resource 
Greve, 1997 and golden parachutes dependency of directors. 
by US corporations Replication of economic 
benefits. 
Haunschild and Choice of investment Legitimation' Replication of economic 
Miner, 1997 bank adviser by US benefits. 
acquirers, 1988-93 
- 
I I 
4 This study was not designed as a test of institutional theory. Institutional and information effects were 
given equal prominence as possible causes of isomorphism 
74 
Adrian Haberberg 
Table 3.2 (continued) 
PhD Thesis 
Westphal and Adoption and Background Resource dependency. 
Zajac, 2001 implementation of stock institutional Replication of 
repurchase programmes pressures an (ambiguous) economic 
by 412 medium-large US assumption of study benefits 
- 
stock repurchase 
firms 
-but not sufficient raises share price 
to outweigh local 
power structures 
Glynn and 1,600 name changes by Legitimation; None apparent 
Abzug, 2002 US firms, 1800-2000 "symbolic 
isomorp ism" 
Operational pra ices 
Eisenhardt, Compensation policies Inertia None (but no task 
1988 in 54 US speciality environment pressures to 
retailers, 1980-81 change practices) 
Levitt and Nass, Imitative behaviour by Normative A mature industry, with 
1989 textbook publishers isomorphism relatively little scope for 
moderated by innovation. Mimesis 
academics. compatible with dominant 
strategy of cost reduction 
(Porter, 1980) 
Lounsbury, Adoption of recycling Legitimation with Some (marginal? ) benefits 
2001 practices at Great Lakes student body in recruitment and 
colleges and universities retention of students 
Rao, Greve and Initiation and None adduced Replication of economic 
Davis, 2001 abandonment of firm benefits. 
coverage by Wall Street 
analysts 
Sherer and Lee, Introduction of non- Legitimation by Resource scarcity in task 
(2002) partner-track promotion prestigious firms as environment 
and recruitment in large enabler of change 
US law firms, 1987 
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Chapter 4 
PhD Thesis 
Development of hypotheses 
In this chapter, I develop specific hypotheses to test the unanswered questions, set out in 
the concluding sections of Chapter 3, regarding isomorphism in strategic decision 
making. As I shall show as I expand on the background to the hypotheses, each of them 
has a twofold purpose: firstly, it aims to test the influence of the different potential 
sources of variation in the incidence of isomorphic decision-making, described in 
Chapter 2; secondly, and no less importantly, many of them are set up so that their 
investigation throws some light on the validity of aspects of the institutional and non- 
institutional explanations for isomorphism, summarised in Chapter 3. 
This chapter broadly follows the structure of the closing sections of Chapters 2 and 3, 
with hypotheses relating to environmental contingencies, the properties of the field, the 
perceived value of the precise practice, the properties of the decision and the 
organisation's situation and internal properties. I also review variables for which it is 
not possible to develop particular hypotheses, due to the ambiguity of the nature of their 
impact on isomorphic decision making; they will feature as control variables in this 
research. 
4.1 The effects of the business environment 
The reasons for investigating the existence of contingent links between environmental 
attributes and the incidence of isomorphic decisions were set out in section 3.6.1. They 
include the possibility of progressing the debate as to the degree of strategic choice 
(Oliver, 1988; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) or determinism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
involved in such decisions. 
On the basis of my earlier reviews of the literature, surnmarised in section 3.6.1, two 
attributes of the environment appear worthy of particular investigation: the industry's 
age, and by implication its stage in its life-cycle; and the degree of environmental 
uncertainty. 
4.1.1 Effects of industry age 
With the passage of time within an industry, routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
become embedded within individual firms and technologies mature and become more 
widely shared (St John et al, 2003). This contributes to a more general phenomenon, the 
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more widespread sharing between firms of mental models or recipes (Spender, 1989) so 
that industry rules of the game (Porter, 1985) become established. Conformity with such 
rules of the game is likely to enhance an organisation's legitimacy with customers, 
competitors and suppliers of key inputs, including capital, improving its survival 
prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), whereas "In the first early phase, conformity to the 
expectations of constituent groups is difficult, because uncertainty is so high that 
organisations do not have a target for imitative and alignment efforts. " (St John et al, 
2003: 530). Together, as described in section 3.4.4, the entrenchment of routines and 
increased pressures for conformity will promote inertia in the firrn's decision-making. It 
is also possible that the practice of copying successful firms may become 
institutionalised as a decision-making heuristic. 
Furthermore, as the industry ages, economic returns to exploitation of established 
routines become increasingly attractive and less risky relative to those from exploration 
of new ones (March, 1991) leading, for example, to an increased emphasis on process, 
as against new product, development (Porter, 1980). 
Thus inertia, the desire for legitimacy, resource dependency and, to some extent, the 
desire to replicate economic benefits seen elsewhere, would all point to an increasing 
proportion of decisions becoming isomorphic with those of competitors as the industry 
grows older and more established. Regulatory and legal pressures are also likely to 
increase over time as the industry becomes larger, its effects upon society at large are 
better understood and societal pressures to correct any excesses grow: recent examples 
include attempts to increase the regulation of the PC software industry, with anti-trust 
legislation against Microsoft, and of the financial derivatives industry. 
These inertial, legitimation and economic factors lead to the following hypothesis: 
HI: The incidence of isomorphic behaviour in an industry is positively 
associated with the time since industryfoundation. 
It should however be noted that the impact of industry age on the economic benefits 
to be gained from isomorphic decisions is ambiguous. As an industry becomes more 
established, information regarding competitors' policies, and their success and failure 
rates becomes easier to obtain and to interpret (St John et al, 2003), but equally the firm 
gains better feedback regarding the effectiveness of its own practices. This will affect 
the marginal benefit, in terms of better information and reduced risk, from copying 
another firm's practices rather than continuing with or enhancing one's own. 
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Knowledge may also be gained as to the extent to which increasing adoption of a 
practice is advantageous or disadvantageous to an adopter (see 3.5.2 for a discussion), 
enabling managers in some cases to decide with more confidence to adopt distinctive 
practices or market positions. 
A test of this hypothesis is thus also a test of non-institutional versus institutional 
explanations of isomorphic decision-making. If the hypothesis is not supported, this 
would indicate that the economic factors discussed in the previous paragraph were more 
influential than the mix of institutional and economic considerations invoked in 
developing the hypothesis. 
4.1.2 Effects of environmental uncertainty 
The contingent effects of environmental uncertainty were extensively investigated in the 
1960s and 1970s, with a revival in the 1990s. Although the results of these studies are 
inconsistent and difficult to interpret (Milliken, 1987), links have been established 
between dynamism and uncertainty in the environment and aspects of organisational 
structure (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1973; Osborn and Hunt, 1974; Paswan, 
Dant and Lumpkin, 1998). It has also been found that increased environmental 
uncertainty is associated with heightened boundary spanning activity (Leifer and Huber, 
1977) and the development of indirect ties between competitors at board level (Lang 
and Lockhart, 1990). However, links with other strategic variables are less clear: 
Parnell, Lester and Menefee (2000) failed to find an association between the degree of 
environmental uncertainty experienced by firms and the generic strategy (according to 
Miles and Snow's (1978) typology) adopted. 
As discussed in section 3.6.3, a managerial desire to avoid uncertainty, implicit in 
institutional theory and also a plausible economic-based motive for the emulation of 
decisions taken elsewhere, would imply an increase in the incidence of isomorphic 
behaviour as environmental uncertainty increased. Specifically, it would imply that the 
prevalence of isomorphism would increase in highly complex or dynamic environments, 
or where there were fluctuations in the degree of munificence, complexity or dynamism. 
The increased boundary spanning activity and board interlocks mentioned in the 
previous paragraph would similarly point to a positive association between isomorphic 
behaviour and environmental uncertainty (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Davis 
and Greve, 1997), motivated either by the desire for legitimation or by the desire to reap 
the economic benefits of the information derived from such linkages. There are no 
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grounds for suspecting either positive or negative associations between enviromnental 
uncertainty and isomorphic behaviour on the grounds of inertia, legal and state 
pressures or resource dependency. Therefore I derive the following hypothesis: 
H2: The incidence of isomorphic behaviour in an industry will be positively 
associated with environmental uncertainty 
A test of this hypothesis is a test, not just of the effects of the environment on 
isomorphism in strategic decision making, but also of the extent to which uncertainty 
avoidance forms part of the motivation for the emulation of decisions seen elsewhere. 
4.2 The effects of the propetties of the field 
As I noted in section 3.6.3, the impact on isomorphic behaviour of such properties of an 
organisation's field as degree of professionalisation and density of linkages has been 
established in many studies. However, long-standing hypotheses relating to the effect of 
field structuration, and particularly industry concentration, have yet to be resolved. 
In general, the effects of industry concentration are incompletely understood by 
economists, despite the availability of new, fuller economic databases, (Caves, 1998). 
Higher concentration appears to be associated with low rates of turnover due to entry 
and exit (Caves, 1998), and low rates of acquisition activity (Schoenberg and Reeves, 
1999) but economics researchers have failed to find clear empirical correlations with 
other factors such as incumbent mobility (Caves, 1998). Efforts by researchers in 
innovation management to verify Schumpeter's (1942) hypothesis that the larger firms 
in more concentrated industries would be better able to fund intensive research and 
development have also had ambiguous results: R&D appears to be positively associated 
with industry concentration in Italy (Filatotchev, Piga and Dyomina, 2003) but 
negatively associated with it in Australia (Rogers, 2002). 
In the specific case of industry concentration's influence on isomorphic behaviour, 
neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) posits a positive association. This 
is because dominant firms, with high market shares, would constitute highly visible role 
models, and deviation from their practices would jeopardise the legitimacy of other 
firms and their managers. This would be reinforced by resource dependency effects, 
since these dominant firms would establish clear expectations among resource- 
controlling stakeholders as to the practices that are likely to be successful. Dominant 
firms might also impose norms on their suppliers, channels and buyers in terms of, say, 
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payment ten'ns or lot sizes, which those players would then transmit to, or even impose 
upon, smaller firms in the industry. 
It is unclear how increasing industry concentration might influence managers 
motivated by a desire to replicate economic bencfits from elsewhere; this will depend 
on how easy it is to understand such benefits (Greve, 1998a). On the one hand, with 
increasing concentration, managers may find it easier to see which practices are leading 
to success 
- 
insofar as market share can be deemed an appropriate measure of success 
- 
and will know which competitors have gained leadership and thus constitute models to 
be emulated. They would, furthermore, be more likely to economise on search costs and 
avoid risk through the adoption of practices that had been proven to be successful 
elsewhere, if they came under pressure from powerfW industry leaders. However, where 
the effect of a particular practice in an organisation's success is clear, it may not lead to 
imitation; managers may instead use that information to pursue a conscious policy of 
differentiation from the market leaders (Deephouse, 1999). 
On balance, however, institutional and non-institutional arguments combine to 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H3: The incidence of isomorphic behaviour in an industry will be positively 
associated with industry concentration. 
A negative finding with respect to this hypothesis would, on the other hand, indicate 
that decision-makers make more heedful and discriminating use of the information 
derived from market leader behaviour than is supped by institutional theory. 
4.3 The effects of the perceived value of the precise practice 
As I noted in section 3.6.3, little direct evidence has been produced that, in taking 
isomorphic decisions, decision-makers are consciously reacting to evidence from other 
firms that the practice that they are "imitating" confers economic value, legitimacy or 
any of the other benefits discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4. Mimetic, coercive and 
normative isomorphism all require some knowledge of the strategies being deployed by 
competitors or other peer organisations, and few studies have produced clear evidence 
of the existence of such knowledge 
if pressures for economic effectiveness in a given task environment are the dominant 
cause of isomorphism, then imitation will occur in broadly equal measure, regardless of 
whether or not managers have knowledge of other firms' strategies. If it is either 
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legitimation or the desire to replicate economic benefits that underlie isomorphic 
behaviour, on the other hand, then isomorphism between firms is something more than 
simultaneous reaction to the task environment, and knowledge of what other firms are 
doing will affect the proportion of isomorphic decisions, according to the following 
hypothesis: 
H4a: In a given industry, the proportion of isomorphic decisions will vary 
significantly according to whether or not the emulator firm has 
knowledge ofthe strategies that it is mimicking. 
The competitive intelligence relating to the economic benefits from a decision could, 
in theory, result in either isomorphic or non-isomorphic (Deephouse, 1999) decisions; 
managers might use such information to conclude that a distinctive practice or market 
position was more desirable than isomorphism. However, if it is legitimation that drives 
isomorphism, then such information of a practice's adoption should consistently 
enhance the probability of a isomorphic decision. The search for legitimacy can be 
expected to generate a higher incidence of unthinking mimetic behaviour by managers 
than the more heedful, albeit boundedly rational, assessments of the economic benefit, 
so that a slightly stronger version of H4a applies, as follows: 
H4b: In a given industry, the proportion of isomorphic decisions will be 
greater when the emulatorfirm has knowledge of the strategies that it 
is mimicking. 
4.4 The effects of the propetfies of the decision 
As I have already discussed in sections 2.3 and 3.6.4, the influence of the nature of the 
decision on SDM processes in general and isomorphism in SDM in particular has been 
little studied. In the absence of prior theory, the hypotheses that follow therefore draw 
largely upon a priori reasoning. 
4.4.1 Ambiguity and isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have conjectured that firms will be more likely to model 
themselves on successful organisations where the relationship between ends and means 
is uncertain. Hypothesis H2 posits an association between isomorphic behaviour and 
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uncertainties emanating from the environment. But uncertainty in the relationship 
between ends and means may be a property of the decision itself. When managers 
decide to cut prices or increase advertising expenditure, they do so in the expectation, 
not least from economic theory, that the result, ceteris paribUS5, will be an increase in 
sales. However, when they decide to change the nature of their advertising message or 
the balance of their spend between media, the outcome is invariably less certain. There 
are no established theories to indicate which form of message or advertising medium are 
most likely to bear fruit. Trial and error, abetted by market research, are the order of the 
day. Accordingly, there is the following hypothesis: 
H5: the proportion of isomorphic decisions will be highest for decisions 
where the relationship between ends and means is least clear. 
Like H2, this hypothesis constitutes a test of the influence of uncertainty avoidance 
on isomorphic decisions. Note that the direction of this relationship is not self-evident. 
Decision ambiguity was identified in section 3.6.4.2 as one possible cause for the 
findings of Oliver (1988) that isomorphisms in various dimensions of strategy were a 
function of strategic choice rather than institutional (or population ecology) influences. 
if there is too much ambiguity in the outcome of a decision, then the information 
derived from observations of the experiences of other organisations may appear 
valueless to the decision-maker. If the incentive to emulate another firm's practices 
disappears in the absence of some reasonable expectation of equivalence of outcomes, 
then the relationship between ends-means clarity and isomorphism might be the 
opposite of that hypothesised. 
4.4.2 Combinatorial complexity and isomorphism 
I have already discussed (section 2.1) the fractal nature of strategic decisions and 
(section 3.6.3) the lack of studies that observe isomorphism across a set of related 
practices or sub-decisions. In this section, I set out a simple hypothesis, a test of which 
will remedy this gap in the literature. 
In order to do so, I introduce the concept of combinatorial complexity of a strategic 
decision, defined as the number of sub-decisions that need to be taken in order to 
5 Of course, cetera rarely are pares, and the actual outcome will depend on the systemic properties of the 
firm's competitive environment and on the actions of competitors. But in terms of defining the relative 
uncertainty inherent in different types of decision, this statement holds good. 
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establish that decision. Thus the adoption of a matrix (Bums and Wholey, 1993) or M- 
form (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer et al, 1993) structure has a combinatorial complexity of 1 
-a firm either has one of those types of structure or it does not. A marketing strategy, as 
a 
defined by the classic marketing mix, has a combinatorial complexity of 4 (product, 
price, people, place). 
The larger the number of different types of decisions a firm's managers are required 
to take, the larger the number of alternative role models that present themselves, each 
with different qualifications for emulation (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 1 therefore 
posit the following hypothesis: 
H6., The degree of isomorphism observed in a given market will diminish with 
the combinatorial complexity ofthe decision involved 
Support for this hypothesis will support the views of theorists such as Haunschild, 
Miner and Oliver that convergence between organisations' practices and strategies is 
less inexorable than originally posited by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). 
4.5 The effects of firm situation and internal factors 
As I established in sections 2.3.5 and 3.6.5, idiosyncratic aspects of the organisation, 
based upon its culture have a considerable influence upon the mindset of decision- 
makers and thus upon decision processes and outcomes. The history of the organisation 
and the personal backgrounds of decision participants will shape decision-makers' 
cognitive processes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002). 
These will determine the issues that are considered (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Ocasio, 
1997) and the solutions that are contemplated (Cyert and March, 1963, Kiesler and 
Sproull, 1982) by the people involved. These will be further moderated by the extent to 
which the firm's situation is framed as favourable or unfavourable. 
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Figure 4.1 The impact of internalfactors and organisation's situation on isomorphic 
strategic decision-making in organisations 
Prganisational 
Environ- Individual 
perceptions 
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Strategic 
decision: 
isomorphic 
or non- 
isomorphic 
mental Individuals' 
and cognitive, 
Internal processes 
Data 
Organisational 
situation 
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The processes involved in the fonnulation of isomorphic decisions are shown in 
Figure 4.1, a modification of the more general schema set out in Figure 2.1. Individuals, 
on the basis of data from the organization and its environment as filtered through their 
cognitive processes, perceive isomorphic pressures based upon the strength of factors, 
such as the resource, legitimacy and economic benefits attached to a practice, set out in 
Chapter 3. Political and learning processes within the organisation then determine 
which, if any of these perceived isomorphic pressures result in a isomorphic decision. 
Both individual cognitive processes and organisational. processes are shaped by the 
organisation's culture and moderated by its situation. 
In the following sub-sections, I set out hypotheses as to the relationship between 
isomorphic pressures and isomorphic action; between the organisation's situation and 
isomorphic pressures and action; and between culture and isomorphic pressures and two 
prominent manifestations of an organisation's culture, namely its strategic intent and the 
degree of political behaviour. 
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4.5.1 Effect of isornorphic pressures on incidence of isomorphic 
decisions 
As already mentioned, a positive association between isomorphic pressures and 
frequency of isomorphic action is an implicit assumption of neo-institutional theory. 
Indeed, most theories of organisational decision-making posit some association between 
stimulus and action, even though they may differ as to whether the stimulus is perceived 
prior to the action or is only consciously invoked post hoe (Weick, 1979; Bourgeois, 
1980). 
It will be the power structures within the organisation (Pfeffer, 198 1) that will dictate 
which issues are likely to be the subject of significant decisions, and issues of power 
and politics that are the key determinant of whether individual perceptions of 
isomorphic pressures translate into organisational action. Power, however, is likely to 
rest with groups that are critical in enabling the organisation to deal with its 
environment (Hambrick, 1981). It is these groups that are most likely, by virtue of their 
links with the environment, to perceive isomorphic pressures and, by virtue of their 
power, to be able to translate them into action. 
Since power and politics are thus unlikely to obstruct the intuitively plausible causal 
linkage between pressure and action, we have the following hypothesis: 
H7: lsomorphic decisions are more frequent in firms where the perceived 
strength of isomorphic pressures is high. 
4.5.2 Organisational situation, isomorphic pressures and 
isornorphic behaviour 
Managerial attitudes and the consequent decisions are affected by the manner in which a 
decision is framed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Greve, 
1998b; Hodgkinson et al, 1999). Whether a TMT approaches a decision in the context 
of perceived success or failure affects the riskiness of the decisions that are 
contemplated. If isomorphism is seen as a means of avoiding risk, then the decision 
context will affect managers' perceptions of whether they are under pressure to emulate 
their peers. 
Empirical studies have found that observed that highly performing firms are the most 
often imitated (Haveman, 1993; Bums and Wholey, 1993), an observation that is 
consistent with isomorphism, as means of obtaining any of the forms of benefit 
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discussed in Chapter 3, be it legitimation, resource benefits or economic benefits. Such 
imitation of successful firms may be by other successful firms seeking a low-risk way 
of preserving their position. However, Deephouse (1999) contends that isomorphic 
behaviour is associated with firms whose priority is survival, whereas those seeking 
economic rents and competitive advantage will privilege non-isomorphic decisions that 
lead to the development of distinctive strategies and strategic resources. This can be 
expressed in the following hypothesis: 
H8: Isomorphic behaviour will be more common amongst poorly performing 
firms than amongst better-performing ones. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), on 
the other hand, holds that people will have a greater tendency to ignore risk if their 
perceived situation is unfavourable, which will be the case if their performance has been 
poor. Managers in such circumstances are more likely to adopt heterodox, risky 
strategies in an attempt to redeem their situation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Greve, 
1998b). Thus they will perceive isomorphic pressures less strongly than their higher 
performing peers, whether those pressures emanate from the desire for legitimation or to 
emulate economic benefits seen elsewhere, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H9: The perceived level of isomorphic pressures within an organisation will be 
negatively related to its past performance. 
It will be remarked that H7, H8 and H9 appear to be mutually inconsistent: on the 
face of it, no more than two of the three hypotheses can be true. For example, if both H7 
and H9 are true, then it appears inevitable that H8 will fail. Two remarks can be made in 
this regard. 
Firstly, this inconsistency is more superficial than real. H7 is a general hypothesis, 
whereas H8 and H9 are specific to the effects of organisational situation. It is quite 
possible for H7 to hold for most isomorphic pressures, but not for those specifically 
related to organisational performance. 
Secondly, as the arguments deployed above in support of the hypotheses indicate, 
each represents a current thread within the theories relevant to isomorphic decisions, 
and so inconsistencies in the hypotheses accurately reflect inconsistencies between the 
relevant theories. In particular, the apparent contradiction between H8 and H9 reflects 
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the fact that the asymmetrical nature of attitudes to risk, as found by prospect theory, 
has yet to be fully integrated into institutional theory. Indeed, tests of these hypotheses 
can be taken as a test of whether prospect theory holds for organisations as well as 
individuals, a proposition for which there has hitherto been only limited (e. g. Greve 
1998b) empirical support. 
4.5.3 The effect of strategic intent 
An organisation's mission, vision, values and strategic intent are prominent symbolic 
manifestations of a firm's culture, to which many writers (e. g. Drucker, 1973,1994; 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1989,1994; Campbell and Yueng, 1991; Collins and Porras, 1991, 
1995,1996; Collis and Montgomery, 1998) accord great importance. For example, 
Lyles and Schwenk (1992) place them at the core of the organisation's knowledge set. 
Although the benefits of mission, vision and values have not been conclusively 
demonstrated (Bart and Baetz, 1998), missionary organisations (Mintzberg, 1979) are 
held to benefit from speedier decision-making, lower agency costs and enhanced 
reputations vis-A-vis their peers. Mission and strategic intent play a prominent part in 
the strategy processes of certain firms (Hart and Banbury, 1994). 
Essential elements of effective missions and visions include (Campbell and Yueng, 
1991; Collins and Porras, 1991,1996) a clear ideology or set of values, a core purpose 
or set of superordinate goals for the organisation and an envisioned future, which may 
incorporate exacting, "stretch" goals (Hamel and Prahalad, 1993; Collins and Porras, 
1996). Because such aspects of organisations are likely to be easily observable as well 
as important, they are suitable candidates as independent variables in exploring the 
impact of culture on isomorphic behaviour. 
While isomorphic pressures may lead organisations to adopt some of the symbolic 
manifestations of strategic intent, such as mission statements, true organisational visions 
are generally held to be manifestations of deep-seated internal values and aspirations, 
largely immune to external influences. Strategic intent may indeed lead the organisation 
to reinvent its environment rather than respond to it (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). 
Organisations showing strong strategic intent are thus more likely to invent their own 
rules, and so to act in defiance of industry norms, to ignore resource dependency issues 
and to use information on competitors' actions in order to differentiate themselves 
rather than emulate competitors' actions, leading to the following hypothesis: 
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H1 0: The perceived level of isomorphic pressures within an organisation will be 
negatively related to the strength of its strategic intent. 
4.5.4 The effect of political behaviour 
For the same reasons as strategic intent, political behaviour is a prominent manifestation 
of an organisation's culture that is highly suitable for study as an independent variable 
in the the development of isomorphic decisions in organisations. It too is both 
important, for reasons already discussed in section 2.2.3, and likely to be easily 
observable to both insiders and outsiders. 
The dysfunctional (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Dean and Sharfman, 1996) 
aspects of political behaviour derive from the manner in which it increases the level of 
affective conflict within a group (Amason, 1996). This is because political processes are 
organised around the self-interest of groups or individuals, rather than that of the 
organisation (Dean and Sharfman, 1996: 375). Affective and cognitive conflict are 
correlated (Amason, 1996) so that such pressures are likely to militate against 
organisations' capacity to absorb economically rational arguments in favour of 
isomorphism, based on information drawn from the task environment or the 
organisational field relating to economic benefits perceived elsewhere. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1.1a): High levels of political behaviour within an organisation will be 
negatively associated with isomorphic pressures derived from 
information relating to peer behaviour 
One way in which these conflicts might be resolved is by the intervention of powerful 
external stakeholders exerting pressures for coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). This has been observed as a major influence on the adoption of specific 
policies by universities (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Lounsbury, 2001). Equally, 
internal participants may invoke coercive pressures from respected outsiders (Buchanan 
and Boddy, 1992) in order to legitimate their own positions. Such political pressures 
may serve to undermine the taken-for-granted assumptions supporting existing 
practices, leading them to be deinstitutionalised (Oliver, 1992). Thus: 
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H11b): High levels of political behaviour within an organisation will be 
positively associated with isomorphic pressures based on legitimation. 
0 4.6 Effects not to be tested 
4.6.1 Top management team constitution 
Since, as I observed in section 3.6.5, theory accords a prominent role in the formation of 
an organisation's culture to its leaders, it would be natural and desirable to draw 
hypotheses relating the isomorphic pressures and/or isomorphic behaviour to the 
attributes of those leaders. In this section, I discuss why it has proven impossible to 
formulate such hypotheses. 
Such hypotheses would have related to the constitution of the top management team, 
a better predictor of firm behaviour than the attributes of the CEO (Hambrick, 1994). 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that the organisation was a reflection of its top 
managers, and used the precepts of bounded rationality to argue that the age, functional 
backgrounds and other career experiences, education, socioeconomic roots, financial 
situation and group characteristics of the TMT would affect the cognitive biases, and 
hence the strategic choices and then the performance, of the organisations that they 
controlled. A considerable literature has arisen to test these propositions (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1990; Priem, 1990; Lant et al, 1992; Simons, 1995; West and Schwenk, 
1996; West and Meyer, 1998; Knight et al, 1999). Researchers have examined the 
capability of top management teams with differing lengths of service, functional 
backgrounds and degrees of diversity in their ethnographic make-up to respond to 
environments displaying varying degrees of dynamism, munificence and slack (Dess 
and Origer, 1987; Priem, 1990). 
However, research has failed to find an unambiguous relationship between these 
variables, even after controlling for environmental contingencies (Priem, 1990; West 
and Schwenk, 1996). After an extensive and inconclusive study, West and Schwenk 
(1996) concluded that this line of research had reached a dead end. 
Heterogeneity in tenure, age and background, both at TMT level and more generally 
within organisations, has nonetheless been shown to have significant effects on a variety 
of indicators. Increased top management diversity in educational and functional 
background has been associated with increased innovativeness (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989), diversity in industry tenure with increased growth rates (Eisenhardt and 
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Schoonhoven 1990) and diversity in educational background with an increased 
propensity to change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). This is believed to be because 
"diversity enhances the breadth of perspective, cognitive resources, and overall 
problem-solving capacity of the group" (Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996: 662). 
Other studies are reported to have found contradictory effects, however, with 
heterogeneity within the top management team negatively associated with innovation 
and propensity to change because of the communication difficulties and lack of shared 
paradigms within the TMT (Hambrick et al, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999). 
In the specific case of isomorphic decision making, there is some limited empirical 
evidence, from the airline industry, that TMT characteristics have an effect: more 
educated TMTs are more likely to match competitors' actions with identical responses 
(Smith, Grimm, Gannon and Chen, 1991). However, because research into the effects of 
diversity has in general yielded such inconclusive results, I advance no hypotheses 
regarding such effects on isomorphic pressures, but my research design includes control 
variables to take account of their potential impact. 
4.6.2 Other variables 
From the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, a number of other variables can be identified 
for which it would have been desirable to test the relationship with isomorphic pressures 
and/or incidence of isomorphic decisions. These include the leadership and learning 
styles to be found within the organisation. The design and context of the study used for 
this research, which I discuss in the following chapter, have however precluded the 
testing of such hypotheses, for reasons which I discuss in the section devoted to Study 
Limitations in Chapter 7. 
Considerations of study design also prevent the testing of the effect of a decision's 
visibility to top management on isomorphic decision making. 
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Chapter 5 
PhD Thesis 
Study Methodology 
In this chapter, I describe and justify the laboratory methodology used to test the 
hypotheses set out in Chapter 4.1 start by setting out the design parameters for the 
study. I then review the strengths and weaknesses of the different settings available for 
testing hypotheses of the type set out in the previous chapter 
- 
computer-based digital 
simulation, experiment, laboratory within a simulated environment and field 
- 
and 
justify my choice of a laboratory method using a simulated environment for this study. 
Next, I describe the design used, showing how it is appropriate to the hypotheses set 
whilst also reviewing the compromises made vis-A-vis an ideal experimental design. 
Finally, I describe the manner in which each of the variables was operationalised, and 
discuss the implications for the external and internal validity of the results. 
It should be noted that in this chapter and this thesis I distinguish between simulations 
which take place without human intervention (other than to capture the outcomes), 
typically realised on a computer, and those which provide simulated environments to 
which human participants respond. The former I shall refer to as "simulations" or 
sometimes, for added emphasis, "pure simulations" or "digital simulations". The latter I 
shall refer to as "simulated environments" or, since they are often deployed as the 
context for business games, "games". 
5.1 Study design parameters 
In developing this study, I have set a number of design parameters with a view to 
enhancing the distinctive contribution of the thesis whilst meeting the design 
requirements, summarised in Table 5.1, that arise from the nature of the hypotheses 
themselves. 
Design Parameter I As I concluded in section 3.6.3, one of the most important 
unresolved questions relates to the relative importance, as a motivator of isomorphic 
decisions, of legitimation versus the desire to capture economic benefits perceived 
elsewhere The influence of legal and state pressures and of resource dependency 
considerations, on the other hand, has already been established, and so it would be 
highly desirable to either control for their influence or assess the effect of the other 
influences in their absence. This is particularly desirable given the difficulty 
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encountered by earlier researchers in separating legitimation from resource dependency 
effects. 
Tahle 5.1 Summarv of knotheses and design implications 
Hypo- Dependent Independent Hypo- Implicationsfor study design 
thesis variable variable thesised 
association 
T Time since Positive Longitudinal data dating back to 
industry industry foundation 
foundation 
Incidence of 
H2 isomorphic Environ- Positive Cross-sectional or longitudinal 
behaviour in mental data spanning environments with 
industry uncertainty varying grees of uncertainty 
H3 Industry Positive Cross-sectional or longitudinal 
concen- data spanning industries with 
tration varying degrees of concentration 
1146) Proportion of Knowledge Significant Data on precisely what was isomorphic 
of strategies 
in either decided at what point, and on the 
decisions by k d i i direction information available to decision c e m m 
- ! 14b) firm Positive maker at the time 
. H5 Proportion of Clarity of Negative Comparative data for decisions 
isomorphic ends/means with different levels of clarity in 
decisions by relationship relationship between ends and 
firm for decision means; ideally taken at similar 
points in time 
H6 Degree of Combin- Negative Data relating to combinatorially 
isomorphism atorial complex decisions and to 
in market complexity constituent sub-decisions 
of decision 
H7 Frequency of Perceived Positive Data on precisely what was 
isomorphic isomorphic decided at what point. Data 
decisions by pressures perceived isomorphic pressures at 
firm point when decision taken 
Perceived Finn per- Positive Data on isomorphic pressures and 
isomorphic formance performance at point when 
pressures decision taken 
H9 Frequency of Firm per- Negative Data on performance at point 
isomorphic formance when decision taken 
decisions 
HIO Perceived Strategic Negative Data on isomorphic pressures, 
isomorphic intent strategic intent and political 
Elio pressures (on Political Negative behaviour at point when decision 
- HI lb) various behaviour Positive taken 
bases) I I 
Although resource dependency and legal and state pressures feature amongst the 
influences cited in support of certain of the hypotheses, notably HI, they are not crucial 
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to the plausibility of any of the hypotheses, so removing them from consideration would 
not compromise the arguments invoked in Chapter 4. 
Design Parameter 21 discussed in sections 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 the unresolved questions 
regarding the universality and pervasiveness of isomorphic behaviour, and the effects of 
decision attributes. These inform, in particular, H5 and H6, but also HI, since the idea 
that isomorphic decision-making increases with industry age is also a manifestation of 
the neo-institutional theory that organisations are destined to become more similar. This 
means that the study design must allow the comparison of isomorphic decision-making 
between different types of decision, and between different sub-decisions within an 
overall strategy, as well as incorporating a longitudinal dimension so that the effects of 
the passage of time can be assessed. 
Design Parameter 3 As I mentioned in section 3.6.3, most research hitherto has 
observed isomorphic outcomes but not linked such outcomes directly to given stimuli, 
or probed the processes whereby the decisions were reached. In order to investigate 
these linkages and processes, it is necessary within the study to establish precisely 
which decisions were taken, at what point in time. Hypotheses HI, H2, 
- 
and H3 
associate such decisions with the environmental contingencies at the point at which they 
were taken, H7 with the perceived isomorphic pressures at the time and H9 with the 
firm's performance. H4a and 114b require in addition that the study captures the 
information available to decision-makers regarding the practices of role models. 
Design Parameter 4 Following on from Design Parameter 3, and also from the 
points made in section 3.6.5, it is desirable, in order to improve understanding of the 
processes underlying isomorphic decisions, to measure isomorphic pressures and the 
cultural factors that might affect them, in order to be able to test hypotheses H7-H IIb 
inclusive. 
Design Parameter 51 highlighted in 3.6.1 the dearth of research comparing patterns 
of isomorphism across different industries and markets. H2 and H3 require the presence 
of cross-sectional or longitudinal data spanning environments that differ in uncertainty 
or structuration. 
Design Parameter 6 Both the institutional and the economic explanations for 
isomorphic behaviour depend fundamentally on notions of bounded rationality. The 
research must therefore confront decision makers with situations where they confront 
limitations in both their access to information and in the time available to process it. 
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5.2 Simulations., laboratory and field research 
-a comparison 
In order to meet the design parameters, five research methods can be considered; in 
decreasing order of the control exerted over the environment in which phenomena are 
measured, and increasing order of realism, they are: pure simulations, experiments, 
quasi-experiments, simulated environments and field research. In the following sub- 
sections I discuss briefly their strengths and weaknesses and their applicability to the 
current research. 
5.2.1 Pure digital simulations 
Simulations are "techniques for studying mathematically complex systems" (Winsberg, 
2003: 107). In a simulation, both subjects and the environment in which they operate 
are replaced by appropriate theoretical models whose behaviour is simulated. In the 
physical sciences there are instances where, for ease of measurement, one analogue 
system may be chosen to simulate another. For example, for ease of measurement, an 
electrical damped harmonic oscillator may be used to simulate the behaviour of 
mechanical ones (Winsberg, 2003). Such analogues are not available to researchers on 
human behaviour, so that simulations are typically undertaken, as they increasingly are 
also in the physical sciences, using digital approximations to expected real-world 
behaviour, realised on a computer. 
Simulations of this kind enable the researcher to control, with considerable precision, 
environmental conditions and the rules governing their evolution, alongside any 
behavioural rules or decision heuristics utilised by any agents simulated by the system. 
They have been employed as "management flight simulators" which encourage 
managers to express their tacit assumptions as to the behaviour of a system, explore the 
implications of differences between assumptions and also explore the behaviour of the 
system under different evolutionary and competitive conditions; use of such techniques 
is held to promote organisational. learning (Senge and Sterman, 1992; Sterman, 1994, 
2000,2001). 
Simulations also have a number of roles in organisational research. They have been 
used to explore the implications of different types of institutional structure and decision 
rules in areas such as innovation diffusion (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993,1997; 
Strang and Macy, 2001) organisational decision-making (Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1973; March and Shapira, 1992) and organisational leaming (March, 1991). Some such 
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studies are purely exploratory 
- 
they answer the question "how would the world, or the 
organisation, look if these conditions were met? " 
A second class of simulation study may attempt to establish normative findings as to 
0 the kinds of behaviours that might be utilised or avoided by human actors. Thus 
I Kleinmuntz (1987) used Monte Carlo methods to investigate the efficacy of different 
decision-making heuristics for tackling a simulated medical treatment problem, showing 
that they outperformed random strategies but were usually outperformed by more 
sophisticated decision rules incorporating Bayesian estimates of probabilities of patient 
recovery under different treatment scenarios. Such exercises may incorporate elements 
of experimental design to ensure that, for example, all variants of the decision rules are 
tested under comparable combinations of conditions in the simulated environment. 
The degree of control offered to the researcher over all elements of simulation means 
that the internal validity of research based upon them is extremely high. External 
validity, on the other hand, depends on the accuracy with which the underlying model 
captures the physical and institutional structure of the real system, alongside the 
decision rules being employed by any simulated actors. Some researchers attempt to 
calibrate their models against real world data: Sterman showed (1988) that the TREND 
function, a simple extrapolative model of expectations, adequately models changes over 
time in forecasters' expectations of energy demand and (1987) that the decision rules in 
a capital acquisition model were close to those used when human subjects participated 
in a business game modelled upon the simulation. In other cases, such as the innovation 
diffusion studies cited above, readers are implicitly left to themselves to judge the 
external validity of the simulation, on the basis of the degree of correspondence between 
simulated outcomes and those perceived in the real world. 
Digital simulations (e. g. Strang and Macy, 2001) have, as I have already mentioned, 
been used to explore patterns of diffusion of a practice within a field. However, given 
the current state of knowledge, it would not be feasible to develop a model that met the 
design parameters for this research. As discussed in section 3.4.3, there is as yet no 
clearly validated set of theories on which to base a model of isomorphic behaviour or, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, the formation and influence of isomorphic pressures. There 
has been so little research into the differential effects of various kinds of decision, 
moreover, that there is almost no empirical evidence against which to judge the validity 
of a model of that aspect of the process. 
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Whilst interesting results might emerge from a comparison of the behaviour of 
different models, based for example upon legitimation and upon the replication of 
economic benefits, it is far from evident that this would have any greater success than 
empirical research to date in discriminating between the effects of the two stimuli, as 
required in design parameter 1. Accordingly, I reject pure, digital simulation as a 
methodology for this research. 
5.2.2 Experiments and quasi-experiments 
Experimental research is the primary technique for identifying causal relationships 
between variables. This is achieved by isolating the elements that are in common and 
those that differ between similar instances of an event, and perhaps by observing 
concomitant variation between two factors. It requires objective observation, in a 
strictly controlled situation, of phenomena induced by the experimenter by the variation 
of certain factors while others are kept constant (Christensen, 1994). It is the prevailing 
research method in the physical sciences and psychology. 
A key defining aspect of the experimental method is the control exerted over the 
results through the elimination, or the holding constant, of factors irrelevant to the 
enquiry. This is achieved principally through the random allocation of subjects to 
phenomena, the deployment of "controls" - groups of subjects that are not treated with 
any of the experimental factors and can thus serve as a basis of comparison - and the 
limitation of the environment to the confines of the laboratory. 
Where either randomization or the use of control subjects is absent, then the internal 
validity of the research is necessarily compromised. If only a single group is observed, 
without controls, or if the control group has not been carefully matched to the sample, 
ideally through random allocation of subjects, the result is a "pre-experimenf' whose 
internal validity is suspect. If both control (even if not fully matched) and sample are 
observed before and after treatment, or if there are multiple observations of the sample 
before and after treatment, so that a clear baseline and effect are observable, then the 
research design is deemed a quasi-experiment, whose results may still be usable with 
qualifications6. 
Laboratory methods, which include research in simulated environments (section 
5.2.3) along with experiments and quasi-experiments, have a number of benefits 
' if multiple treatments are administered to a single group, so that it essentially serves as its own control, 
then the design qualifies as a full experiment. 
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(Griffin and Kacmar, 1991; Christensen, 1994; Brown and Lord, 1999). They allow 
researchers to study situations that are too rare to be observed in the field, have yet to 
arise in real life or could not be observed there for ethical or practical reasons. 
Researchers can control extraneous conditions (Griffin and Kacmar, 1991), isolate 
particular constructs of interest (Swieringa and Weick, 1982) and make causal 
statements regarding the relationship between them, since well-designed experiments 
have high internal validity (Christensen, 1994; Taylor, Goodwin and Cosier, 2003). 
Finally, laboratory studies allow a large number of observations to be made within a 
compressed time frame (Clark and Montgomery, 1998). 
5.2.2.1 Fxperiments in the social sciences 
Experimental methods have a long history of usage within the social sciences 
(Swieringa and Weick, 1982; Roth, 1988; Griffin and Kacmar, 1991; Kagel and Roth, 
1995; Moser, 1998); Roth (1988) attributes the first informal experiments in economics 
to Bernouilli in 1735. More recently, economists have used experiments to test, and in 
some cases to develop, key theoretical propositions relating to two-person bargaining 
(e. g. Roth and Malouf, 1979,1982; Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982), free- 
rider behaviour (Smith, 1980; Marwell and Ames, 1981; Kim and Walker, 1984), the 
prisoner's dilemma (Lave, 1962), the 'winner's curse' in auctions (Bazerman and 
Samuelson, 1983; Kagel and Levin, 1986) and in second-price auctions (Cox, Smith and 
Walker, 1983,1985), and prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Accountancy researchers 
have used experiments and simulations to investigate, inter alia, the effect of different 
accounting treatments on financial analysts' valuations of firms (Barrett, 1971; Bollom, 
1973; Dietrich, Kachelmeier, Kleimnuntz and Linsmeier, 2001), the factors used by 
auditors in assessing internal controls (Ashton, 1974) and taxpayers' behaviour in 
reporting income under different tax rates (Moser, Evans and Kim, 1995). 
The use of experimental studies within decision-making research is also well 
established. Tjosvold and Field (1983) used an experiment on 114 undergraduate 
students to determine the effects of different decision-making strategies on the speed 
and quality of decisions and on the degree of commitment to the decisions in question. 
Whitney and Smith (1983) employed a case-study based experiment, in which 88 
students assumed the roles of operations managers and strategic planners, to show how 
consensus formation within organisation sub-groups can polarise attitudes and impede 
effective strategy implementation. Schweiger, Sandberg and Ragan (1986) used an 
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experiment, based on the experiences of 120 MBA students in analysing a strategic 
management case study, to assess the relative efficacy of dialectical enquiry, devil's 
advocacy and consensus in SDM. More recently, Hodgkinson et al (1999) have 
employed an experiment, again involving undergraduate subjects, to show the efficacy 
of cognitive mapping in eliminating the framing bias that sometimes affects strategic 
decision-making. Laboratory methods allow processes governing decision-making and 
the arrival at consensus to be observed more directly than field studies (Dess and 
Origer, 1987). 
5.2.2.2 Criticisms of the experimental method 
Nonetheless, the role of experimentation in the social sciences outside psychology 
remains controversial, largely on account of concerns regarding their external validity. 
In economics, a number of experiments have been criticised because the situations in 
which they place participants are too far from their real world experience, a criticism 
that is echoed by some psychologists (Christensen, 1994). Other criticisms of 
economics experiments relate to the incentives offered for completing the tasks being 
too trivial or the time available for learning how to respond too short (Binmore, 1999; 
Loewenstein, 1999). These, however, fall short of rejecting the notion of experiments in 
economics, amounting rather to a plea for more careful experimental design, a concern 
echoed by Roth (1994). 
In the fields of accountancy and organisation studies too, some researchers have 
expressed concerns relating to the external validity of laboratory studies, particularly 
given the prevalence of students as subjects (Swieringa and Weick, 1982; Griffin and 
Kacmar, 1991; Brown and Lord, 1999). The proportion of published articles in 
management featuring laboratory studies is small (7.5%) by comparison with field 
studies (55%) and is in decline (Griffin and Kacmar, 1991; Taylor, Goodwin and Cosier 
2003). 
However, other researchers have expressed the view that such concerns have been 
exaggerated (Brown and Lord, 1999) and that the preponderance of field studies in 
refereed journals may be due simply to bias on the part of editors, reviewers and 
researchers (Taylor et al., 2003). A review of laboratory studies in management (Locke, 
1986) concluded that there was no support for the belief that they produced different 
results from field studies. Loomes (1999) concludes that in economics, experiments 
have generated bodies of largely consistent data that throw doubt upon long-standing 
economic theories and suggest a persistent "fuzziness" in decision-makers' thought 
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processes. He suggests that the challenge is to design experiments that match the 
challenges to the experience of the subject so that the outcomes will be more 
representative of decisions taken by sophisticated participants in the markets or contexts 
under examination. 
This view echoes the importance placed by Swieringa and Weick (1982: 80) on what 
they term "experimental realism" 
- 
that the laboratory situation appears meaningful to 
participants in a way that compels them to react seriously to it. If a laboratory study 
possesses experimental realism, then considerations of "mundane realism" 
- 
precise 
affinities with real-life situations - assume minor importance. 
5.2.2.3 Simulated environments in experimentation 
Clearly, however, a degree of mundane realism assists experimental realism, and this 
has led some researchers to employ computer-based simulated environments with a 
view to enhancing both. "Simulations 
... 
can be used to replicate natural settings. They 
can be used to capture some of the reality of those settings, obtain high subject 
involvement and preserve some confounding elements that are part of any natural 
setting" (Swieringa, and Weick, 1982: 61). 
They also allow the researcher to control the treatments to which subjects are exposed 
and the order in which they are encountered, thus facilitating the delivery of 
experiments with a factorial design, which has proved attractive to some researchers in 
decision-making. Kleinmuntz and colleagues have examined the impact on decision 
making of the manner in which data are presented and perceived: the effects of 
provision of a Bayesian decision aid on "cures" in a medical simulation, under two 
different probabilities of "death" resulting from "treatments" prescribed (Kleinmuntz 
and Tbomas, 1987); the impact, on subjects' rankings of different simulated loan 
applications, of the way in which data are presented, the number of different 
applications presented at one time, subject experience and feedback (Schkade and 
Kleinmuntz, 1994; Fenema and Kleinmuntz, 1995); the effect on responses to general 
knowledge questions of inducing respondents to assess relevant conditional 
probabilities (Kleinmuntz, Penemer and Peecher, 1996). In these studies, the 
experimental method is adhered to carefully: the experience of each participant - the 
"medical cases" or "loan applications" that they view 
- 
is very similar in all regards 
apart from those, such as order or presentation, deliberately varied by the experimenter. 
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Other researchers, while adhering to experimental method insofar as subjects are 
randomly allotted to conditions, or all experience similar starting conditions, have 
deviated from it in other regards. Sometimes subjects are allowed to self-select their 
groups rather than be randomly allocated to them, as was the case with Gladstein and 
Reilly's (1985) study of decision making under threat. 
11 
Other deviations occur when researchers assess the impact of factors endogenous to 
the simulation: differing conditions governing the complexity of a simulated 
environment on subjects' decisions regarding new product development (Paich and 
Sterman, 1993) and inventory management (Diehl and Sterman, 1995); and the effects 
of past success on strategy persistence (Audia, Locke and Smith, 2000). In these studies, 
there is scope for significant history effects due to variation between subjects' 
experiences as the result of their own autonomous decisions. For example, in the two 
experiments undertaken by Sterman and colleagues, subjects' experience could vary 
significantly according to decisions taken in the first few iterations of the simulation. In 
the case of Audia et al's (2000) study, subjects were left to decide how much 
information to purchase in order to make their decisions. a true experiment would have 
allocated varying, but controlled, amounts of information to different subjects according 
to a factorial design. 
These deviations from the experimental gold standard did not, however, destroy the 
studies' internal validity. Gladstein and Reilly's study meets the criteria for a quasi- 
experiment. In the case of Sterman and colleagues' two studies, the similarities in the 
patterns of different subjects' decisions were so strong that it was clear that history 
effects were not substantive. Audia et al measured their subjects' information purchases 
and controlled statistically for their effect on the dependent variable, thus blending field 
experimental techniques. These studies demonstrate how a measure of variation in the 
strict experimental method has come to be accepted in order to take advantage of the 
realism offered by simulated environments. I return to this in section 5.2.3 below. 
5.224 Appropriateness ofexperimentsfor present study 
The isomorphism and institutional theory literatures feature very little experimental 
work, and the one major exception (Zucker, 1977) can be criticised for lack of 
mundane, or even experimental realism: the guessing of the distance travelled by a 
beam of light in a darkened room is not, in this writer's experience, a standard element 
of workplace practice. A laboratory study may thus be able to make a distinctive 
contribution in this area of theory. 
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Experiments would clearly meet design parameter 1: a laboratory setting would allow 
for the elimination of legal, state and resource dependency pressures. It should be 
feasible to development an experiment, or more probably a set of experiments, that 
11 conform 
to design parameters 2,3 and 5. Design parameter 6, which mandates 
conditions conducive to boundedly rational thinking, indicates that a simulated setting 
might be needed which either embodies complexity (e. g. Paich and Sterman, 1993; 
Diehl and Sterman, 1995) or where time constraints are sufficient to inhibit subjects 
from fully analysing all available alternatives. 
However, I contend that design parameter 4, which involves the investigation of the 
cultural antecedents of isomorphic pressures, cannot be met in an experimental context, 
since the synthesis of political and cultural phenomena to an acceptable degree of 
experimental realism poses great difficulties. Such phenomena can only be observed in 
a field or field-like setting. 
5.2.3 Simulated environments 
I have mentioned that certain studies have employed simulations experimentally in 
research in ways that do not, strictly speaking, meet textbook standards of experimental 
methodology. Within some of these studies, there is clearly as much interest in 
phenomenological observation of human behaviour within the simulated environment as 
in the behaviour of the ostensible dependent variables of the study. Thus, Kleinmuntz 
and Thomas (1987) gave prominence to the fact that none of the subjects in the medical 
simulation attempt treatment without testing, although this might be deemed a rational 
strategy; the number of tests used was neither a dependent nor independent variable in 
the experiment. Similarly, the most important conclusions of Diehl and Sterman (1995) 
related, not to the experimentally determined effects of dynamic complexity on 
performance, but to the poor overall performance of subjects relative to potential and to 
their overall insensitivity to demand factors. 
Sterman's earlier (1989a, 1989b) studies of decision-making behaviour in simulations 
of capital acquisition and inventory management display a still more pronounced 
phenomenological bias. These are laboratory studies, and may be called "experiments" 
when written up in published articles, but they are clearly not even quasi-experiments: 
in neither is there an independent variable that is systematically manipulated. They can 
be seen retrospectively as part of a developing trend to treat simulated environments, 
not as experimental settings, but as representations of field environments, within which 
101 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
research can be undertaken using fieldwork, rather than experimental, methods. Rather 
than subjects being allocated to set treatments or conditions, whose effects are then 
measured, the conditions experienced by subjects are monitored and their impact on the 
dependent variables of interest is analysed statistically. For example, Sterman's (1989b) 
observation of subjects' behaviour in the Beer Game led to an estimate of the decision 
rule implicit in their "beer orders"; none of the parameters in the rule was subject to 
experimental variation. 
The earliest such "quasi-field7' (Marinova, 2004) studies date from the desire to 
validate the use of business games as tests of managerial performance in assessment 
centres in the 1960s. Starting from the late 1970s, a considerable body has emerged of 
simulation-based studies, mainly in the areas of group behaviour and decision making 
and strategic management, but to a lesser extent also examining organizational 
behaviour and decision support systems 
- 
see Keys and Wolfe (1990) and Lant and 
Montgomery (1992) for reviews. 
Tahle 5.2 Puhlished studies hased on Markstrat2 and MarkstraB simulations 
Study Topic Subjects Publication 
Hogarth and Impact of decision rule on MBAs Management 
Makridakis, 1981 
_ 
performance Science 
Ross, 1987 MBAs 
Cook and Page, Correlation between risk and Execs Journal of 
1987 return for different strategies Business 
Research 
Glazer, Steckel and Effect of group attitude, MBAs Journal of 
Winer, 1987 effort and influence Business 
distribution on performance Research 
Lant and Impact of success and failure MBAs & Journal of 
Montgomery, 1987 on risk-taking and search execs Business 
behaviour Research 
Utsey, 1987 Comparison of profit from Execs Journal of 
actual decisions with Business 
potential profit Research 
Walsh, Henderson Negotiated belief structures MBAs Organizational 
and Deighton, 1988 within groups Behavior and 
Human Decision 
Processes 
Walsh and Impact of attribution on MBAs Journal of Social 
Henderson, 1989 commitment escalation Psychology 
Lant, 1992 Manner in which aspirations MBAs & Management 
adapt to performance execs Science 
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Table 5.2 continued 
PhD Thesis 
Study Topic Subjects Publication 
Glazer and Weiss, Effect of planning style and Execs Journal of 
1993 marketplace turbulence on Marketing 
decision making/performance Research 
Clark and Effect of competitor MBAs Marketing Letters 
Montgomery, 1996 awareness on performance 
_ Van Bruggen, Effect of quality of marketing MBAs Int. Journal of 
Smidis and decision support systems on Research in 
Wierenga, 1996 performance under differing Marketing 
conditions oftime pressure 
Clark and Deterrent effect of reputation MBAs Management 
Montgomery, 1998 and antecedents of credibility Science 
Clark and Processes whereby managers MBAs & Journal of 
Montgomery, 1999 identify competitors execs Marketing 
Van Bruggen, Effect of marketing decision MBAs Management 
Smidis and support systems on decision Science 
Wierenga, 1998 effectiveness under differing 
conditions of time pressure 
Lant and Hurley, Effect of aspirations, and MBAs & Group and 
1999 performance feedback on execs Organization 
investment commitment Management 
Kilduff, Angelmar Relationship between Execs Organization 
and Mehra, 2000 demographic and cognitive Science 
team diversity, and between 
diversity and performance 
Fenwick and Neal, Effect of gender composition Under- Gender, Work and 
2001 on group performance graduates Organization 
Malter and _ Impact of individual leaming Under- Int. Journal of 
Dickson, 2001 skills on firm performance graduates Research in 
Marketing 
Van Bruggen, Improvement in estimates of Under- Journal of 
Lilien and Kacker, marketing variables from graduates Marketing 
2002 using multiple informants Research 
Chandy, Prabhu Effect of firm dominance and MBAs Journal of 
andAntia, 2003 technology expectations on Marketing 
new technology investment 
Marinova, 2004 Effect of market knowledge MBAs Journal of 
diffusion on innovation effort Marketing 
and firm performance 
Italicised studiesfollowed experimental procedures with random allocation ofsubjects 
to groups and conditions. 
Simulations used include Tycoon (Gladstein and Reilly, 1985) The Executive Game 
(Remus, 1987) and MasterPlanner (Saunders Stem, Wensley and Forrester, 2000), but 
the best-established simulated environment is Markstrat (Larreche and Gatignon, 1990), 
a marketing simulation which has formed the basis for twenty-two published studies, 
summarised in Table 5.2, of which only three have followed experimental disciplines of 
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allocating subjects randomly to groups and treatments, and administering similar 
treatments to different subjects, or groups of subjects. 
Simulated environments have a number of advantages, apart from those already 
discussed in section 5.2.2.3. They allow researchers to interrogate subjects, using the 
kinds of research instruments common in fieldwork, and observe actual behaviours, 
while minimising the danger of disruption to the research from unexpected 
environmental events and giving the researcher increased confidence in the internal 
validity of the findings, by virtue of their control of the simulation context and structure 
(Clark and Montgomery, 1998). They permit compression of the time dimension: 8-10 
"years" of simulated gameplay can be compressed into a matter of weeks or even days. 
They nonetheless entail greater compromises on internal validity than is found in 
experiments. Because events in the simulation are determined by competitive 
interaction between teams of participants, the range of treatments experienced will vary 
from team to team and between experimental settings: it is rarely possible to ensure that 
all subjects undergo a similar set of conditions without distorting the educational 
experience for which they have often paid substantial sums. Such differences may even 
be hard-coded into the simulation: in Markstrat, for example, groups' starting positions 
vary in terms of market share and profitability, which may significantly effect observed 
behaviours (Ross, 1987). Other compromises are discussed in section 5.3.1.2 below. 
Simulated environments also entail compromises on external validity, albeit to a 
lesser extent than in many experiments. The use of student subjects, while 
commonplace in all areas of the social sciences, raises the same issues already (5.2.2.2) 
discussed in relation to experiments 
-I discuss this further in section 5.3. It is not self- 
evident that longitudinal developments in respondents' attitudes and learning fully 
simulate those that occur in the field over more protracted periods. Quite a number of 
studies (see Table 5.2 for examples) use performance within the game as a dependent 
variable, thus implicitly assuming that performance in the simulated environment is a 
valid predictor of performance in the field, which in turn entails two ftuther 
assumptions. 
The first is that the game software models the competitive environment with 
sufficient precision that differences in subject decisions and behaviours in the game lead 
to similar differentials in group performance - e. g. profits or market share - as would 
occur in real industries. For simplified simulations, such as those employed by Sterman 
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and associates, which model only a limited set of parameters, this assumption may well 
be justified. However, for more complex, whole enterprise simulations, such as 
Markstrat, it is not evident that the decisions that lead, say, Firm A to be the most 
profitable firm and Firm B to be second most profitable in a simulated five-finn 
industry would yield the same rankings in a real life competitive environment. The 
current state of theoretical knowledge of economics and organisations does not yet 
enable us to predict real-world outcomes with anything approaching this degree of 
precision. The second assumption is that strong performance in a business game is a 
good predictor of later managerial performance in a firm, a contention for which there is 
no clear empirical evidence (Wolfe, 1976; Wolfe and Roberts, 1986,1993; Keys and 
Wolfe, 1990). 
The growing canon of published work cited in this section is testament to the 
acceptance of quasi-fieldwork in simulated environments as a valid compromise 
between the observability and control offered by the laboratory and the external validity 
of true field environments. For the purposes of the present study, an appropriately 
specified simulated environment would allow: the exclusion of legal, state and resource 
dependency pressures (Design Parameter 1); the incorporation of different types of 
strategic decision and sub-decisions as well as a longitudinal dimension (Design 
Parameter 2) and cross-sectional exposure to different environments (Design Parameter 
5); the identification of the precise timing of specific decisions and of associated 
environmental and other contingencies and of the information at decision-makers' 
disposal (Design Parameter 3); the administration of questionnaires to measure 
isomorphic pressures and their hypothesised precursors (Design Parameter 4); and the 
imposition of time pressures and/or sufficient complexity (Design Parameter 6). The 
fact that there are no published studies of the isomorphism using business simulations 
would add to the distinctiveness of the research. 
5.2.4 Field environments 
It remains to consider whether a fully-fledged field study would be acceptable as a 
research design. Design parameters 2,4 and 6 could also be met in a field environment. 
It would, however, be difficult to "switch off I legal, state or resource pressures in a field 
setting, or to measure them with sufficient precision to control for their effect, so 
Design Parameter I could be met with difficulty if at all. Design Parameter 5 could in 
theory be met, but only at considerable cost; I conjecture that this is why H3 has yet to 
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be validated. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2.1, Design Parameter 3 cannot be met in 
a field environment, so that none of the hypotheses requiring precise temporal 
association of decisions with other contingent variables could be tested there. However, 
the hypotheses H 10, H 11 a) and H 11 b), where isomorphic pressures are the dependent 
variable, would be susceptible to field study. 
5.3 Study method 
There are thus two candidate methods for this study: a combination of experimental 
methods, for hypotheses HI 
-H9 inclusive, and field studies, for H 10, HII a) and HII b); 
or a quasi-field study in a simulated environment to test all hypotheses. All choices 
between candidate methods involve trade-offs along a number of dimensions (McGrath, 
1982; Keys and Wolfe, 1990; Lant and Montgomery, 1992): the ability to generalize 
from the sample to the population, the control and precision with which to evaluate the 
behaviours and the realism of the setting in which the actors behave. 
In this instance, considerations of convenience and of parsimony in the use of 
resources also came into play. As I have argued in 5.2.2.4, Design Parameter 6, with the 
need to place subjects in a situation in which decision making would be boundedly 
rational, points to the use of a simulated environment or game as the basis for any 
experiments conducted for this study. Isomorphic pressures (independent variable of 
H7) could be synthesised outside the simulated environment, but the game in question 
would need to have sufficient experimental realism that, when subjects mimicked other 
organisations' practices, they did so for reasons similar to those underlying isomorphic 
decisions by firms in real life. This would not necessarily need to be a whole enterprise 
game 
- 
Paich and Sterman (1993) observed isomorphic decision making in a simplified 
simulated environment where subjects had been told that the simulated "competitor" 
was using nSfve decision rules. However, it would need to embody a range of decisions 
and sub-decisions (for H5 and 1-16), and be sufficiently complex to allow for comparison 
of the effects of varying environmental uncertainty (to test 1-12), the numbers of 
competitors (H3) and the available competitor information (H4a and b). 
The cost in time and effort of developing a simulated environment of such complexity 
specifically for this purpose, and then verifying its external validity, would be 
prohibitive. Of the researchers referenced in this section, only Audia et al (2001) and 
Kleinmuntz and his associates have done so. The management flight simulators 
developed for various teaching purposes by Sterman and colleagues tend to include only 
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sparse competitive information and span a single environment 
- 
they are thus unsuitable 
for the present study, and an experimenter would in any case confront the challenge of 
finding ways to guard against the "video game mentality" (Isaacs and Senge, 1992), 
a 
which drives subjects to play the game repeatedly to find optimal strategies, rather than 
using their own boundedly rational judgment. 
The attractions of using a commercially available whole enterprise business game are 
thus considerable, as are those of having a single setting for the research, rather than 
splitting it between experiment and fieldwork. Since an appropriate exercise, the 
BRANDMAPSTMmarketing strategy game (Chapman, 1994a, 1994b) was being used in 
the institution where I am employed, I opted for a quasi-field study within this 
simulated environment. 
The compromises that this decision entails with regard to internal and external 
validity will be discussed in section 5.4. However, this choice of method and setting 
have two advantages over and above those already discussed. Firstly, it places the study 
within the stream initiated by Haveman (1993) and Greve (1998a, 2000) who studied 
isomorphism in the adoption of new market positions, extending this work to firm's 
actions in perpetuating or changing existing positions. Secondly, since there has been no 
published, simulation-based research in isomorphism or institutional theory, it 
constitutes a source of distinctiveness for the present thesis. 
5.3.1 Suitability of BRANDMAPS as a research environment 
BRANDMAPS simulates competition between firms marketing up to four variants of a 
mythical product ("Vaporware") in a number of geographic markets (seven in this 
implementation), each with differing demand conditions and customer preferences. 
Firms can enter and leave particular markets, potentially allowing for the existence of 
markets with different number of competitors as required by design parameter 5. They 
develop products to meet perceived customer demands, specify production levels, set 
advertising and promotion budgets and orientations and determine marketing channels 
and salesforce levels 7; longitudinal observation of a range of strategic decisions and 
concomitant sub-decisions is thus feasible, meeting design parameter 2. Participants 
may purchase a variety of sophisticated market studies to assist their decisions, the 
7 The software also allows for decisions a  to how much production capacity should be purchased for use 
in subsequent periods. This feature was not enabled during this study - capacity automatically expanded 
or contracted to match production requirements for a given period. 
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content of which can be captured by the researcher, thus affording insight into which 
information informed which decisions, fulfilling design parameter 3. The interactions 
between the variables are complex and non-linear, increasing the simulation's mundane 
realism and external validity whilst rendering it extremely difficult for participants to 
second-guess the algorithms, so that their decisions are perforce boundedly rational, as 
required by design parameter 6. 
The task environment modelled by this implementation of BRANDMAPS can be 
classified, using Dess and Beard's (1984) typology, as munificent, stable and complex. 
Munificence results from the absence of resource constraints: cash is available without 
limitation, although interest charges become penally high once debt exceeds 50% of 
equity, and penalties for mistaken decisions are low 
- 
for example, market entry 
decisions can be reversed at minimal cost other than the loss of sunk investment in 
advertising. This, together with the absence of legal and state pressures from the model, 
means that the simulated environment meets design parameter 1, whilst limiting the 
external validity of the findings. Stability comes from the low variation in demand from 
period to period, although there are sufficient variations in dynamism between markets 
to meet design parameter 5. Significant variations in customer requirements across 
products and geographic areas confer complexity upon the environment, reinforcing the 
need for boundedly rational decision making. 
The business simulation unfolds over several weeks, allowing time for the 
administration of questionnaires to participants as required by design parameter 4. 
5.3.1.1 BRANDAMPS compared with Markstrat 
BRANDMAPS thus meets all the study design criteria laid out in section 5.1. It has 
been used since the late 1970s to develop marketing analysis, planning and strategy 
skills for business students in North America, Europe and Japan. BRANDMAPS 
regularly figures alongside Markstrat in surveys of high quality business games (e. g. 
Fritzsche and Bums, 2001; Puto, 2004), and there is some anecdotal evidence to the 
effect that it is a more challenging student experience. Despite this, it has not hitherto 
been used for published research. 
It has, nonetheless, a number of potential advantages vis-A-vis Markstrat. Because it 
simulates results for the entire firm, rather than just the marketing function, its face 
validity and the consequent confidence that isomorphic decision-making will parallel 
that in real life is higher. Because teams start from a uniform position, any positions of 
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advantage are likely to be correlated with good (albeit perhaps fortuitous) decisions, and 
perceived as such should a team decide to emulate such decisions. With asymmetric 
starting positions, such as those imposed by Markstrat, a potential emulator could never 
be sure if its own or a competitor's position resulted from its own decisions or from its 
starting endowments, which might distort the value of the information conveyed by a 
competitor's adoption of a practice, and also relationship between a firm's isomorphic 
behaviour and it own performance (H8). 
5.3.1.2 Complex versus simple simulations 
The length and extra complexity of BRANDMAPS, however, while contributing to 
external validity, poses issues of internal validity. In this subsection, I review how this 
extra complexity affects each of main extraneous variables (Christensen, 1994) that 
might threaten the internal validity of the study: history, maturation, instrumentation, 
selection, mortality, subject effects, experimenter effects, sequencing and subject 
sophistication. 
In so doing, I use as a comparator a hypothetical simulation similar to that used by 
Paich and Sterman (1993) in their study of decision making for a new product under 
conditions of boom and bust. Paich and Sterman's simulator embodied just two decision 
variables, price and target capacity, and was played by student subjects, as homework, 
over 38 simulated periods, during a real elapsed time of ten days. It involved one 
competitor, whose decisions were synthesised by the computer and on occasion 
emulated by the human subjects. As I have already argued, this particular simulation, 
whilst permitting sufficient variation in the synthesised environment to test the effects 
of varying environmental uncertainty (1-12) was not rich enough in either decisions or in 
numbers of competitors to meet the other design parameters for the present study. 
However, it possible to conceive of a development of this simulator, in which 
experimental variations were possible in the numbers of competitors (to test 1-13), the 
amount of supplied information (114a and b) and numbers and types of decision 
variables (1-15 and 1-16) could be tested. 
I limit my discussion also to the testing of hypotheses Hl-H7 inclusive. The 
measurement of the isomorphic pressure, cultural and political variables required for 
H8-Hllb is, as already stated, simpler but less externally valid in a simulated 
environment than in the field, and this is not related to the complexity of the simulation 
except in the extreme case when subjects are too pressurised to complete questionnaires. 
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History threats derive from extraneous variables intervening between measurements 
of dependent variables. The necessarily more protracted timescale of the more complex 
game, needed to allow the subjects to give decent consideration to the choices available 
to them, will inevitably allow more scope for such extraneous factors to come into play. 
For example, some newsworthy business event, or some feature of a module being 
taken by a significant number of the students, might influence them towards or away 
from isomorphic decisions. Assignments on other modules, or even outbreaks of 
influenza or other "buge', may form a distraction that compresses the timescales 
available for certain decisions, perhaps making isomorphic, decisions more attractive as 
fi(short cuts". 
It should also be noted that such history effects are also potential influences on the 
internal validity of full-scale longitudinal field studies, which may span years rather 
than mere weeks. It is usual in field research to control for only the most obvious 
extraneous events, such as wars or economic crises, and this in effect is the policy that 
was followed for the present study. In the event, no overt signs were detected, during 
my observation of group decision processes, of any such extraneous factors at play. 
BRANDMAPS appeared to be a focal point for many of the groups and to take priority 
over other learning activities, an observation echoed in many of the published studies 
featuring similar exercises. 
Maturation threats emanate from changes in biological and psychological conditions 
that occur with the passage of time, such as the onset of fatigue, boredom or frustration. 
Such threats appear to be equally applicable to the complex and to the simple exercise. 
While Paich and Sterman (1993) attempted to avoid fatigue effects by allowing their 
subjects ample time for the entire exercise and by not limiting the time available for 
each round of decisions, it would be a rare cohort of students in which at least some of 
the decisions for some of the trials were not completed in haste and at the last available 
moment. Fatigue or frustration might logically appear to be greater threats to a 
protracted and complex exercise, but this would be offset with the threat that boredom 
with a repetitive task would constitute in a simpler exercise. For a motivated student, 
the challenge of mastering complexity might serve keep the task fresh and challenging, 
thus sustaining commitment to the simulation and hence the study. 
Learning is another aspect of maturation that occurs during both simple (e. g. Sterman, 
1987) and complex simulations. It however does not pose a threat to the current study, 
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being one of the potential influences on isomorphic behaviour over time that informs 
Hl. I consider possible interaction effects of time with other independent variables in 
section 5.4 below. 
Instrumentation threats are the results of changes in the assessment of the dependent 
variable as a result, for example, or improved skill or declining attention levels on the 
part of the observer. Such threats are absent in both complex and simple simulations, 
where the dependent variable (here, isomorphic decisions) is recorded automatically by 
the game software. 
Statistical regression refers to a phenomenon whereby extreme scores in any sample 
will tend to move towards the mean with repeated testing. Since this is a function of 
repetition, rather than of duration or complexity, this threat will be equally present for 
simple or complex simulations with similar numbers of iterations. 
Selection biases are introduced through non-random allocation of subjects to 
treatment conditions and are similarly not inherently a function of simulation 
complexity. However, with a simpler game played over a short space of time, it may in 
the event prove more feasible to persuade subjects to work in teams that they do not 
select themselves, either randomly allocated or matched in terms of academic ability, 
age and work experience. In practice, where groups of students, rather than individuals, 
have been the subjects of complex, whole enterprise simulations such as Markstrat, then 
group composition has invariably been self-determined by the subjects themselves 
rather than at random. In the admirably frank words of Gladstein and Reilly in the 
Academy of Management Journal (1985: 625), "We do not know what effect this self- 
selection may have had. " The possible implications for the present study are reviewed in 
section 5.4. 
Mortality threats arise from the loss of subjects from various experimental groups, in 
a fashion that distorts their comparability. This might be expected to be a greater danger 
for a complex simulation on account of its longer duration and consequent higher 
potential drop out rates, than for a simpler one. However, the challenge inherent in the 
more complex simulation, students' loyalty to their team mates and the fact that such 
complex simulations tend to be graded appear to serve to offset any tendency on 
students' part to quit the exercise. Mortality simply was not an issue for the present 
study, and has not been reported as such for any of the studies based on complex 
simulations that were reviewed in section 5.2.3. On the other hand, Sterman 
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experienced a high proportion of mortality in his (1989b) study of decisions in the Beer 
8 Game, which is perhaps the simplest conceivable externally valid simulation exercise 
. 
This mortality, due to inadequate record keeping on the part of participants, did not 
distort the outcomes simply because its design did not involve the allocation of subjects 
to treatment conditions. Mortality from this particular cause would not occur within a 
computer-based simulation, whether simple or complex, but the example serves to 
illustrate that simplicity is not of itself insurance against threats of this nature. 
Subject effects relate to socially constructed preconceptions on the part of subjects as 
to the nature of the task confronting them. On the basis of perceptions formed relating 
to the demand characteristics of the study 
- 
their notions as to the study purpose, 
derived from briefings by the researchers, from the research setting itself and from 
rumours in and around the participant group - subjects will arrive at an idea of the task 
required of them and then set out to fulfil it. In so doing, they will be influenced by a 
desire for positive seýfpresentation to act during the study in a manner that appears to 
portray them in the best possible light. 
For example, Paich and Sterman (1993) found that a number of respondents followed 
a strategy, during their "boom and bust" simulation, of aggressive early expansion to 
capture experience curve benefits. Whether this was through a desire to impress the 
professors with their learning or for lack of a compelling alternative is not known; 
however, this turned out to be an inappropriate strategy for the environment modelled 
by the simulation and did not even succeed in giving the desired positive self-image. 
The professors' comments in the 1993 paper make it clear that they would have been 
more impressed with a strategy that showed greater sensitivity to the demand and 
feedback characteristics of the environment. 
This illustrates the possibility that participants in a simple simulation, with relatively 
few decision variables at their disposal, might be inclined to second-guess the nature of 
the response expected of them, and tailor their decisions accordingly. In the particular 
case of this study, there was a clear danger that subjects, having been lectured (by this 
researcher amongst others) on the benefits of differentiation, might have been 
8 The Beer Game requires teams of four participants to play the roles of various players in the supply 
chain for beer. Their only decision is how much beer to order each period, in response to orders received 
from colleagues ftirther down the supply chain (those playing the role of retailer receive "orders" from a 
simulated customer). They are told to minimise the (easily calculated) joint costs of stockholding and 
stockouts. The simulation takes the form of a board game and record keeping is manual. 
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influenced to avoid emulating decisions seen elsewhere, to a degree that distorted the 
outcomes of the research. 
Within a complex simulation, this danger recedes. The study setting is typically no 
0 different from the normal learning environment, and certainly dictated more by the 
I demands of pedagogy than of research, so there are few cues, erroneous or otherwise, to 
be drawn from it. The profusion of decisions to be taken will make it very difficult for 
subjects to identify the demand characteristics of the study or to fix on any one decision, 
or pattern of decisions, that will yield positive self-presentation. The true nature of the 
study can indeed be disguised because of the amount of confounding information 
emerging from the simulation (see Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981, for an example). 
Subjects are more likely to conclude that positive self-presentation will come from 
doing well in the game, which typically they display a strong desire to do in any case. 
This gives both uniformity of motivation across the sample, and congruence between 
participant and researcher aims. The self-presentation motive is also helpful to the 
present study in that it introduces legitimation pressures into the simulated environment. 
Experimenter effects arise when the expectations of the researcher are in some 
manner transmitted to the subjects. These can affect field as well as laboratory studies, 
and may be equally a threat with both complex and simple simulations. As with subject 
effects, however, the greater profusion of influences assailing the subjects and the fact 
that the setting is pedagogic rather than research-based would imply that researcher 
expectations are more likely to be picked up and to influence proceedings in a simple 
simulation. 
Sequencing effects come about when a subject's response to one treatment are 
influenced by prior treatments, and are as likely to occur in simple as in complex 
simulations. Finally, subject sophistication, which I mention for completeness, comes 
about when certain effects can only be perceived and reported to a researcher by 
subjects familiar with the discipline in question. This is not relevant to phenomena such 
as isomorphism, which is observed directly by the researcher rather than mediated by, 
the subjects, and is not influenced by the complexity of the simulation. Studies of this 
nature in any case invariably used sophisticated subjects such as MBA students. 
The choice between a complex and a simple simulation is very similar to that 
between quasi-field and experimental settings; those arguments are rehearsed in 5.2.2 
and 5.2.3 above. It amounts to a choice between the superior external validity of the 
113 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
complex simulation and the more clear cut internal validity of the simple one: in a 
simple simulation, it is easier to design exercises that focus upon the behaviour of one 
or two variables, without confounding history effects and interference between 
variables. However, the advantage in internal validity of the simpler simulation is offset 
by the reduction in subject effects conferred by the complex simulation. 
It is of course possible for a simulation to become too complex, so that external 
validity is lost and subject actions become random efforts to get through the game, 
unguided by any business logic. However, the danger of subject confusion has been 
shown (Sterman, 1989a, Diehl and Sterman, 1995) to be present for simpler simulations 
as well. BRANDMAPS is, as the following description will show, one of the most 
complex business games of its kind. However, the decisions it requires from 
participants are a reasonable approximation to those that a similar small team of 
marketing executives might be called upon to make in real life, albeit over a longer time 
scale. Use of this, and similar simulated environments, can be seen as a valid response 
to the challenges (see section 5.2.2.2) posed by scholars such as Loomes (1996). 
An examination of the decisions taken by subjects during the present research reveal 
some that lack any apparent logic, such as those where products are launched with 
projected revenues that fail to cover the marketing budget, and some where there is 
evidence of desperation - radical cuts in prices or boosts to advertising. But my 
observations of the group processes howed that right to the end of the game there was a 
consistent attempt to apply business logic, however flawed, to the situations 
experienced. I conclude that it constitutes a viable setting for my research. 
5.3.2 The BRANDIVIAPS simulation 
- 
study setting 
I now proceed to a detailed description of the study setting. BRANDMAPS admits of 
considerable tailoring by each adopter to fit the requirements of a given teaching 
situation. The description that follows is of the implementation used at Westminster 
Business School during the second semester (February-May) of academic year 
1999/2000. 
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The game forming the basis of this study lasted for seven periods, each lasting one 
quarte? in game time and one week in real time. Students played the game in seven 
self-selected groups (see 5.3.5 for details) each representing one firm in the 
"Vaporware" industry. The groups assumed management of their firm at the end of the 
first "quarter", when it had been trading for an indeterminate length of time, and 
managed it until the game ceased at the end of quarter eight. The true duration of the 
game was known to each group at the start of the exercise; there was no attempt to 
prevent endgaming. 
5.3.21 Startingposition 
At the end of quarter 1, each firm offered four products or "brands" (numbered 1-4), 
which were completely undifferentiated: brand I from each firm was identical in terms 
of price and formulation to that offered by every other firm. The raw materials for each 
of the four brands were the same, but the proportions of each differed between brands. 
There were five basic raw materials; in addition brands could differ in terms of the 
degree of compatibility they offered users with other Vaporware brands, and in terms of 
the number of months' warranty offered (up to a maximum of 9). Compatibility and 
Warranty were potential differentiation factors but carried heavy cost implications. 
Brand I was originally priced at around $675 and was formulated to offer a lower 
degree of functionality than the three other brands, each of which had slightly different 
formulations but a similar starting price, $2,700. 
Each firm had an active presence in four regions, named after and given certain size 
and demand characteristics intended to miffor the nature of, Northern Europe, Southern 
Europe, Central Europe and the United Kingdom. Each firm offered Brand I in 
Northern Europe, Brand 2 in Southern Europe, Brand 3 in Central Europe and Brand 4 
in the UK, and no other products in any of the seven markets. All seven firms had 
identical results from that first quarter of trading, with a 14.3% share of each of the four 
active markets. 
Each maintained a salesforce of 50 persons in each of the four active markets, and 
also in each of the remaining three regions: US, Pacific and Canada. This enabled any 
firm to enter any of the three untapped regions immediately, if they so chose. The role 
of the salesforce was to persuade dealers to stock their firm's brands; dealers, whose 
behaviour was modelled by the game software, were, participants were warned, 
9 The designation of the periods in question as quarters rather than years was not important, since in this 
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"thoughtful, rational buyers" (Chapman, 1994a: 23) who represented the only available 
distribution channel and who might delist a brand that failed to average at least a 2% 
market share over four successive quarters. There were no provisions for direct 
negotiation with dealers or for the setting up of exclusive dealerships. 
5.3.2.2 Participant decisions 
For quarter two, and for each of the subsequent quarters, teams were able to make 
decisions as follows (they are surnmarised in Figure 5 1). 
For each brand they could specify the quantity to be produced, and a percentage of 
extra production to be made available at extra cost in the event of demand outstripping 
supply. Production capacity automatically and instantly adjusted to meet the specified 
production quantities. They could allocate a sum to research and development for the 
brand: the handbook indicated such investment this would, in an unspecified fashion 
and timescale, serve to enhance consumer perceptions of product quality and that a 
constant flow of investment of at least a specified minimum level was preferable to 
occasional large injections of funds. 
They could, finally, propose a new formulation for the brand involving changes to the 
proportions of any or all of the raw materials, and/or to compatibility and/or warranty. 
They were warned that such proposals should normally be undertaken only after 
extensive market research. Such proposals carried a moderate cost for "R&D and 
retooling", along with those of a mandatory "patent search". If a proposed new 
formulation was too close to that of any existing Vaporware brand, it was deemed in 
breach of patent and could not be implemented. Otherwise, it was implemented 
immediately, with all dealer and factory inventories of the old version of the brand 
being sold off at a heavy discount. An experience curve effect meant that unit 
production costs fell once accumulated production for a brand had passed a certain 
point. Such experience benefits were lost if a brand was reformulated. Old and new 
versions of a brand could not co-exist, and new brands could only be introduced if an 
existing one was withdrawn. 
For each region, the team could vary the size of its salesforce, subject to a maximum 
increase per region in any one quarter of 50 persons; there were no limits on the size of 
reductions. Both hiring and firing carried up front costs. They could also alter the 
compensation of the salesforce, varying either or both of salary or commission levels, 
implementation f the game there was no seasonality of demand. 
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but were warned not to allow compensation levels to differ excessively between regions 
in order to avoid "morale problems". 
Teams could introduce any brand, new or existing, into any region with immediate 
effect; a moderate fixed cost per brand per region was chargeable. Brands could also be 
dropped from any region, with zero notice or penalty. Firms might, but were not 
required to, schedule advertising, salesforce and R&D activity for a brand in advance of 
that brand's launch in a particular region, as had occurred in quarter 1. 
For each brand in each region, the teams could vary the proportion of salesforce 
time to be allocated to it. They could set the list price of the product to the dealer; this 
was then marked up by the dealer before sale to the end user. Teams had no control of 
end user prices, and could only discover them by purchasing market research. They 
could offer temporary rebates to dealers as an incentive to stock a particular brand. They 
could invest in up to two promotional activities from a menu of ten, including some 
incentives to dealers, some to the sales force, or a direct rebate to the customer. They 
could also specify just the amount to be invested in promotion and leave the rest to the 
"regional sales manager's" (i. e. the software's) discretion. They could vary the amount 
to be spent upon advertising in the quarter, and also the "media mix" (direct marketing, 
magazines, newspapers, radio, TV) to be used and the "media contenf': up to two 
product attributes (price, quality, uses, benefits and availability) that the advertising 
should emphasise. Regions varied in their sensitivity to advertising, price and other 
elements of the marketing mix. 
Teams were required to submit a sales forecast for each brand in each region. 
Forecasts did not affect production, but inaccuracies in the forecasts were reflected in a 
uplift to fixed overhead costs to reflect the implications for facilities and manpower 
planning. 
Finally, teams could purchase any number of market research reports from a list of 
fifty. Examples are shown in Exhibit 1, but the menu includes research on: economic 
projections; total industry statistics for sales force sizes and compensation levels and 
various types of marketing expenditure; competitor financial performance or market 
shares; precise information on competitors' prices, media content or other decisions, 
including one study that gives full information on the marketing mix for any selected 
products or brands; consumer perceptions of particular products; conjoint analyses and 
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other reports designed to assess price sensitivities or consumer preferences for different 
product attributes or preferences between actual and/or hypothetical brands. 
Decisions for each period were submitted to the module leader on disc or 
a (exceptionally) on paper fonns. The game software then calculated each group's sales, 
I profit and loss, balance sheet and other perfonnance data for that period. It also 
computed a quantitative assessment of group performance, which contributed to the 
grade for the module and was based on groups' rankings in terms of return on equity, 
market share growth and operating efficiency. However, groups' performance on this 
measure was never reported to them during the game. The most visible measure of 
comparative performance was share price: each group received a report of this each 
quarter for all participating firms. Groups were also informed of their own ROI and 
their aggregate market share by volume and value of sales. 
5.3.2.3 Underlying model 
Since performance in the game is not a dependent variable in any of the hypotheses, the 
mundane realism with which BRANDMAPS models firm and market behaviour is not 
central to the validity of the study. The crucial factor for external validity is 
experimental realism - since I am investigating the effect of performance as an 
independent variable (148 and H9), it is important that subjects believe that the 
performance reported by the game software is a reasonable proxy for that which would 
have resulted from comparable decisions in a real world environment, so that 
isomorphic decisions in the game are made on a similar basis to that obtaining in real 
firms. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, and also to help the reader assess 
experimental validity, I summarise here the key features of the model, although I refrain 
from giving details that might assist a BRANDMAPS participant to second guess the 
software. The actual detailed equations, which are commercially confidential; can be 
found in the Instructor's Manual (Chapman, 1994b) and also as Appendix 110. at the end 
of this thesis. Many equations include random noise factors to simulate market 
uncertainty, lagged terms to simulate end-user and dealer inertia and special conditions 
to simulate market reactions to sudden changes of direction, including new product 
introductions. The software models evolution in user tastes during the game, so that the 
participants are aiming at a moving target. 
10 Appendix 1, for reasons of commercial confidentiality and copyrightý is available only to the examiners 
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A firm's performance in BRANDMAPS is largely driven by its sales, of which the 
main determinants are market size and market share (see Figure 5.2). The size of a 
market in a given region in a given quarter is determined essentially by GNP and the 
total "marketing effort" by all firms in that and the previous quarter. GNP is a 
composite of regional population, per capita income and consumer price index, whose 
levels and growth rates are set by the game administrator; the levels can be discovered 
by the students via market research. 
A brand's share of a given market is a function of- the marketing effort for that brand 
in that market, relative to the total marketing effort in that market; and the previous 
quarter's market share. "Marketing effort" is a measure of the effectiveness of a firm's 
marketing of a given brand in a given region as reflected in end-users' perceptions of 
the value for money offered by a brand. As shown in Figure 5.3, it has three main 
components: perceived performance of the brand; perceived convenience in purchasing 
and using the brand; and price charged by the dealer to end users. 
Price to end users, as already mentioned, is a function of the list prices set by 
teams, dealer rebated and any discount offered within the brand's promotional 
budget. 
Perceived performance is a function of two factors: the closeness of the brand's 
formulation to the user's ideal, and the end-users perception of the brand's quality, 
which is in itself a non-linear function of accumulated R&D spend. 
Perceived convenience is the most complex quantity modelled by BRANDMAPS. 
It is driven by some of the same factors that drive perceived performance: perceived 
brand quality and a subset of product attributes. These are attenuated by: customer 
awareness (a complex function of advertising spend, mix and content together with 
other elements of the marketing mix, so that brands that promise different attributes 
to those delivered are penalised); dealer activity in stocking and promoting a brand 
(driven by a combination of salesforce effort and expected profit margins, which in 
turn are a complex function of dealer rebates and promotional activity and of historic 
sales of that brand in that region); and price stability 
- 
radical movements in price, in 
either direction, are modelled as causing inconvenience and are penalised. 
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Market shares are translated into revenues and costs and inventory levels in a 
straightforward algebraic fashion (summarised in Figure 5.2), though costs may be 
increased as a result of poor forecasting or attenuated through experience curve effects, 
as already discussed. Overheads costs are set, and balance sheet movements modelled, 
in a similarly predictable fashion, so that the complexity of the model from the point of 
view of the participant resides in understanding the effects of marketing decisions on 
sales volume. 
The firm's stock price is driven by financial and market performance in a manner 
intended to reflect, simplistically, the responses of real bourses to such information. 
6.3.3 Study context 
The BRANDMAPS game on which the cuffent studies are based fornied the focus of an 
MBA elective module in strategic marketing, taken in this instance by 34 students 
formed into seven groups/firms. 
The experimenter played no role in teaching or grading the module, and no academic 
credits were contingent upon participation in the experiment' 1. The students were given 
a short presentation about the aims of the research, which they were told related to 
strategic decision-making, and the likely demands upon them, and were asked as a 
group whether they were prepared to participate. They agreed without demur, although 
one student later failed to complete any questionnaires 
- 
no comment was made about 
this, during or after the study. The only inducement offered for participation was some 
brief feedback upon the social processes and interpersonal interactions observed in each 
group of students. The danger of bias through "resentment due to coercive recruitment" 
(Whitney and Smith, 1983: 171) is therefore small. 
5.3.4 Study design 
The entire universe of information available to each group at a given point in time, 
along with the decisions groups took on the basis of that information, was recorded by 
the game software and was available to the researcher. Instrumentation effects thus pose 
no threat to the internal validity of this part of the study. 
" The experimenter was the lead instructor for another module which was compulsory for all students in 
the class in question, and tutored half of them on that module. There is no evidence that the students felt 
in any way inhibited or threatened as a result of this relationship. Many of them felt able to comment 
frankly to the experimenter about the strengths and weaknesses of the module. 
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In addition to the game inputs and outputs, survey data were collected from 
participants. Questionnaires (see Exhibit 2) were administered to each student just 
before they handed in their decisions for periods 2,4 and 6 and at the conclusion of the 
game, just before they obtained the final results 12 
. 
The questionnaires asked 
participating students to express, on a seven-point Likert scale, their degree of 
agreement or disagreement with a number of statements representing measures of the 
dependent and independent variables for H 10, HIIa and HIIb, along with a number of 
other variables that were subsequently discarded from the study. Apart from a small 
adjustment to the wording used in the final questionnaire, to reflect the fact that the 
game had finished, there were no adjustments made to the research instrument over 
time. 
Of the 136 questionnaires distributed over the four periods, 122 were completed. As 
previously mentioned, one student failed to complete any questionnaires. One further 
questionnaire was not returned for each of periods 2 and 4, six for period 6 and two for 
period 8; one of those two was also amongst the six missing for period six. Participation 
rates for each period thus varied between 79% and 94%. At least three members (i. e. a 
majority) of every group submitted completed questionnaires for each period. There is 
little evidence of mortality within the study; all group members remained enrolled right 
through the module and participated throughout in group decision making. 
By sampling at a number of different points in time, with the study variables being 
able to alter state between observations, in a situation analogous to a longitudinal field 
study, this design avoided the danger that in a simulation "a single run provides only a 
single, complex observation. " (Swierenga and Weick, 1982: 61). The extent and 
intensity of groups' deliberations over each period's decisions, both observed by this 
researcher and reported by the participants, was evidence that every quarter was a 
separate vent, and the each period's decisions were effectively independent of those in 
the preceding periods, except insofar as information as to the effects of earlier decisions 
would inform subsequent ones. Only at the very end of the game was there evidence of 
maturation effects in the form of fatigue, a briefer decision-making process and a 
tendency to perpetuate rather than revise earlier decisions. 
Four of the seven groups also agreed to be observed during one or more of their 
decision-making sessions. Limited resources, together with the facts that different 
12 Since there was reason to expect that attendance at the session prior to the period 8 decision would have 
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groups' meetings often coincided, that some groups were unwilling to be observed and 
that others held their meetings in inaccessible places, such a members' workplaces, 
meant that it was impractical to observe any single group right through the game, or to 
a 
see a cross-section of groups for any single decision period. In the event, four of the 
groups were observed in a total of five meetings; two were very short, although the 
others lasted in excess of one hour. This was insufficient to give a coherent picture of 
group behaviours, so that the desired triangulation was therefore not effectively 
achieved and there is thus no effective check on the convergent validity of the survey 
measures. However, the observations did generate isolated points that have contributed 
to the study. 
The MBA students were naYve participants 
- 
they had not been exposed to 
institutional theory and the questionnaire contained items unrelated to isomorphic 
pressures, political behaviour or strategic intent. The questions on these topics were 
interspersed through the questionnaire, which served to reduce the risk of subject 
effects. The identification of the demand characteristics of the research (Christensen, 
1994) would have been extremely difficult, not least because I was myself at that stage 
pursuing a line of enquiry that was different from that presented in this thesis, so that 
the risk of conscious or unconscious bias in the responses was small. Some positive 
self-presentation effects may, however, have distorted measurement of the political 
behaviour variable 
-I discuss this in section 5.4.10. 
My tardiness in arriving upon a research question was in one sense an unfortunate 
deviation from the Popperian ideal of scientific enquiry, but had the benefit of 
nullifying any potential experimenter effects. The lecturer in charge of the strategic 
marketing module was also unaware of the precise aims of the research, and so was 
unable to bias the students' responses even if he had desired to do so. 
As discussed in 5.3.1.2, the embedding of the research within a challenging, time 
consuming and assessed simulation exercise minimised the likelihood that students 
would have either time or energy to devote to devising questionnaire responses or to 
modifying game decisions in a way that might distort the research outcomes. Subject 
effects therefore posed little threat to the internal validity of the study. On the other 
hand, because the outcomes were assessed, and the exercise was embedded in an 
educational context in which some students might have felt the desire to impress their 
been poor, the decision was taken to postpone data collection for this period. 
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instructor and avoid ignominy within their peer group, legitimation remained as a 
possible influence on the decision processes of participants. 
6.3.6 Demography of sample and external validity 
The students, 19 male and 15 female, ranged in age from 25 to 52, with a mean age of 
32.1 years and a median age of 30.7. All but seven of the subjects were under 35 years 
of age at the start of the study. All had a minimum of three years' managerial 
experience. There are no published guidelines for the size and demographic 
characteristics required of a student sample in order to give adequate xternal validity, 
and surprisingly few studies report the ages of participants. The sample for this study is, 
on average, three years older and with more managerial experience than the sample 
reported by Schweiger et al (1986), and five years older than those reported by Walsh 
and Henderson (1989) and Marinova (2004). Clark and Henderson (1996,1998) do not 
report the ages of the second-year Stanford MBA student participants in their studies; if 
their profile resembled that of the 2004 class, whose mean age on entry was 28 years 
(Stanford, 2003) then it would be similar to that of Schweiger et al. Many other studies 
(e. g. Tjosvold and Feld, 1983; see Table 5.2 for other examples) use undergraduate 
subjects, sometimes mixed with postgraduates (e. g. Whitney and Smith, 1983). 1 
conclude that the age profile of this sample is slightly closer to that of the managerial 
population at large than was the case for comparable published studies, and so meets or 
exceeds their standards of external validity on that score. 
However, the sample remains somewhat younger and less experienced and with a 
higher proportion of females than might be expected from a sample of practising senior 
managers. For example, Hodgkinson et al (1999) report a sample of senior managers 
with a similar spread of ages (25-50) to that in the current study but a considerably 
higher mean (37.1). Kilduff et al. 's (2000) sample of executive MBA participants 
similarly lay in the age range 26-56, with a mean of 41. 
This difference would only threaten the external validity of the results if these 
differences might be expected to affect the variables under consideration (Weick, 1964; 
Whitney and Smith, 1983). To translate this into the terms of this study, external 
validity will be threatened if there is some reason to believe that the relative youth and 
inexperience of the sample and the high proportion of females in it will affect the 
manner in which isomorphic pressures are influenced by political behaviour and 
strategic intent. Note that differences between the levels of these variables in the sample 
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and the population at large will not destroy external validity as long as the relationships 
between them are unaffected. Similarly, external validity will be affected if there is 
reason to believe that young, inexperienced or female managers are more or less likely 
than others to take isomorphic decisions when their firms are unsuccessful, when they 
possess knowledge of competitors' activities, when isomorphic pressures are strong or 
as the industry ages. 
However, Remus (1996) reports no marked differences between the decision making 
of managers and graduate business students, and there is little empirical evidence for 
any generic differences in employee behaviours that are attributable to age, gender or 
race (Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999). Increasing age has been shown to reduce 
employees' proclivity to change jobs (Youngblood, Mobley and Meglino, 1983), and to 
lead to a reduction in change-seeking and risk-seeking behaviour (Carlson and 
Karlsson, 1970; Vroom and Pahl, 1971; Child, 1974; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Contemporary theorists, however, believe that firm-specific factors such as length of 
tenure in post (Flaherty and Pappas, 2002) and diversity in ages, genders and 
background (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Pelled et al, 1999; Simons, Pelled and 
Smith, 1999) have greater impact than do state variables such as the average age or the 
gender make-up. 
In the context of the present studies, there is thus no empirical evidence that the 
demographic make-up of the sample will affect the observations of the decision-making 
variables, although there will be a need to control for diversity within the student 
groups, a point to which I return when I discuss control variables below. 
If isomorphic behaviours are socially constructed as less risky than non-isomorphic, a 
young sample is less likely to respond to given stimuli with an isomorphic decision than 
the more mature managerial population at large. Carlson and Karlsson (1970: 714) 
estimate that on an index of change-proneness that has a reference value of 1.00 for a 
typical 20-24 year old, the value for 30-34 year olds (the mean and median for the study 
sample) is 0.55 whereas the value for 44-54 year olds (anecdotally a likely age for a 
senior manager) is of the order of 0.2-0.25. Thus, estimates of the degree of isomorphic 
behaviour from this study are likely to be biased downwards, although the precise 
extent of this bias is unclear, since the risk-taking proclivity of the "average manager" 
alters little between the ages of 33 and 48 (Vroorn and Pahl, 1971). 
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The empirical evidence supporting the widespread prejudice against laboratory 
methods on the grounds of limited external validity thus appears extraordinarily thin, 
and not a concern for the present study. 
5.3.6 Size of sample and internal validity 
Turning now to considerations of internal validity, the sample, with 34 individuals in 
seven groups, is somewhat smaller than those employed for most of the other studies 
cited above. The smallest study with individual (as against group) subjects had 66 
participants and most others had over 100. For the Markstrat studies with group 
respondents cited in Table 5.2, the median sample size was 28 groups, with almost all 
utilising between 15-35 groups. The two largest studies (Lant, 1992; Fenwick and Neal, 
2001) sampled 50 and 60 groups respectively. However, even smaller sample sizes, of 
six groups, have on occasion been accepted as valid for both experimental (Whitney and 
Smith, 1983) and quasi-field (Marinova, 2004) studies. 
Other measures of sample size support this view that the study, while small, is not 
unreasonably so. For isomorphic pressures, strategic intent and political behaviour, the 
seven groups were each sampled at four different points during the game, yielding a 
total of 28 datapoints. This compares with 23 groups, sampled once, in Tjosvold and 
Field (1983), six groups, each yielding a single reading, for Whitney and Smith (1983), 
and 30 groups, each yielding a single reading, in Schweiger et al (1986). However 
Zucker's (1977) sample consisted of 180 individuals, of whom 45 contributed to all 
three stages of the study. More recent studies by Clark and Montgomery (1998), with 15 
groups each sampled at three points during the game, Hodgkinson et al (1999) with 81 
undergraduates and Audia et al (2000), with 168 individuals each yielding a single data 
point, also generated significantly more data than the current study. 
Other factors to be discussed in section 5.4 in relation to the individual variables 
contribute further limitations to the internal validity of this portion of the research, 
which is thus best considered as an exploration of the utility of laboratory-based 
investigations for culturally based phenomena of this kind. 
For hypotheses HI-H9, the unit of analysis was the decision rather than the group, 
and here my dataset consisted of 715 isomorphic decisions in a total population of 3464. 
The internal validity of this portion of the research should therefore be adequate. 
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The groups into which students were formed themselves were not random 
- 
students 
selected their fellow group members. This, as mentioned above, is common practice in 
quasi-field studies of this nature, and it was a longstanding practice on the module and 
programme to allow students to select their own group. I judged that an insistence on 
random groups would j eopardise the degree of participation in the study. 
Three of the seven groups consisted entirely of full-time students, two entirely of full- 
time students and two were mixed. Thus there is a danger that the groups might, after 
all, have a number of ready-formed institutions at the very start of the game. The 
novelty of the challenge posed by the game, which none of the students had played 
previously, would mitigate this danger, but as groups were not observed during their 
initial two decision periods (to avoid embarrassment during the forming and norming 
process), there is no direct evidence of its extent. Where feasible, I control for the 
effects of cohort coherence. 
5.4 Operationalisation of variables 
In this section, I discuss how the dependent and independent variables for each 
hypothesis were operationalised. I shall assess impact of maturation, statistical 
regression and selection on the internal validity of each study variable. I have 
established, through the previous discussion, that the impacts of instrumentation, 
mortality, subject effects, experimenter effects and subject sophistication were minimal 
or absent during the study, and that there is no evidence of history effects. 
5.4.1 Total decisions 
The decisions taken by each group in each period are described in section 5.3.2.2.1 
reluctantly excluded R&D and product reformulation decisions from the analysis. None 
of the market research provided by the game software reported competitors' R&D levels 
- 
the best data available reported industry average spend by region. It was therefore 
impossible for firms to take informed isomorphic decisions, and including R&D would 
thus have distorted the measure of the proportion of decisions taken with 
foreknowledge, which is important for the testing of H4a and 1-14b. 
It would have been desirable to include reformulation decisions, since it is they that 
confonn most closely to the classical definition of a strategic decision, in that they 
involve substantial commitment (Ghemawat, 1991). However, the structure of the game 
prevents a group from reformulating a product so that its attributes come within a 
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defined "patent zone" of a pre-existing brand, so precise isomorphism is not possible. 
Such decisions were in any case so few in number (9, or 0.3% of the total) that their 
omission could not distort the overall level of the analysis. 
For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, I divide the remaining decisions into the 
following categories: "activity" decisions 
- 
whether to launch a brand in or withdraw it 
from a given region; "marketing" decisions each region in which a brand was active 
- 
price levels, advertising spend, media content, media mix, spend on sales promotion, 
and types of activity to which to allocate that promotional spend; "efforf' decisions 
regarding the number of salespeople to hire in each region and the proportion of their 
time to be allocated to each brand within that region; and. "compensation! ' decisions for 
salespeople by region. 
It was necessary to exclude from the analysis decisions that had been recorded by the 
software but were in fact simply carry-overs from earlier periods that had not been reset. 
I therefore recorded the following as valid decisions: all activity decisions; all marketing 
decisions for active brands in regions where they were being actively marketed and all 
compensation decisions for regions where there were active salespeople. For the effort 
decisions, it was necessary to decide whether to treat the decisions on numbers of 
salespeople as separate from the decisions on allocation of effort, or to treat them as a 
composite decision as to the numbers of salesperson equivalents associated with a given 
brand in a given region. The observed meetings offered no guidance as to the subjects' 
thought processes, but since the most precise competitor information offered to the 
participants used the composite (number of salespersons attached to each brand), this 
was the practice that I followed. The result of this was to reduce the number of 
decisions considered independently by 279, or 8%. 
Table S. 3: Numbers of decisions by group andperiod 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Total 
Period 3 159 95 102 98 54 77 74 659 
Period 4 127 87 88 115 51 82 104 654 
Period 5 106 78 94 102 45 86 91 602 
Period 6 103 71 85 78 45 72 83 537 
Period 7 103 70 72 75 45 70 90 525 
Period 8 89 70 62 69 45 70 82 487 
Periods 3-8 687 471 503 537 285 457 524 3464 
Mean c. v 
94.140.35 
93.430.27 
86.000.24 
76.710.23 
75.000.24 
69.570.20 
494.86 0.248 
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Finally, I excluded all decisions taken in the first two quarters. Decisions 
corresponding to the first quarter, the game's starting point, were taken by the game 
software and were the same for all groups, so that decisions that were deliberately 
0 
isomorphic with another group's independent decisions were not possible until the third 
quarter. The final population comprised 3,464 decisions (see table 5.3). 
There is a maturation effect, as groups withdraw from market positions that prove 
unviable, so that the mean number of decisions per group falls steadily over time. The 
coefficient of variation (final column, Table 5.3) also declines, but the decline is not 
monotonic and so it is unclear whether it constitutes statistical regression or a symptom 
of the fatigue referred to in section 5.3.4. 
There is one particularly adventurous and active group (group 1) and one particularly 
cautious one (group 5) but no evidence of any bifurcation in the sample in a manner that 
might indicate selection effects. 
5.4.2 Isornorphic decisions 
To measure the number of isomorphic decisions, all decisions taken by each group in 
each quarter were compared to those taken in previous quarters by that and all 
competing groups. As I shall discuss below, issues of definition made it necessary to 
operationalise a number of alternative versions of this construct, but in the first instance 
I identified a decision as isomorphic if it resembled a decision taken by one or more 
competing groups in the previous quarter more closely than it resembled the equivalent 
decision taken by the group itself, or if it was the unaltered continuation of such a 
decision taken in a previous period. Perpetuations of past isomorphic decisions 
continued to be counted as isomorphic in subsequent periods even if the groups that 
were being emulated had since altered their own practices. 
My aim throughout this classification process was to be generous in defining 
isomorphism, so as to capture every instance where one group might be deemed to be 
imitating another. I could then assess later the effects of tightening that definition to 
exclude decisions that fell outside certain criteria. 
I isolated decisions relating to Brand 1, the low-priced, downmarket brand, from 
those relating to the other three brands, which I treated as closer substitutes. This may 
have caused me to misclassify some decisions relating to firms 4 and 5, who 
repositioned their respective Brands 1 in quarters 4 and 5 respectively, and their 
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imitators. However, the repositioned brands both had prices that started out at more than 
treble the price for other firms' Brand 1, and even after later reductions were still 
approximately 100% higher than those other brands'. They were also marketed in 
different regions from most other firms' Brand 1. The number of decisions for which 
there was scope for misclassification between isomorphic and non-isomorphic was 
therefore few. 
For quantities measured as continuous variables, such as prices, advertising 
expenditure and salaries, two forms of isomorphism were observable. The first, which I 
term isomorphism of level, occurred where, for example, one group appeared to be 
trying to match another group's prices or advertising expenditure closely. The second 
type, which I term directional isomorphism, occurred where, for example, a group 
appeared to be following another group's price cut with a cut of their own, but were not 
attempting to match it precisely. I also recorded the absolute distance between the 
decision taken and the closest of the competitor decisions that it appeared to be 
emulating, as a percentage of the quantity that was being copied. So where, for example, 
a group responded to a competitor price of $2500 by cutting its own price for that brand 
to $2550, the difference was recorded as 2%. 1 felt it necessary, again in the first 
instance, to not stipulate absolute equivalence as a condition for isomorphism since, in 
some cases, it would be difficult for a group to match a competitor precisely, even if it 
wished to do so. For example, for most of the market research reports provided in the 
game, price information related to the prices at which dealers were selling to end-users. 
Groups could however change only the factory prices at which they sold to the dealers, 
and could not precisely determine the mark-ups those dealers would charge, which 
might vary from quarter to quarter. 
There were three decision variables not calibrated on a continuous scale: media 
content, media mix and promotional type. For media content, groups could select for 
emphasis in their advertising up to two attributes, such as quality or price, from a list of 
six. I recorded an isomorphism. of level, with a distance of 0%, where one group 
matched another's media content precisely. As an alternative to isomorphism of level 
and directional isomorphism I developed a third category, partial isomorphism, for 
cases where the match of attributes was less straightforward. Where only one attribute 
within a group's media content matched another group's, I recorded a partial 
isomorphism with a distance of 50%. Where both attributes were being emphasised by 
at least one competitor, but there was no single group that was emphasising both 
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together, then I recorded a partial isomorphism. with a distance of 25% (an arbitrary 
figure mid-way between zero and 50% ). 
For media mix, where groups could allocate advertising between media in any 
proportion and invariably used all five possible media, I could find no objective basis on 
which to identify partial isomorphism. Where, for example, a group had identical 
allocations to another on three of the five media, but greatly different allocations on the 
remaining two, it was unclear whether this was any more of less "isomorphic" than 
where the two groups differed on their use of all five media, but only marginally so. 
However, I recorded an isomorphism of level where one group matched another's mix 
precisely. 
For promotional type, firms could opt to leave the allocation of promotional activity 
to the sales manager's discretion, or decide to allocate 100% of it to one of nine 
activities, or to allocate 65% of it to one, major, activity and the remaining 35% to a 
second, minor, one. I recorded an isomorphism of level with a distance of 0% where a 
group's allocation precisely matched that of at least one other group. I recorded a partial 
isomorphism with a distance of 65% where the matched activity was the minor one for 
either party, a distance of 35% where it constituted the major activity for both and a 
distance of 30% (100% 
- 
205%) where the major and minor activity of the imitator 
respectively mimicked the minor and ma or activity of the other party. I recorded a j 
distance of 10% (another arbitrary figure) where the major activity of the imitator 
mirrored the major activity of another group, and the minor activity imitated either 
activity of a third group. 
Since the entire population of decisions, rather than a sample, was used for these 
measures, internal validity was high. The distinction between partial isomorphism and 
isomorphism of level was clear and not subject to judgement. The distinction between 
isomorphism of level and directional isomorphism was in some cases more arbitrary, 
but in the end I did not find it necessary to discriminate between the two in my analysis: 
it was sufficient to use the measured distance between two decisions (an objective 
measurement, not subject to judgement) to discriminate between differing degrees of 
isomorphism. Thus, the identification of isomorphism is robust and reliable, with the 
invention of distance measures for certain combinations of media mix and promotional 
type being the only arbitrary feature. 
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As I discussed in section 2.2.4, there are issues in defining how alike two decisions 
need to be in order to consider them isomorphic. In order to ensure that the results were 
robust, I operationalised four alternative definitions of isomorphism, as four datasets of 
decisions. The first, and most all embracing, dataset 1, included all isomorphisms, 
whether they were new decisions or perpetuations; of past decisions, and comprised 
1,176 decisions, or 33.9% of the total (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4. 
- 
Numbers of decisions by category 
- 
dataset I 
Total decisions taken 
No of isomorphic decisions 
-level/ directional 
-partial 
-perpetuation 
Isomorphic % of total 
% of isomorphic 
-level/directional 
-partial 
-perpetuation 
Sales 
Marketing Activity Compensation effort Total 
2400 96 558 410 3464 
767 25 210 174 1176 
331 25 76 118 550 
165 0 0 0 165 
271 0 134 56 461 
32.0% 26.0% 37.6% 42.4% 33.9% 
43.1% 100.0% 36.2% 67.8% 46.8% 
21.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.0% 
35.3% 0.0% 63.8% 32.2% 39.2% 
Dataset 2 excluded perpetuations of past decisions, on the grounds that in such cases 
the firm was showing isomorphism, with itself rather than with other firms, and 
comprised 715 decisions or 20.6% of the total. This dataset did not discriminate 
between decisions on the basis of distance. 
The third dataset further restricted isomorphic decisions to those with a distance of 
12.5% or less from the decision of which they were a copy. The choice of the 12.5% 
breakpoint was largely arbitrary, and was arrived at after inspecting the data for a point 
at which there was a substantial gap before the next most distant decision. Dataset 3 
comprised 447 decisions. 
Table 5.5. 
- 
Percentage of isomorphic decisions by group and period 
- 
dataset 2 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Mean C. V. 
Period 3 18.2% 11.6% 20.6% 29.6% 14.8% 7.8% 45.9% 20.9% 0.62 
Period 4 28.3% 28.7% 30.7% 16.5% 47.1% 13.4% 34.6% 27.2% 0.41 
Period 5 25.5% 9.0% 25.5% 22.5% 40.0% 17.4% 25.3% 22.8% 0.41 
Period 6 29.1% 26.8% 18.8% 32.1% 31.1% 13.9% 13.3% 23.3% 0.35 
Period 7 25.2% 14.3% 9.7% 17.3% 15.6% 8.6% 16.7% 16.0% 0.34 
Period 8 6.7% 15.7% 16.1% 13.0% 15.6% 7.1% 6.1% 10.9% 0.43 
Periods 3-8 22.4% 17.6% 20.9% 22.0% 27.4% 11.6% 23.7% 20.6% 0.24 
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The final set of decisions, dataset 4, contained only 332 decisions, and 
operationalised the strictest possible definition of isomorphism, comprising only 
isomorphisms of level with a distance of zero. 
Table 5.5 shows the proportion of each group's decisions that count as isomorphic 
under the broadest definition that excludes repeated decisions. There is clearly a 
substantial range of values, so that discriminant validity is adequate. 
There is no clear sign of any maturation effect: the mean proportion oscillates before 
falling over the last two periods. The coefficient of variation falls and then rises again 
- 
there is little systematic evidence of statistical regression. 
There is one group (group 6) that consistently takes a lower proportion of isomorphic 
decisions than the mean; this is neither the most nor least active group in terms of 
overall number of decisions taken. All other groups have at least two periods when they 
are below the sample mean and two when they are above it. I conclude that there is little 
evidence of distortion through selection effects. 
5.4.3 Industry age 
This variable was simply operationalised as the quarter, in game time, in which a 
decision was recorded. 
5.4.4 Environmental uncertainty 
The measurement of environmental uncertainty poses considerable methodological 
problems in field studies, with researchers disputing the validity of research instruments 
and debating whether the correct measure is of "objective" uncertainty or "perceived" 
uncertainty (Milliken, 1987; Kreiser and Marino, 2002). Here, my aim is to seek 
associations between objective uncertainty and organisational action, with managers' 
socially constructed perceptions being an intennediate variable to be investigated, 
perhaps, at some later point. 
The seven regions in BRANDMAPS were similar in terms of munificence 
- 
resource 
constraints were not apparent in any of the seven - and complexity - the difficulty that 
they posed game participants in the understanding of market dynamics. Neither did 
either of these parameters change over time. Thus, of the three possible sources of 
environmental uncertainty (Dess and Beard, 1984; Kreiser and Marino, 2002), only the 
degree of dynamism varied between region and time period. 
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Milliken (1987) has commented that measures of environmental uncertainty should 
attempt to capture unpredictability rather than simple volatility (e. g. rates of change). 
Accordingly, I have measured this variable as the coefficient of variation of the size of 
the market, measured by value 13 , over the three periods prior to that in which the 
decision was recorded. For this variable, therefore, there were no readings prior to 
quarter 4. 
Discriminant validity again appeared adequate with a range of readings between 0 
and 1.1, though heavily skewed in the rage 0-0.2 (Table 5.6) 
Table 5.6: Numbers of instances encountered by groups of markets with volatilities 
(v) in indicated ranges 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
Not present 2 0 1 3 10 0 2 
O<v: 50.02 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
0.02<v: 50.05 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 
0.05<v: 50.1 7 8 7 7 7 8 7 
0.1<v: 50.2 5 6 6 5 3 6 5 
0.2<v: 50.3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 
0.3<v: 50.5 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 
v>0.5 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 
35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Groups are almost equally exposed to markets of differing levels of volatility, so that 
the validity of this measure is not compromised by selection effects. There is prima 
facie evidence of a maturation effect, with volatility diminishing over time; volatility 
and age are significantly correlated (Kendall tau = 
-0.24, p [one tailed test]= 0.0276). 
This is what would be expected of a real industry as it matured, but means that the 
results of H2 must be interpreted with due caution. 
5.4.5 Industry concentration 
Industry concentration was measured as the Herfindhal index (i. e. the sum of the 
squares of the market shares, measured by value 14 of all participating firms) for each of 
the seven regions in the quarter prior to that in which the decision was recorded, so that 
it represented the situation as groups would have perceived it at the time when they 
were deliberating upon their decisions. Discriminant validity of this variable appeared 
13 As with the Herfindhal index, the measures by volume and by value were highly correlated (tau = 0.58, 
p<0.000 1) but the value measure yielded the more significant results. 
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adequate, with a range of readings between 0.14 and 0.93, although heavily skewed in 
the range 0.1-0.3 (Table 5.7). 
Table S. 7: Numbers of instances encountered by groups of industries with 
Herfindhal indices (h) in indicated ranges 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
No presence 2023 13 02 
O<h-<0.15 5555555 
0.15<h-<0.2 21 21 21 21 17 21 21 
0.2<h: 50.25 8878788 
0.25<h-. e. 0.3 III1011 
0.3<h-<0.4 III1011 
0.4<h-<0.61 3323033 
h>0.61 1330031 
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
It will be seen that, with the exception of the unadventurous Group 5, which chose to 
enter no new markets and so avoided exposure to any of the most concentrated ones, all 
groups obtained near equal exposure to industries at different concentration levels. 
Selection effects therefore have not affected the internal validity of this variable. 
Maturation effects are also absent, since highly concentrated industries mostly occurred 
either at the beginning of the game, when firms are venturing into the US, Pacific and 
Canada regions, or at the end, when there has been a shake-out in those same regions. 
The correlation between the Herfindhal index and industry age is correspondingly low 
(Kendall tau--0.11, p=0.355); in effect, this element of the study resembles an ABA 
experimental design (Christensen, 1994: 357) in which an alternation of treatments - 
high industry concentration/low concentration/high concentration 
- 
serves to obviate 
sequencing and maturation effects. 
Within BRANDMAPS there is no interaction between the regions: competitive 
decisions made in one region do not affect another, so each can legitimately be regarded 
as a separate industry. My observations indicated that participants were treating them as 
entirely separate, with no observed attempts to retaliate in one region against 
competitive actions in another. 
5.4.6 Degree of knowledge 
For each of the isomorphic decisions taken by each group in Quarter n, the market 
research reports issued to the imitator group in the quarter n-I were scrutinised. The 
14 1 also calculated the Herfindhal indices for market share measured by volume. The values of the two 
sets of indices were highly correlated (Kendall tau = 0.84, p<0.0001), but the index measured by value 
gave a larger number of significant results. 
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degree of prior knowledge available to that group in making that decision was then 
assessed by the researcher and classified on the following four point ordinal scale: 
no relevant information available 
1) vague information available indicating prevailing industry norms for the 
quantity to which the decision related 
2) precise information available indicating prevailing industry norms for the 
quantity to which the decision related 
3) precise information available regarding competitors' decisions for the 
quantity and region to which the decision related. 
This classification was straightforward. Sample copies of the relevant market research 
reports and a table of the category for which each was consigned for a given class of 
information can be found in Exhibit I at the end of this chapter. 
The market research reports capture all the information that is officially available to 
each group. There remains the possibility that groups were exchanging information 
informally, or acquiring it illicitly. In one instance during the meetings I observed, 
(Group 5 meeting to discuss their Quarter 4 decisions) a group member jocularly 
boasted that she had been "spying", but this was an isolated case, and information thus 
gained appeared to be trivial, and directional rather than precise. It is therefore unlikely 
that information acquired by these means has distorted the analysis. 
5.4.7 Decision ambiguity 
The decisions taken were allocated to three classes depending on the degree of 
ambiguity involved between decision and outcome, using arguments similar to those in 
section 4.4.1. The classification is surnmarised in Table 5.8. 
Td7hl, e 5.8. - BRANDMAPS decisions classirted bv decision-outeame ambiguitv 
Causally clear Moderately ambiguous Highly ambiguous 
Price Salesforce salary Media content 
Advertising spend Sales commission Media mix 
Promotional spend Promotional type 
Salesforce effort Market entry/exit 
Salesforce compensation decisions were classified as moderately ambiguous because 
there is ambiguity whether any increase in sales will outweigh the extra cost of raising 
compensation levels, partly because of danger that increased compensation will enable 
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personnel to reach their target quarterly earnings more quickly, and may curtail rather 
than increase incentives. 
5.4.8 Effects of combinatorial complexity 
The marketing strategy was assessed at the level of the brand in a given region, since 
this was the level at which competitive decisions are taken in BRANDMAPS. I 
conducted the analysis for the period 8, the end of the game, to give isomorphic patterns 
the maximum possible time to emerge. 
The degree of isomorphism between brand strategies was assessed at four stages of 
combinatorial complexity: price alone (complexity 1), price plus advertising spend and 
promotional spend (complexity 3), those three marketing variables plus salesforce effort 
and compensation (complexity 6) and all marketing and salesforce variables 
(complexity 9). 
I used the methodology set out in section 5.4.2 to assess the degree of similarity 
between strategies, and set the breakpoint for accepting two strategic elements as 
isomorphic as a distance of 12.5%, the same criterion used for accepting a decision as 
part of dataset 3 in the earlier chapters. This meant that the step from complexity 6 to 
complexity 9 was an exacting one; isomorphism. in the three final variables, media type, 
media mix and promotional type, could only be achieved through a precise match 
between firms. 
The exception to the use of the 12.5% criterion was my initial groupings of brands by 
price point. Here, I used my own subjective perceptions of how a consumer might group 
the brands, given the range of prices at which products were being offered in that 
market. The groupings are described in Table 5.9. 
1 then tracked the extent to which firms in each price grouping retained strategic 
similarity as the combinatorial complexity of the strategy increased. I counted the 
proportions of strategic elements classified as isomorphic at each stage of combinatorial 
complexity, and also the numbers of complete matches between pairs of firms within a 
price grouping. 
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Table 5.9 Price mroupinzs bv re2ion. period 8 
Grouping I Price band I No of 
firms 
No of 
pairings 
Region I (I outside group 
_ 1.1 $600-659 3 3 
1.2 $1,300-1,600 3 3 
1.3 $1,800-2,150 3 3 
Region 2 (1 outside grouping) 
2.1 $2,600-3,100 17 21 
Region 3 (2 s outside groupings) 
3.1 $2,000-2,200 1 4 12 
3.2 $2,500-2,525 1 2 1 
Region 4 (2. firms outside groEeýý 
4.1 $2,500-2,7 08 28 
Region 5 (1 outside groupings) 
5.1 $600-689 3 3 
5.2 $1,250-1,400 2 1 
Region 6 (14m outside groupi 
6.1 $610-669 4 6 
6.2 $2,000-2,200 2 1 
6.3 $2,525-2,700 2 1 
Region 7 (1 f4rm outside groupý 
7.1 1 $2,700-2,750 12 1 
PhD Thesis 
5.4.9 Performance 
in developing a measure of performance to use as the independent variable in H8 and 
H9, it was less important to mimic the measures typically used in field studies, such as 
ROI and ROS, than to use measures that groups might be using to monitor their own 
progress relative to their competitors, since it is their construction of their relative 
position which might be expected to influence the decision to copy another group. 
Each group received each quarter detailed profit and loss statements for each brand in 
each region. However, only the aggregate earnings and dividend figure was obtainable 
for competing groups, and this was purchased by only two groups on a regular basis 
(intermittently by a third group). This was not therefore seen as an appropriate 
pcrforrnancc indicator for the purposes of this study. 
There was no consistency between groups in the measures mentioned in the observed 
meetings. Since each group received a report of stock prices for all participating groups 
each quarter, this was adopted as one performance measure. Market share was 
mentioned in several meetings, and of the seven groups, three purchased market share 
data for all or almost all quarters, a fourth group on three consecutive occasions and a 
further group once. It was therefore in common use by many groups and forms a logical 
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measure of performance in a marketing simulation. I therefore recorded market share by 
volume and by value for each group in each quarter. 
Since some groups might have focused more on growth than on actual levels of 
performance as a performance indicator, I recorded both levels and growth rates for 
each of the three measures. For stock prices, the growth rate was the percentage growth 
in price seen in each quarter versus the previous quarter. For the two market share 
measures, the growth rate recorded was the arithmetic difference between the share in 
each quarter and the previous quarter. 
5.4.10 Isornorphic pressures 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in this study I measure the strength of 'isomorphic pressures" 
as perceived by the participants. In this, I differ from previous researchers who have 
preferred, through carefully constructed proxy measures such as the den sity of contacts 
between the organisation and others in its organisational field, to measure pressures 
actually exerted by external bodies. Since no earlier surveys utilising these constructs 
were available, I operationalised the extent of isomorphic pressures using the survey 
questions set out in Table 5.10. 
These questionnaire items covered three of the four types of isomorphism identified 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The item for coercive isomorphism could also be seen 
as a partial measure of normative isomorphism, although such pressures were expected 
to be similar for all participants, since all had been subjected to identical and recent 
normative conditioning as to what constituted acceptable management behaviour 
through their MBA instruction. 
I Table 5.10: Operationalisations of the isomorphic pressures constructs I 
Respondents were asked to express agreement/disagreement on a seven-point Likert 
scale to the following questions (italicised wording did not feature on the 
questionnaire): 
Isomorphic pressures based on legitimation 
There is a lot of pressure to be the best-performing group (competitive isomorphism) 
our decisions are what our instructors would expect us to do (coercive isomorphism) 
Mimetic isomorphic pressures based on information relating to peer behaviour 
We are adopting our decisions because other groups have been succeeding with them 
The policies we use are based on successful, real-life companies 
Since the third of these questions C'We are adopting our decisions because other 
groups have been succeeding with them") did not apply at the time of first completion 
of the questionnaire, because the respondents had at that stage no opportunity to see 
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which strategies had been successful, responses to that question for that period were set 
at the mid-point (4) of the Likert scale. For all items, the full range of the scale was used 
at various stages, indicating a reasonable degree of discriminant validity. 
My original intention was to utilise the four items as a single scale, since DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) indicated that the different types of isomorphism overlapped and 
might be expected to coexist. However, the Cronbach alpha of the combined measures 
was only 0.355, and no combination of three of the four measures showed a Cronbach 
alpha higher than 0.40, well below the accepted minimum of 0.7. Even the two items 
relating to mimetic pressures based on information, which might be expected to reflect 
different aspects of a respondent's impulse to copy success, correlated poorly, with a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.19. The two items relating to legitimation had a Cronbach alpha of 
0.12. 
I discuss possible reasons for, and implications of, these low reliability scores in 
section 5.6 below. However, my conclusion was that the four questions, whilst 
legitimately grounded in a single body of theory, were in fact measuring different 
things, and I have therefore used four separate single item measures of isomorphic 
pressure, whose names and abbreviations are summarised in Table 5.11. 
Tahle 5.11 Measures of isomorphiC Dressure 
Question Construct Abbreviation Range 
There is a lot of pressure to Competitive isomorphic COMPI 3.25-6.25 
be the best-performing group pressure 
Our decisions are what our Coercive isomorphic COERCI 2.66-5.75 
instructors would expect us to pressure 
do 
We are adopting our Mimetic pressure from MIMIN 1.75-5.67 
decisions because other groups within industry 
have been succeeding with them 
The policies we use are Mimetic pressure external to MIMEX 3.00-6.25 
based on successful, real-life industry 
companies I I II 
As with the two following survey-based measures, the mean score for each group was 
computed for each of the four periods at which the questionnaire was administered. This 
sacrificed some of the discriminant power, but a broad range of responses was obtained 
for each of the four measures (Table 5.11, column 4). 
In testing Hlla, and Hllb, there was the fin-ther complication that theory has not 
established by what mechanism such pressures translate into action. 
One plausible train of events is that isomorphic decision-making would be stimulated 
by a rise in the overall level of pressures within the organisation, as perceived by the 
142 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
totality of its members. It is equally possible, however, that isomorphic decision-making 
might be governed by the number of people in the organisation that were experiencing a 
certain, critical level of isomorphic pressure, with isomorphic decision-making 
0 becoming the norm once that proportion of 
individuals surpassed a certain boundary. 
I For Hlla and Hllb, I therefore operationalised two versions of each of the 
isomorphic pressure constructs. The mean level of pressure within the group would be 
the appropriate measure if the first of the two mechanisms described in the previous 
paragraph was the relevant one. For the second eventuality, I measured the proportion 
of group members reporting a pressure above 4.5 on the seven point scale. The choice 
of the 4.5 breakpoint was to some extent arbitrary, based on my scrutiny of the raw data. 
5.4.11 Political behaviour 
I experienced considerable problems in operationalising a valid measure of political 
behaviour for this study. The political behaviours observed in the context of 
organisational change (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992) were unlikely to manifest 
themselves in the context of the small groups undertaking the BRANDMAPS exercise. 
For example: since resources within the game were not dependent on particular personal 
behaviours, and since real-life resources such as computers were freely and equally 
available to all, the granting and withdrawal of resources was not available as a 
political behaviour; information, while scarce, was equally available to all members in a 
group, so that counter intelligence information did not feature as an effective political 
weapon; and the sponsorship of change agents and the removal of resistant elites were 
not options in small groups. I therefore did not seek to measure these behaviours in this 
study. 
Although a field-tested scale for measuring political behaviour in SDM already 
existed (Dean and Sharfman, 1996), it too was inappropriate for this study and sample. 
Dean and Sharfman's (hereafter D&S) first question ("Were group members primarily 
concerned with their own goals, or those of the organisation? ") lacked relevance in the 
context of a newly created "organisation" with no goals outside the game. Where 
individuals did have personal goals at variance with those of the team, these were more 
likely to translate into free rider behaviour than into an attempt to manipulate the group 
decisions. I had already observed, during trial research, that students reacted strongly 
against implications that some were exerting power over others 
- 
there was a strong 
group norm to appear democratic, and questions mentioning power had low 
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discriminant validity. Thus, I did not use D&S' third question C'To what extent was the 
decision affected by power and influence among group members? "). Finally, I judged 
that the open-ended questions, drafted by D&S for use in their structured interviews 
with experienced managers, were less appropriate for use in questionnaires to be 
completed in a limited timeframe without recourse to advice in the event of doubts as to 
what was being sought. 
Table 5.12: Operationalisations of the political behaviour construct 
Respondents were asked to express agreement/disagreement on a seven-point Likert 
scale to the following questions: 
There was no dispute about the decisions we finally took last quarter 
Many in the group initially opposed the decisions that were taken 
Several of the group got together to press for this set of decisions, although the rest were 
less sure 
Accordingly, I tried to design questions that evoked evidence of Phenomena that were 
indicative of political behaviour, rather than get students to indicate directly whether 
they believed that political factors were at work. The phenomena in question were: the 
existence of disputes and opposing views within the group prior to the decision, since in 
the absence of disputes, political behaviour will not manifest itself-, and negotiation 
between coalitions (Pfeffer, 1981; Narayanan and Fahey, 1982; Pettigrew and Whipp, 
199 1). The relevant questionnaire items are shown in Table 5.12 
Although the questions relate more to the discovery of the preconditions for political 
behaviour than to the identification of such behaviour in operation, the hope was that 
together they would furnish a reliable gauge of political activity. However, the 
reliability of the combined measure of political behaviour, derived from averaging the 
scores of the three questions, was poor, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.35.1 have therefore 
used the responses to the final question in table 5.12 as a single item indicator of 
political behaviour. 
The discriminant validity of this measure appeared adequate, with all seven points on 
the scale being used, though on amalgamation of individual into group measures, the 
range was compressed to 2.25-5-0. 
This variable may have been subject to a self-presentation effect, with subjects 
reluctant to admit to the existence of conflict in their group. Maturation and selection 
effects were controlled for by the use of relevant control variables (see 5.4.13) and so 
are not discussed here. 
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5.4.12 Strategic intent 
I was unable to discover an appropriate measurement scale for strategic intent in the 
literature. Collins and Porras (1994) have instruments for assessing the attributes of 
visionary companies, but this relies on abundant pre-existing data about the firm and its 
institutions and could not be applied to a student group in a simulation. Bourgeois 
(1980) measured the related concept of consensus on goals by comparing the weights 
managers attached to items such as profit, growth, innovation and community service 
- 
again, this was not appropriate to the simulation context and in any case omitted the 
visionary and long-term aspects of strategic intent. 
FTable 5.13: Operationalisations of the strategic intent construct 
Respondents were asked to express agreement/disagreement on a seven-point Likert 
scale to the following questions: 
We have a clear view of the winning strategy 
My team members and I share similar goals and objectives 
We have a long-term plan that guides our decisions 
A scale for strategic intent was therefore developed based upon plausible attributes of 
shared long-term vision, and is shown in Table 5.13. As with the previous two 
variables, discriminant validity appeared adequate, although compressed by the group 
averaging process to a range of 3.66-6.09. Reliability for the combined three-variable 
measure was just outside normally accepted criteria, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.68. 
5.4.13 Control variables 
For the examination of HIO, HI la and HI lb, where regression analysis is employed to 
assess the degree of association, I included a number of control variables. 
5.4.13.1 Group heterogeneity 
The reasons for including measures of group heterogeneity as control variables were 
established in section 4.6.1.1 have followed common practice (Hambrick, Cho and 
Chen, 1996) in using demographic proxy measures of differences in team members' 
cognitive structures, rather than seeking to measure these structures directly. 
Educational background is one variable that is commonly measured in diversity 
studies, but was not needed in this case since this sample was drawn from an MBA class 
with highly standardised entry requirements. Management tenure within the firm is 
another frequently measured source of diversity. In this exercise, all members of all 
groups start with no experience and develop experience together at, presumably, a 
broadly similar rate, so length of service will not be a source of inter-group variation. 
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However, within this study observations from different time periods were to be 
combined in a single series, and differences in tenure, along with degree of familiarity 
within the group may be a source of longitudinal variation. I therefore introduced a 
control variable representing elapsed time, measured simply by the period in which an 
observation was taken. 
Of the other sources of diversity commonly measured in studies, age heterogeneity 
could be controlled for by using a variable representing the coefficient of variation 
(standard deviation/mean) of the ages in each group, but information on functional 
backgrounds was unavailable. I have, however, introduced dummy variables to take 
account of whether groups were all full-time students, all part-time students or mixed. 
Heterogeneity in national background is not commonly controlled for in diversity 
studies, presumably because they invariably use managers or samples of firms drawn 
exclusively from the USA. Given the large number of nationalities represented within 
the sample, and the abundant evidence- (Hofstede, 1980,1991) of national cultural 
differences as a potent potential source of cognitive heterogeneity, I introduced a 
control variable measured by the number of nationalities present in each team of five. 
This varied between 1 (there were some all UK groups) and 5. Recent research has in 
fact suggested (Earley and Mosakowski, 2000) that the relationship between consensus 
formation and number of nationalities is U-shaped, with consensus being favoured by 
high degrees of both uniformity and diversity but inhibited by intermediate levels of 
diversity. However, I felt that our teams were too small to permit a full 
operationalisation of this relationship, and so opted for a simpler, linear version. 
. 
5.4.13.2 Top management team tenure 
As already discussed (section 3.6.5) there is are empirically established links between 
length of TMT tenure and adherence to industry norms. Hence it would be expected that 
the length of tenure of a TMT would be positively associated with sensitivity to 
isomorphic pressures. 
Since all groups in the BRANDMAPS simulation have the same length of tenure, it is 
impossible in the current exercise to test this variable independently of industry age. I 
do, however, include industry age as a control variable to take account of increasing 
length of tenure in the population as a whole. 
5.4-13.3 Average age 
Since managers have been shown to become more risk-averse with age (Carlson and 
Karlsson, 1970; Vroom and Pahl, 1971; Child, 1974; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and 
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since risk-aversion is a possible source of isomorphic pressures, I controlled for the 
average age of group members. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated why a simulated environment is appropriate for 
studies in which it is necessary both to gather attitudinal data and to measure precisely 
which decisions were taken, on the basis of which information, and how closely they 
resembled those previously taken by others. I have summarised the issues on internal 
and external validity of quasi-field studies based on simulated environments, showing 
that there is a consistent stream of such studies, including those based, like the current 
study, on marketing games, in reputable j ournals. 
I have reviewed the issues relating to internal and external validity arising from both 
the overall study design and the operationalisation of individual variables, 
demonstrating that there are no significant threats to validity on either count. I have 
demonstrated that though the design for the study is basically sound, there is some 
danger that the small sample size and low number or readings for the isomorphic 
pressure, political behaviour and strategic intent variables may prejudice reliability. 
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Exhibit 1: BRANDMAPS Marketing Research Content 
Analysis 
I= vague data on industry 
norms 
2= precise data on industry 
norms 
3= precise information on 
competitors'decisions 
Competitive Information 
- 
Dividends and Earnings 
2 Brand Composition Analysis 
3 Industry Sales Force Size 
4 Industry Advertising 
5 Industry Sales Force Compensation 
6 Industry Promotion 
7 Industry R&D 
8 Media Content Analysis 
9 Promotional Type Analysis 
10 Conjoint Analysis 
II Customer Brand Awareness 
12 Concept Testing 
13 Preference Testing, Two 3 Existing Brands 
Preference Testing, One 
14 Existing and One Hypothetical 3 
Brand 
15 Preference Testing, Two Hypothetical Brands 
16 Operating Statistics Report 
17 Brand Quality Ratings 
IS Patent Search 
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t: 
1= vague data on industry 
norms 
2 
=precise data on industry 
norms 
3 
=precise information on 
competitors'decisions 
34 Another Conjoint Analysis 
35 Advertising Program Experiment 
36 Competitive Information - Brand Marketing Profiles 
Competitive Information 
- 
37 Sales Force Compensation 
Statistics 
38 Promotion Experiment 
39 Competitive Information - Unfilled Sales Volume 
40 Competitive Information - Brand Margin Analysis 
41 Regional Summary Analysis 
42 Marketing Research Ordering Statistics 
43 Marketing Support Spending Productivity Analysis 
44 Population Forecasts 
45 Per Capita Income Forecasts 
46 Consumer Price Index Forecasts 
47 Self-Reported Attribute Preferences 
48 Brand Satisfaction Ratings 
49 Dealer Inventory Analysis 
50 Price Sensitivity Analysis 
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; ZKETIýG RESEARCH STUDY #1 (COMP INFO 
- 
DIVIDENDS-AND EARNINGS 
CURRENT QUARTER CUMULATIVE 
DIVIRNDS EARNINGS ----------------- 
----------- ----- ------ 
YEAR-TO-DATE 
EARNINGS , 
------------ 
FIRM 1 1.000,000 
-155,440 FIRM 202.640.000 
FIRM 3 6.343.242 9.029.727 
-2.355.433 2.641.010 
19.029,727 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #2 (BRAND COMPOSITION A ALYSIS' 
PRODUCT 7-2 COMPOSITION: 65/23/25/45/ 5/5/8 [Patent Protection Zone 191 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #3 (INDUSTRY SALES FORCE SIZE 
QUARTER 25
---------- 
QUARTER 26
---------- 
QUARTER 27 QUARTER 28
---------- 
---------- 
QUARTER 29
---------- 
REG. 1 
REG. 2 
REG. 3 
REG. 4 
REG. 5 
TOTAL 
- (U. S. 
(U. K. (C. EUROPE) 
(CANADA )(PACIFIC ) 
310 
295 
320 
300 
100 
1.325 
390 
195 
375 
200 
80 
1.240 
450 
100 
375 
255 
90 
1.270 
480 
150 
190 
270 
85 
1.175 
575 
125 
210 
225 
92 
1,227 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 14 (INDUSTRY ADVERTISING 
-QUARTER 12 QUARTER 13 QUARTER 14 QUARTER 15 QUARTER 16
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
REG. 1 (EASTERN ) 7.500.000 1.600.000 1.000.000 3.000.000 5.500.000 
REG. 2 (SOUTHERN) 
. 
6.400.000- 2.650.000 2.750.000 7.000.000 6.500,000 
REG. 3 (CENTRAL ) 9,050,000 7.900.000 8.600.000 8.000.000 5.500.000 
i6fAL 28.950.000 25.200.000 43.050.000 45,200,000 42.000.000 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY f5 (INDUSTRY SALES FORCE COMPENSATION 
ALL REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION 3 REGION 4 
- 
REGIONS 
---------- 
(EASTERN ) 
----------- 
(SOUTHERN) 
----------- 
(CENTRAL ) 
----------- 
(PACIFIC 
----------- 
Salaries 
Commissions 
Compensation 
Compensation (SD)- 
Commission Rate 
2.580 
650 
3.230 
'278 
1.8 
2.602 
-699 3.301 
281 
1.7 
2.533 
975 
3.512' 
321 
2.0 
2.611 
484 
. 
3.095 
219 
1.5 
2.568 
464 
3.032 
234 
2.0 
--- - -- - 
---------- - ----- 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #6 (INDUSTRY PROMOTION 
QUARTER 5 QUARTER 6 QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8 QUARTER 9
---------- 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
REG. 1 (EASTERN ) 5.960.000 7.192.000 5,725,186 9,200,000 5.200.000 
REG. 2 (SOUTHERN) 4.760,000 ?. 408.000 1.500.000 4.500.000 3,000,000 
REG. 3 (CENTRAL ) 6,250.000 4.500.000 9.225,186 5,500.000 4,750.000 
REG. 4 (WESTERN ) 7.000.000 4,650.000 6.306.483 1.300.000 6,700.000 
TOTAL 23.970.000 18.750.000 22.756.856 20.500.000 24.650.000 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 17 (INDUSTRY R&D 
I 
QUARTER 15 QUARTER 16 QUARTER 17 QUARTER 18 QUARTER'19 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---.; ------ ---------- 
AVERAGE R&D 571,2ýO 497.500 412.500 302.6 66 244.375 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #8 (MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 
QUARTER7 55 QUARTER 56 QUARTER 57 QUARTER 58 QUARTER 59
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
REGION 1 (U. S.. I 
Product 1-1 12 12 12 15 
Product 2-1 1 0 21 7 14 
Product 4-2 19 19 13 14 11 
Product 6-1 8 15 15 15- 15 
REGION 2 (EUROPE. 
Product 1-3 7 7 7 
Product 3-2 9 10 
Product 4-3 16 7 7 7 15 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 19 (PROMOTIONAL TYPE ANALYSIS 
QUARTER 8 
---------- 
QUARTER 9 
--------- 
4 
QUARTER 10
---------- 
QUARTER 11
---------- 
QUARTER 12
---------- 
REGION 1 (EASTERN ) 
Product 1-1 10 0 0 32 
Product 2-1 48 0 23 26 92 
Product 5-1 9 9 0 6 10 
Product 6-1 0 10 10 10 10 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 
Product 3-2 43 94 
Product 4-3 96 10 10 10 10 
0' 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 110 (CONJOINT ANALYSIS 
REGION 6 (PACIFIC 
---------- 
RELATIVE SYNTECH 13.7% 
IMPORTANCES PLUMBO 23.2% (given the GLOMP 23.6% 
attribute TRIMICRO 17.6% 
levels in the FRALANGE 
. 
0% 
design of COMPATIBILITY 4.6% 
this conjoint WARRANTY. 3.1% 
study) DEALER PRICE 14.1% 
WEIGHTS FOR Level 11 (10) 65.3 
ATTRIBUTE A. Level #2 (40) 64.4 
SYNTECH Level #3 (60) 37.8 
Level #4 (70) 7.2 
WEIGHTS FOR Level 1 (20) 1.6 
ATTRIBUTE 12. Level 
fi 
(40) 25.4 
PLUMBO Level #3 (60) 100.0 
WEIGHTS FOR Level #1 (20) 99.9 
ATTRIBUTE #3. Level #2 (40) 84.4 
GLOMP Level #3 (60) 17.6 
Level #4 (80) 
.0 
WEIGHTS FOR Level #1 (10) 10.6 
ATTRIBUTE 14. Level #2 (20) 39.1 
TRIMICRO Level #3 (30) 67.8 
Level #4 (40) 85.2 
WEIGHTS FOR Levelll ( 5) 13.5 
ATTRIBUTE #5. 
FRAJAGE 
WEIGHTS FOR Level #1 ( 2) 43.8 
ATTRIBUTE 16, Level #2 ( 4) 51.3 
COMPATIBILITY Level #3 ( 6) 56.9 
Level #4 ( 8) 63.4 
WEIGHTS FOR Level #1 ( 2) 47.1 
ATTRIBUTE Level 2 (- 1 4) 52.9 
WARRANTY Level 3( 6) 56.5 
Level #4 ( 8) 60.3 
WEIGHTS FOR Level 1( 1 500) 90.3 
ATTRIBUTE #8. Level 2( 750) 67.2 
DEAJ-ER PRICE Level #3 ( 1.000) 44.4 
Level #4 ( 1.250) 30.4 
MARKETING-RESEARCH 
-- --- ---------- 
STUDY #11 
-- - --- 
-(CUSTOMER BRAND AWARENESS 
- ----- 
QUARTER 6 
---------- 
QUARTER 7 
---------- 
QUARTER 8 
---------- 
QUARTER 9 
---------- 
QUARTER 10
---------- 
REGION 1 (NORTHERN) 
Product 1-1 37.92 28.82 24.92 42.42 
Product 3-1 43.00 
-62.67 63.17 50.16 53.64 
Product 4-2 32.60 36.32 43.51 40.50 66.13 
Product 6-1 30.60 59.16 76.32 79.95 78.74 
REGION 2 (EASTERN 
Product 1-3 19.15 42.37 47.02 
Product 3-2 17.62 47.28 
Product 4-3 17.92 28.76 46.27 48.79 73.25 
Adrian Haberberg 
WKETING'RESEARCH STUDY f12 (CONCEPT TESTING 
CONCEPT TESTING RESULTS FOR REGION 3 (S. EUROPE): QUARTER 33CONCEPT 34/76/12/91/ 5/2/6 13.9% DEGREE-OF-INTEREST 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #13 (PREFERENCE TESTING. 2 EXISTING BRANDS 
-- - ----- - ---- 
TEST RESULTS FOR REGION 1 (NORTHERN): QUARTER 6 (SPRING 
PRODUCT 1-2. DEALER PRICE-- 880 40.1% PREFERENCE 
PRODUCT 9-3. DEALER PRICE 
- 
1.520 59.9% PREFERENCE 
TEST RESULTS FOR REGION 1 (NORTHERN): QUARTER 6 (SPRING 
PRODUCT 1-2. DEALER PRICE 
- 
880 12.9% PREFERENCE 
PRODUCT 9-3. DEALER PRICE 
- 
1.222 81.1% PREFERENCE 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY R4 (PREFERENCE TESTING. 1 EX AND 1 HYP 
TEST RESULTS FOR REGION 2 (WESTERN ): QUARTER 22 (SPRING 
PRODUCT 8-3. DEALER PRICE 
- 
1.841 12.9% PREFERENCE PRODUCT'33/35/67/12/ 5/7/8. DEALER PRICE 
- 
1.922 87.1% PREFERENCE 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #15 (PREFERENCE TESTING. 2 HYP BRANDS 
TEST RESULTS FOR REGION 
.3 (EUROPE ): QUARTER 36 (FALL RODUCT 22/12/27/43/ 5/3/2. DEALER PRICE 
- 
1.520 : 41.2% PREFERENCE PRODUCT 94/44/ 4/11/ 5/9/3. DEALER PRICE 
- 
1.110 : 58.8% PREFERENCE 
P 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.---- 
--- -- 
-- 
-i 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 116 (OPERATING STATISTICS-REPORT 
OPERATING STATISTICS (YTD) 
ADVERTISING/REVENUES 
EMERGENCY PRODUCTION PREMIUMS/REVENUES 
INVENTORY CHARGES/REVENUES 
[EMERG PREMIUMS + INV CHARGES]/REVENUES 
. 
MARKETING RESEARCH/REVENUES 
PROMOTION/REVENUES 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/REVENUES 
SALES FORCE SPENDING/REVENUES 
DEPRECIATION/PRODUCTION VOLUME 
LOST MARGIN DUE TO STOCKOUTS/REVENUES 
MARKETING SUPPORT SPENDING/REVENUES 
PROFITS/REVENUES 
SALES FORECASTING ACCURACY SCORE 
OPERATING EFFICIENCY SCORE 
FINANCIAL RATIOS 
---------------- DEBT LEVERAGE 
INVENTORY TURNS 
REVENUE To WORKING CAPITAL 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
RETURN ON EQUITY 
INDUSTRY NORMS 
FIRM 6 MINIMUM AVERAGE MAXIKlM ------------------------- 
------ ------- ------- ------- 
7.0% 2.5% 5.7% 9.4% 
M 0% M M 
1.4% M 1.5% 2.7% 
1.4% M 1.5% 2.7% 
* 
l% ix 
. 
4% 
. 
9% 
4.4% 1.3% 4.3% 6.8% 
. 
5% 
. 
3% M 1.8% 
8.3% 2.7% 4.8% 8.3% 
112.2 108.2 119.6 129.0 
' 
0% M 
. 
6% 2.6% 
20.2% 6.9% 15.8% 22.3% 
6.5% 3.9% 8.2% MAX 
22.8% 22.8% 55.4 95.5% 
29.0 25.0 35.0 55.5 
4.3% 0% 17.6% 56.1% 
3.9 3.9 6.8 12.2 
20.0 2.2 14.2 20.0 
4.4% 2.1% 6. Ot 11.9% 
4.6% 2.1% 7.2% 15.3% 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY417 (BRAND QMITY RATINGS 
QUA 
, 
RTER 25 
---------- 
QUARTER 26
---------- 
QUARTER 27
.......... 
QUARTER 28
.......... 
QUARTER 29
.......... 
Product 1-1 45.57 35.29 28.11 24.77 
Product 1-2 2.28 4.63 6.11 24.78 46.77 Product 1-3 2.17 22.54 47.18 Product 2-1 31.67 23.71 27.49 42.20' 49.84 
Product 2-2 36.49 43.91 48.65 52.93 59.65 
Product 2-3 20.50 32.05 42.03 48.93 52.66 
Product 3-1 58.54 50.28 58.11 62.11 63.41 
Product 3-2 37.10 49.08 55.92 51.82 58.26 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #18 (PATENT SEARCH 
***. PATENT FOR PROPOSED PRODUCT OMPOSITION IS AVAILABLE 
PRODUCT 35/45/55/12/ 5/9/7 WOULD NOT VIOLATE MY EXISTING PATENT(S) 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY h9 (COMPETITIVE INFORMATION BALANCE SHEETS) 
DIVISIONAL BALANCE SHEET FOR FIRM 1. QUARTER 55
ASSETS 
CASH 
15: 
431.851 
MARKETABLE SECURITIES 9 045.029 
FINISHED GOODS INVENTORY: 
PRODUCT 1 10.467 Units) CS 601.25 Per Unit] 6.293.331 
PRODUCT 20 Units) ES 
. 
00 Per Unit] 0 
PRODUCT 3 44.795 Units) 468.01 Per Unit) 20.964.326 
PLANT: 
CURRENT PLANT (CAPACITY 
- 
99.7161 71.741.712 
PLANT ON ORDER FOR 1 QUARTER HENCE (CAPACITY 
- 
01 0 
TOTAL ASSETS 123.476.249 
UABILITIES MD EQUITY 
----------------- LOANS 0 
INITIAL (QUARTER 0) CORPORATE CAPITALIZATION 120.000.000 
- 
DIVIDENDS-PAID. PRIOR TO-THIS-YEAR 
-3.608.825 
- 
DIVIDENDS PAID, END OF QUARTER 1 OF THIS YEAR 
-880.000 
- 
DIVIDENDS PAID.. END OF QUARTER 2 OF THIS YEAR 0 
- 
DIVIDENDS PAID. END OF QUARTER 3 OF THIS YEAR 0 
- 
DIVIDENDS PAID. END OF QUARTER 4 OF THIS YEAR 0 
+ RETAINED EARNINGS (AFTER-TAX INCOME PRIOR TO THIS YEAR) 5,325.074 
, 
+-YEARJO-DATE EARNINGS (AFTER-TAX INCOME THIS YEAR) 2.640.000 
TOTAL IABILITIES AND EQUITY 123,476.249 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY'#20 (TEST MARKETING EXPERIMENT 
EXPERIMENTAL (TEST CASE) SCENARIO 
TEST MARKETING RESULTS FOR PRODUCT 1-1 FOR REGION 2 (EUROPE 
1 
QUARTER 11 QUARTER 12 QUARTER 131 rVIA0 A QUARTER 14(Actual] 
----------- 
[Forecast) 
----------- - 
(Forecast] 
---------- 
[Forecast] 
----------- 
MARKET SHARE 8.51% 5.65% 5.12% 4.90% 
INDUSTRY SALES (Units) 85.497 92.499 96,290 89.470 
**PRICE 570 -700 700 700 
BRAND SALES (Units) 7.278 5.224 4.930 4.381 
REVENUE 4 148.460 3.656.800 1 451 000 3,066.700 
PRODUCT OSTS 1: 519.578 1.090.722 : : 029 338 914.712 
REBATES 0 0 a 0 
SALES COMMISSIONS 41.484 109.704 103,530 92.001 
TRANSPORTATION 189.228 135.824 128.180 113.906 
DUTIES & TARIFFS 0 0 0 0 
GROSS MARGIN 2,398.170 2,320.550 2.189.952 1.946.081 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS. 4.841.484 6.209.704 6.203.530 6.192.001 
OPERATING INCOME 
-2.443,314 -3.889.154 -4.013.578 -4,245.920 
-product Composition 11/12/13/ 11/12/13/ 11/12/13/ 11/12/13/ 
24/ 5/5/6 24/ P/7/7 24/ 5/7/7 24/ 5/7/7 
Advertising Spending 2.000.000 2.000.000 2.000.000 2.000,000 
Media Content & Mix 1& 55555 1& 55555 1& 55555 1& 55555 
-Promotion Spending 1.000.000 2.000.000 2.000.000 2,000.000 
Promotional Type 10 10 10 10 
Res & Dev Spending 250.000 250.000 250.000 250.000 
**Sales Force Salary + Commis 2.500 +1 3.000 +3 3.000 +3 3,000 +3 
Sales Force Size 
.. 
200 200 200 200 
Sales Force Time Allocation 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Sales Force Spending 1.541.484 1.909,704 1.903.530 1.892.001 
Customer Brand Awareness 76.96% 75.96% 75.72% 72.75% 
Dealer Promotion Awareness 93-83% 98.32% 96.05% 96.10% 
Dealer Availability 74.98% 74.31% 68.75% 65.01% 
Product Quality Rating 55.93% 54.94% 56.03% 55.06% 
Perceived Performance 
. 
01% 
. 
01% 
. 
01% 
. 
01% 
Perceived Convenience 39.42% 26.98% 25.49% 23.43% 
***-NOTES 
In'this test marketing experiment, OPERAT ING INCOME is calculated assuming 
that administrative overhead for-this bra nd Is at Its base level and. that 
research and development spending 'associa ted with this brand is completely 
allocated to this market regi on. Double asterisks ("**") to the left denote 
decision variables that have beefi changed in this test marketing experiment. 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 121'(BRAND PERCEPTUAL RATINGS 
CORRELATION BETWEEN VOLUME MARKET SHARE AND 
.. 
-------------- --------- ---------- PREVIOUS --------- PERFOR. ------ CONVEN 
Data DEALER VOLUME PER PER 
Points PERFOR CONVEN PRICE MK SHARE $000 $000 
REGION 1 (EASTERN ------ 11 
-. 
01 
. 
35 ------ ------ ------ 
-. 
01 
. 
65 -------- ------ 
. 
08 
. 
49 ------ 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 9 
. 
58 
. 
61 
. 
01 
. 
87 
. 
64 
. 
64 
REGION 3 (CENTRAL ) 6 
. 
78 
. 
83 
. 
00 
. 
80 
. 
75 
. 
82 
REGION 4 (WESTERN ) 10 
. 
59 
. 
84 
. 
39 
. 
85 
. 
63 
. 
86 
REGION 5 (PACIFIC ) 14 
. 
34 
. 
23 
. 
48 
. 
65 
. 
23. 
. 
34 
REGION 6 (EUROPE ) 15 
. 
56 
. 
38 
. 
32 
. 
70 
. 
44 
. 
46 
REGION 7 (CANADA ) 8 
. 
44 
. 
33 
. 
22 
. 
36 
. 
41 
.. 
51 
MEAN SELF-RE PORTED IMPORTANCE W IGHTS 
--------------------------------- PERFORMANCE CONVENIENCE D ALER -------- 
PERCEPTION PERCEPTION PRICE SUM 
REGION 1 (EASTERN ----------- - 19.42 --------- 30.86 - ------ 49.72 ...... 100.00 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 24.62 33.04 42.34 100.00 
REGION 3 (CENTRAL 32.82 29.18 37.99 100.00 
REGION 4 (WESTERN 29.96 27.01 43.03 100.00 
REGION 5 (PACIFIC 33.21 32.12 34.67. 100.00 
REGION 6 (EUROPE 41.22 21.22 37.56 100.00 
REGION 7. (CANADA 28.98 51.01 20.01 100.00 
83 
67 
50 
33 
17 
i 
25 50 75 '100 
C P_ 
MOW DOLLAR-SCALED RATINt: CURRENT VALUES AND CHANGE RATES 
I P+ 
90.1 D 
72.1 
54.1 C- 
36.0 
18.0, U* 
_E 
M 
L 
E 
G 
E 
N 
C 
PERCEPTUAL MAPS FOR MARKET REGION 3 (CENTRAL ): QUARTER 88 (FALL 
------------------------------- I -------------------------------------- 
P RAW RATINGS: CURRENT VALUES AND CHANGE RATES 
I P+ 
C/$000 
9.9 19.9.29.8 39.8 
A 1-1 E 2-1 131 M 4-1 0 5-1 U 6-1 Y M 1 y 381  8-1 7 9-1 
B 1-2 F 2-2 J32 N 4-2 R 5-2 V 6-2 
_ 
! Z7 7  
-2  4e  8-2  8 9-2 
C 1-3 G 2-3 K 3-3 0 4-3 S 5-3 W 6-3 
J 
7 3 1 - 5 8-3 9 9-3 
D 1-4 H 2-4 L 3-4 P 4-4 T 5-4 X 6-4 7_4 2 -4 6 B-44 @ 9-4 
C+ 
L 
E 
G 
E 
N 
D 
uI 
C+ 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #22 (AGGREGATE MARKET STýTISTICS 
CONSUMER PER INDUSTRY SALES VOLUME 
PRICE CAPITA 
------------ --------- POPULATION 
------------ 
INDEX 
-------- 
INCOME 
------ 
PREVIOUS 
-- - 
ýURRENT 
.. REGION 1 (EASTERN 91.715.304 1.130 13.562 ---- - -- 255.093 ....... 278.035 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 40.534,496 975 11.383 99.532 103.557 
REGION 3 (CENTRAL ) 72.766.512 1.096 13.022 237.398 233.082 
REGION 4 (WESTERN ) 51.312.308 1.073 12.474 192.002 205.160 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #23 (REFORMULATION ACTIVITY 
NUMBER OF REFORMULATION BIDS SUBMITTED 
-4 
LOWEST REFORMULATION BID SUBMITTED 
-$ 555 
AVERAGE REFORMULATION BID SUBMITTED 
-S 404.438 
HIGHEST REFORMULATION BID SUBMITTED 
-S 673.198 
NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL REFORMULATION BIDS 
-4 
LOWEST SUCCESSFVL-REFORMULATION 9ID 
-S 555 
Product 1-3 Has Been Reformulated Since Last Quarter 
ProUt 2-3 Has Been Reformulated Since Last Quarter 
Product 74 Has Been Reformulated Since Last Quarter 
Product 9-1 Has Been Reformulated Since Last Quarter 
Study 24 
- 
see overleaf 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY f25 (DEALER PRICES 
QUARTER 5 QUARTER 6 QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8 QUARTER 9 
---------- ---------- ---------- 
---------- .......... 
REGION 1 (EASTERN 
Product 1-1 735 733 1.288 1,288 
Product 4-2 1.288 1.403 1.408 1.433 1.608 
Product 6-1 855 2.274 2.289 2.398 3.185 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #26 (DEALER EBATES 
Wý-- 
QUARTER 5 QUARTER 6 QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8 QUARTER 9 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
REGION 1 (U. S. 
Product 1-1 0000 
Product 2-1 00 20 00 
Product 6-1 0000 
REGION 2 (CANADA 
Product 1-3 000 
Product 2-2 40 0 
Product 3-2 00 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #24 (MARKET SHARES 
OVERALL VOLUME MARKET SHARES [CURRENT] 
-------- ------ ------ ------ --------- FIRM 1 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
11.44 (Previous Market Share 9 99 
FIRM 2 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
26.58 (Previous Market Share : 27: 07 
FIRM 3 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
8.79 [Previous Market Share 
- 
6.68 
FIRM 4 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
23.34 (Previous Market Share 
- 
22.891 
FIRM 5 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
25.03 [Previous Market Share 
- 
24.16] 
FIRM 6 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
4.82 (Previous Market Share 
- 
9.211 
VOLUME MARKET SHARES 
-------------------- 
QUARTER 41 QUARTER 42 QUARTER 43 QUARTER 44 QUARTER 45
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- .......... 
REGION 1 (EASTERN ) 
Product 1-1 12.72 6.84 
. 
08 5.59 
Product 2-1 11.66 4.62 10.74 17.20 12.70 
Product 3-1 9.39 12.90 16.51 15.44 15.84 
Product 4-2 37.11 43.28 26.89 29.23 32.30 
froduct, 8-1 15.28 13.59 17.15 9.84 19.37 
Product 6-1 6.62 17.54 28.62 28.29 14.20 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 
Product 1-3 6.29 13.50 13.01 
Product 2-2 1.25 
. 
98 
Prbduct 3-2 5.28 13.59 
Product 4-3 19.08 54.42 74.43 68.98 72.42 
OVERALL DOLLAR MARKET SHARES (CURRENT] 
-------------------------------------- FIRM 1 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
9.69 [Previous Market Share 
- 
8.751 
FIRM 2*OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
24.94 (Previous Market Share 
- 
23.471 
FIRM 3 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
10.24 (Previous-Market Share 
- 
8.881 
FIRM 4 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
21.70 (Previous Market Share 
- 
18.371 
FIRM 5 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
22.66 [Previous Market Share 
- 
25.981 
FIRM 6 OVERALL MARKET SHARE 
- 
10.77 (Previous Market Share 
- 
14.551 
DOLLAR MARKET SHARES 
-------------------- 
QUARTER 41 QUARTER 42 QUARTER 43 QUARTER 44 QUARTER 45
---------- ----- 7 ---- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
REGION 1 (EASTERN 
Product 1-1 9.42 3.16 
. 
05 4.02 
Product 2-1 8.53 2.10 8.58 12.96 10.97 
Product 3-1 8.66* 19.59 20.50 18.12 16.91 
'Product 4-2 48.14 38.22 19.52 22.56 29.01 
Product 5-1 12.20 10.84 17.58 9.81 13.84 
Product 6-1 5.70 25.09 33.76 36.55 25.26 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 
Product 1-3 8.25 15.32 14.63 
Product 2-2 1.11 
. 
85 
Product 3-2 6.42 14.20 
Product 4-3 22.15 55.38 75.06 68.78 70.33 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 127 (DEALER PROMOTION AWARENESS 
QUARTER 5 QUARTER 6 QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8 QUARTER 9
ING ý ARCH  
---------- 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
A REGION 1 (CANADA  
rEG FN 
Prooduct 2-1 23.85 
. 
13 82.31 87.71 89.74 
Product 
r3-1 
75.09 77.27 77.51 49.43 88.59 
Product 4-2 82.35 87.46 88.00 86.68 77.47 
Product 5-1 42.20 14.52 
. 
07 49.84 72.34 
Product 
: 
6-1 
. 
01 89.01.89.15 91.53 96.85 
PhD Thesis 
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MAR KETING RESEARCH STUDY 128 (DEALER AVAILABILITY 
QUARTER 5 QUARTER 6 QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8
---------- ---------- 
---------- .......... 
QUARTER 9
---------- 
REGION 1 (EASTERN 
Product 1-1 53.45 45.47 33.83 11.62 
Product 4-2 31.85 78.21 81.01 74.25 75.38 
Product 5-1 65.37 60.61 56.10 55.99 45.75 
Product 6-1 51.48 49.59 68.65 86.33 89.87 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 
Product 1-3 4.33 19.57 49.90 
Product 2-2 1.01 1.01 
Product 4-3 5.46 32.81 64.32 81.99 85.83 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 129 (COMPETITIVE POSITION AUDIT 
COMPETITIVE POSITION AUDIT FOR PRODUCT 6-2 QUARTER 81 (WINTER 
REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION REGION 4 (U. S. (CANADA ) (EUROPE 
---------- ---------- ---------- 
(JAPAN 
---------- 
Product Actively Distributed? Yes Yes No Yes 
Current Volume Market Share 15.36 4.74 
. 
00 15.98 
Previous Volume Market. Share 24.13 14.61 
. 
00 22.11 
Relative Sales Revenues 
-- 
Average 
Relative Gross Margin Average Average 
Relative Operating Income Average Average ++ 
Relative Distributor Price Average Average Average 
Change in Manufacturer Price? No No No 
Re ptive Performance - Average Average 
Relative Convenience Average Average Average 
Relative Product Desirability Average Average 
Relative Product Quality Average Average Average 
Relative R&D Spending Average Average 
Product Just Refoýmlated? No No No 
ative Re Customer Awareness Average Average l
Re ative Advertising Spending Zero 
Change in Media Content? No No No 
Relative Deal Awareness 
Relative Promotion Spending Zero 
Relative Dealer Availability ++ Average 
Relative Dealer Margin Average 
Relative Dealer Rebate Zero Zero&Ave Zero 
Relative Sales Force Effort + Average Average 
Relative Sales Force Size + 
Relative Sales Force Compens 
--- 
+ 
Legend: More Than 2.0 Standard Deviations Above Mean 
... 
Between 1.5 and 2.0 Standard Deviations Above Mean 
++ Between 1.0 and 1.5 Standard Deviations Above Mean 
+ Between 0.5 and 1.0 Standard Deviations Above Mean 
Average Between 
-0.5 and +0.5 Standard Deviations From Mean Between 0,5 and 1.0 Standard Deviations Below Mean 
Between 1.0 and 1.5 Standard Deviations Below Mean 
... 
Between 1.5 and 2.0 Standard Deviations Below Mean 
---- 
More Than 2.0 Standard Deviations Below Mean 
Zero Variable Has Value of Zero (0) 
Zero&Ave Variable Has Value of Zero (0) Which Also Equals Average 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 130 (PATENT ZONE SEARCH 
PATENT ZONE SEARCH AROUND 12/23/34/45/ 5/6/6: 
11/ 3/44/ 5/6/6 OK 11/22. /33/45/ 5/6/6 XX '11/22/33/46/ 5/6/6 OK 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 131 (INDUSTRY SALES VOLUME FORECASTS 
QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8 QUARTER 9 QUARTER 10 [History] [History] (History) (Forecast +/- Error] 
------- ---------- ---------- .................... 
REGION 1 (U. S. 252.347 255.093 278.035 299.996 7.083 
REGION 2 (U. K. 52.407 99.532 103.557 107.544 2.922 
REGION 3 (C. EUROPE) 211.294 237.398 233.082 228,580 4.845 
REGION 4 (JAPAN 235.875 192.002 205.160 , 220.616 5.035 
REGION 5 (HK/T/K/S) 35.875 92.002 
- 
105.160 120.616 6.036 
NOTE 
"Error" corresponds to the 90% cohfidence interval for the forecast value. 
For example. a forecast of "110.120 +/- 4.451" corresponds to a 90% degree- 
of-confidence that the true value lies between 105.669 (110.. 120-4.45D. 
-and 114.571 (110.120+4.451). Of course. this-also implies that there is a 10% 
chance that the true value will be less than 105.669 or more than 114.571. 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #32 (BRAND SALES VOLUME FORECASTS 
QUARTER 7 QUARTER 8 QUARTER 9 QUARTER 10 (History] [History] (History] [Forecast +/- Error] 
----- ---- ---------- ---------- -------------------- 
REGION 1 (EASTERN 
Product 6-1 72.231 72.177 39,494 14.028 +/- 918 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 
REGION 3 (CENTRAL 
Product 6-1 12.981 21.232 +/- 879 
Product 6-3 12.321 15.634 21.321 34.543 +/- 1.243 
REGION 4 (WESTERN 
Product 6-2 101.981 123.123 56.712 21.321 +/- 2.123 
NOTE 
"Error* corresponds to the 90% confidence interval for the forecast value. L For example. a forecast of "110.120 +/- 4.451" corresponds to a 90% degree- 
of-confidence that the true value lies between 105,669 (110.120-4.451) and 14.571 (110.120+4.451). Of course, this also implies that there Is a 10% 
cc11haC; ce 
that the true value will be less than 1.05,669 or more than 114.571. 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #33 (REFORMULATION ACTIVITY 
- 
DETAILED 
NUMBER OFREFORMULATION BIDS SUBMITTED :4 
LOWEST REFORMULATION BID SUBNITTED 555 
AVERAGE R FORMULATION BID SUBMITTED -S 404.438 
HIGHEST REFORMULATION BID SUBMITTED -$ 673.198 
NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL REFORMULATION BIDS -4 
LOWEST UCCESSFUL REFORMULATION BID -S 555 
Product 3-4 Has Been Reformulated Since Last Quarter To 80/30/40/20/50/7/5 
Product 6-3 Has Been Reformulated Si. nce Last Quarter 
PhD Thesis 
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Study 34 
- 
output is identical to Study 10 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY f35 (ADVERTISING PROGRAM EXPERIMENT 
RESULTS OF ADVERTISING EXPERIMENT FOR PRODUCT 5-2 IN REGION 2 (CANADA 
Advertising Spending $ 1.250.000 
Media Content U) 21 
Media Mix Us) 22559 
Estimated Customer Awareness For Product 5-2 
- 
50.5% 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #36 (COMPETITIVE INFORMATION 
- 
BRAND PROFILES) 
DEALER ADVERTISING PROMOTION SALES 
------------- ------------------- --------------- 
FORCE 
Price Rebate $ Amount MC Media S Amount Type SIZE 
------ ------ ---------- -- -; ---- ---------- ---- ..... 
REGION 1 W. S. 
Product 1-3 901 0 1.750.000 15 55555 1.250.000 26 44 
Product 4-4 905 0 2.000.000 6 33456 500 000 96 200 
Product 5-2 1.223 100 2.000.000 14 23433 500: 000 74 100 
Product 7-3 905 0 5.000.000 6 33456 500.000 96 20 
REGION 2 (EUROPE 
Product 1-2 867 50 500.000 15 55555 00 40 
Product 3-1 1,180 0 2.000.000 14 12789 3.000.000 69 100 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY f37 (COMPETITIVE INFORMATION SFC STATISTICS) 
ALL REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION 3 REGION 4 
REGIONS (U. S. (U. K. 
,) (C. EUROPE) (CANADA 
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
FIRM 1 
Salaries 2.665 2.790 2.500 2.700 2.650 
Commissions 469 687 439 228 562 
Compensation 3.134 3.477 2.939 2.928 
. 
3.212 
-Commission Rate 1.3 11.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 Sales Force Size 870 220 200 250 200 
INDUSTRY 
Salaries 2.580 2.602 2.533 2.611 2.568 
Commissions 650 699 979 484 464 
Compensation 3.230 3,301 3.512 3.095 3,032 
Compensation (SD) 387 312 479 299 374 
commission Rate 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.5 2.0 
Sales Force Size 3,270 870 750 850 80 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 138 (PROMOTION EXPERIMENT 
RESULTS OF PROMOTION EXPERIMENT FOR PRODUCT 9-3 IN REGION 8 (AUST&NZ 
romotion Spending -$1.500.000 
roTotional Type U) - 18 
Estimated Dealer Promotion Awareness For Product 9-3 - 69.0% 
PhD Thesis 
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MARKýTING RESEARCH STUDY #39 (COMPETITIVE INFORMATION 
- 
UNFILLED SALES) 
ALL REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION 3 REGION 4REGIONS 
----------- 
(U. S. 
----------- 
(U. K. 
----------- 
(FRANCE ) (GERMANY 
----------- --------- -- 
FIRM 1 
Product 1-1 0 0 0 
Product 1-2 15.000 14.000 
Product 1-3 0 0 0 0 
Firm 1 Total 15.000 14,000 0 0 0 
FIRM 2 
Product 2-1 0 0 0 
Product 2-2 1.016 1.000 
Product 2-3 0 0 245 0 
Firm 2 Total 1.016 1.000 0 0 
INDUSTRY 20.056 15.000 5.056 0 0 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #40 (COMPETITIVE INFORMATION 
- 
BRAND MARGINS 
ESTIMATED [PER UNIT] PRICES, 
COSTS. AND MARGINS 
----------------------------- BRAND FORMULATION (A D Dealer Manuf Unit 
REFORMULATION QUARTER] Price Price Cost Margin 
----------------- ----- ------ ----- ------ ------ 
REGION 1 (EASTERN 
Product 1-4 
Product 2-4 
Product 9-4 
REGION 2 (SOUTHERN) 
Product 1-1 
30/30/30/ 5/ 5/5/5 
30/30/30/ 5/ 5/5/5 
44/44/44/441 5/4/4 C 31 
41/23/81/22/ 5/l/l [ 21 
920 575 320 255 
924 578 320 258 
897 560 293 267 
899 580 153 427 
*** NOTES *** (1) "Brand Formulation" refers to the last "recorded" formulation of a brand. 
Formulations are only *recorded" when a firm executes Marketing Research 
Study #2 ("Brand Composition Analysis") or Marketing Research Study #33 ("Reformulation Activity 
- 
Detailed"). 
(2) "Reformulation Quarter" refers to the quarter in which the last recorded 
brand formulation occurred. Quarter "**" refers to brands that have not 
been reformulated since quarter 0. (3) "Dealer Price" is the price at which dealers sell brands to customers. (4) "Manuf Price" is the price at which manufacturers sell brands to dealers. (5) "Unit Cost" is the raw materfals. production. labor. plant depreciation (assuming full capacity usage). and transportation and shipping costs. 
Experience curve cost reductions and smoothing cost adjustments, if any. 
in production and labor are not included within these "Unit Cost" 
figures. Other components of variable costs (dealer rebates and sales 
commissions) are also not Included In these "Unit Cost" figures. (6) "Margin" equals "Manuf Price" minus 
r 
"Unit Cost. " 
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MARKETING RESEARCH 5TUDY 141 (REGIONAL S"ARY ANALYSIS 
REGION STATISTICS. REGION 2 (MEXICO ). QUARTER 44 (FALL 
Quarter 
Chan 
Previous I Current (, 3e 
Population 40.979.028 41.357.708 9 
Consumer Price Index 930 949 2.0 
Per Capita Income 11.146 11.496 3.1 
Industry Sales Volume 71.125 66,361 
-6.7 
Industry Advertising 8.000.000 4.000.000 
-50.0 Industry Average D Price 878 887 
-1.0 Industry Promotion- 3.000,000 4.000.000 33.3 
Industry Average R&D 250.000 350.000 20.0 
11ndustry Sales Force 
- 
400 350 
-12.5 
BRAND PERFORMANCE STATISTICS. REGION 2 (MEXICO ). QUARTER 44 (FALL ) 
Volume Market Share M D_Price ý_Per P_Con 
1-3u 33.8 + $ 798 57.7 27.4 ++ 
2-2 27.6 + S 842 24.3 21.3 ++ 
3-1 22.0 $1.028 
- 
11.6 12.9 
4-1 4.3 $1.279 58.0 + 2.9 
6-2 
.3 $7 74 + 1 1.5 --1 15.0 --1 
6% h 1ý% ' 31% 
*** NOTES *** (1) An "r" after a product number denotes a reformulation-in this quarter. 
AV denotes unfilled orders in this quarter.. A "** denotes a product 
that has been reformulated and that has unfilled orders in this quarter. (2) Changes of more than 25%. from the previous-quarter value. are flagged 
by "++" and "--' to the right of the current-quarter entry for increases 
and decreases. respectively. Changes of more than 5% but less than 25%. 
from the previous-quarter value, are flagged by "+" and %" to the right 
of the current-quarter entry for increases and, decreasel. 
-respectively. Changes of less than 5% from the erevious quarter are not flagged. (3) "D Price" is dealer price. "P-Per is perceived performance. and "P-Con" 
is-perceived convenience. 
-- -------------- 
- -- mý ----- 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY-02 (MARKETING RESEARCH ORDERING STATISTICS 
MR # Marketing Research Study 
1 COMPETITIVE INFORMATION 
- 
YTD EARNINGS 
2 BRAND COMPOSITION A ALYSIS 
3 INDUSTRY SALES FORCE SIZE 
4 INDUSTRY ADVERTISING 
5 INDUSTRY SALES FORCE COMPENSATION 
6 INDUSTRY PROMOTION 
7 INDUSTRY R&D It 
8 MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 
9 PROMOTIONAL TYPE ANALYSIS 
10 CONJOINT ANALYSIS 
Ordering Frequency 
High 
Moderate 
Very Low 
Very Low 
Low 
Very Low 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
Very High 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 143 (MARKETING SUPPORT SPENDING PRODUCTIVITY 
MARKETING SUPPORT SPENDING PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS. REGION 6 (JAPAN 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMPARATIVE NORMS 
........... F1 iW 2 INDUSTRY 
Product Product Product (In All (in This 
2-1 2-2 2-3 Regions) Region) 
------- ------- ------- -------- -------- SALES VOLUME PER $000 OF: 
Advertising 4.0 13.7 17.0 8.5 
Promotion 10.9 37.1 45.8 23.0 
Research & Development 32.3 109.8 135.6 68.0 
Sales Force Compensation- 5.1 15.3 13.0 9.8 
SALES REVENUE P R S OF: 
Advertising 2.3 7.5 9.7 4.8 
Promot on 6.3 20.3 26.1 13.1 
Research & Development 18.7 60.0 77.3 38.7 
Sales Force Compensation' 2.9 8.3 7.4 5.6 
------------------------------------------------------------------ : .......... 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #44 (POPULATION FORECASTS 
QUARTER 31 QUARTER 32 QUARTER 33 QUARTER 34 QUARTER 35(History] [Forecast] [Forecast] [Forecast] [Forecast) 
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
REG. 1 (U. S. ) 110.281.568 111.381,656 112.619.728 113,866.448 115.062.488 [100.001 [101.001 [102.121 [103.251 (104.341 
REG. 2 (U. K. ) 50.397.428 50.919.024 51.528.744 52.120.060 52.777.044 [100.00] [101. 
-031 [102.241 (103.421 [104.721 
REG. 3 (GERMANY ) 84.437.184 85.300,120 86.142.776 87.087.536 87.972.984 (100.001 [101.021 (102.021 [103.141 (104.191 
REG. 4 (FRANCE ) 62.765.016 63.546.976 64.411.756 65.203,948 65.973.252 [100.001 (101.251 [102.621 (103.891 [105.11] 
- -- -- ------- - -------- - ------ - -- ------ 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #45 (PER CAPITA INCOME FORECASTS 
QUARTER 80 QUARTER 81 QUARTER 82 QUARTER 83 QUARTER 84
[History] [Forecast] [Forecast] (Forecast] [Forecast) 
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
REG. 1 (EASTERN 15.905 
- 
16.051 16.250 16.419 16.594 [100.001 [100.921 (102.171 (103.231 [104.341 
REG. 
-2 (SOUTHERN) 13.400 13.530 13.669 13.807 13.944 [100.001 (100.961 (102.01] [103.031 [104.061 
REG. 3 (CENTRAL 14.930 15.082 15.261 15.383 15.545 (100.001 (101. M (102.221 (103.031 [104.121 
REG. 4 (WESTERN 14.318 14.478 14.627 14.799 14.964 (100.001 (101.121 [102.161 (103.361 [104.521 
PhD Thcsis 
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------- --------- - ---- MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #46 (CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FORECASTS 
============ý--==-=====--===--==-=-== --- === -------- = ----------- - --- 
] 
QUARTER 43 QUARTER 44 QUARTER 45 QUARTER 46 QUARTER 4/ 
] [History] [Forecast] [Forecast] [Forecast] [Forecast 
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -------- 
REG. 1 (CANADA 1.407 1.427 1,452 1.472 1,491 [100.001 (101.401 [103.171 [104.641 [106.01) 
REG. 2 (U. K. 1,121 1.132 1,143 1.154 1,166 
[100.001 [100.981 [101.901 [102.891 [104.001 
REG. 3 (U. S. 1.373 1.392 1,414 1.432 1.454 [100.001 (101.431 [102.981 [104.291 (105.911 
REG. 4 (C. EUROPE) 1,319 1.339 1.355 1,378 1.399 
[100.001 [101.551 (102.771 [104.501 [106.111 
------------------------ 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #47 (SELF-REPORTED ATTRIBUTE PREFERENCES 
--------- - --- - ------- 
REGION 8 (CANADA REGION 8 (CANADA 
Attribute 8 30.1% ......................... 1ý 11. 20 12.2% -------- 
Syntech 32 5% 
4 4 2 
56 9'", 
68 
80 
21, t, 
32 
. ....... . 
............. 
..... 
........... 
...... .................. 
92 33.0; 
%............. 0-Y. A.. 
Attribute 8 3 
#2. 20 13.1 
. 
................. 
Plumbo 32 28. 
" 44 32., : 
56 16J: 
68 
80 
5.1 
92 
Attribute 8 8 
#3, 20 12.,,: 
Glomp 32 14 %% 
........ ............. ..... 44 
56 
16, 
15 l ......... . 
68 ý iz 13. (1: 
80 11. 
... ........................ 92 7., 
........... ..... 
Attribute 8 
. 
2% 
#4. 20 
. 
8% 
Trimicro 32 2- 
44 
56 
6. 
12 
68 . 21 
80 27_4 
92 29.2% 
.0 
Sex 
Attribute 8 No resuiLs due to vaporware technology constraints. 
#5, 20 No results due to vapor-ware technology constraints. 
Fralange 32 No results due to vapor-ware technology constraints. 
44 No results due to vaporware technology constraints. 
56 No results due to vaporware technology constraints. 
68 No results due to vaporware technology constraints. 
so No results due to vaporware technology constraints. 
92 No results due to vaporware technology constraints. ý 
14% 21% 2A% A% 42 + 
Phl) Thesis 
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MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY 148 (BRAND SATISFACTION RATINGS 
Brand Satisfaction. Relative'To Current Brands 
---------------------------------------------- 
QUARTER 23
------ 
QUARTER 24 QUARTER 25
.......... .......... 
QUARTER 26
---------- 
QUARTER 27
---------- 
REGION 1 (U. S. 
Product 1-2 43.75 42.46 17.18 9.56 7.86 
Product 3-1 4S. 52 46.15 17.65 9.72 8.04 
Product 4-3 24.89 17.78 10.35 8.07 
REGION 2 (U. K. 
Product 1-1 9.66 10.55 10.73 10.64 10.52 
Product 1-2 
-9.61 7.98 8.68 9.02 9.01 Product 7-1 9.49 8.85 8.05 7.45 7.38 
Product 9-3 10.28 9.47 8.64 8.29 7.98 
Brand Satisfaction, Relative To "Ideal" Brand 
.............................................. 
QUARTER 23
--------- 
QUARTER 24 QUARTER 25
---------- ---------- 
QUARTER 26
.......... 
QUARTER 27
.......... 
REGION 1 (U. S. 
Product 1-2 35.46 35.53 14.21 BAO 6.33 
Product 3-1 36.20 36.44 13.96 8.25 6.35 
Product 4-3 16.29 14.51 8.30 6.49 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY #49 (DEALER INVENTORY ANALYSIS 
- 
ALL BRANDS 
QUARTER 12
---------- 
QUARTER 13
---------- 
QUARTER 14
---------- 
QUARTER 15
.......... 
QUARTER 16
---------- 
REGION 1 (U. S. 
Product 1-2 11.552 12.771 
Product 2-2 0 0 0 
Product 3-1 12.556 6.930 0 0 28.482 
Product 4-2 60 291 20.922 
Product 6-3 9,048 6,189 3,179 2.310 986 
REGION 2 (U. K. 
Product 1-1 7.840 6.120 0 6.314 10.716 
If 
Adrian Haberberg 
MARKETING RESEARCH STUDY f50 (PRICE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
, 
qGION 7 (HK/T/K/S). REGION 7 (HK/T/K/S) 
Estimated-Preference Shares Given Product 1-1 @S 919: 25.5% 
Product Formulations and Dealer Prices Product 2-2 @S 803: 24.4% 
of All Actively Distributed Products Product 5-2 @$ 913: 27.9% Product 8-3 @ $1.033: 22.2% 
Product 1-1 Estimated Preference Shares Product 1-1 @ $ 700: 42.0% 
at Various Dealer Prices Given Current Product 1-1 @ $ 750: 37.5% 
Product Formulations and Dealer Prices Product 1-1 @ $ 800: 33.4% 
of All Other Actively Distributed Product 1-1 @ $ 850: 29.8% 
Products Product 1-1 @ S 900: 26.6% 
Product 1-1 @ $ 950: 23.8% 
Product 1-1 @ $1.000: 21.4% 
Product 1-1 @ $1.050: 19.2% 
Product 1-1 @ $1.100: 17.3% 
*** NOTES *** (1) Preference shares refer to market shares if only two aspects of the whole 
marketing program. formulation and dealer price. matter to customers. (2) A 20% range around current dealer gice is used In this pri6e sensitivity 
analysis. Extrapolations beyond te imediate vicinity of current dealer 
ýrice are likely to be unreliable. Substantial. dealer price changes are 
Rely to lead to competitive counter-responses thus making preference 
share predictions problematic. (3) These preference snares should be viewed as long-run "full information" 
estimates to wbich market shares might stabilize assuming that customers 
have equal access (i. e.. equal awareness, equal distribution. equal 
convenience. " etc. ) to all products actively distributed In this market. 
PhD Thesis 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
Exhibit 2: Questions administered to participating 
students 
168 
STRATEGY FORMULATION Date: 18 May 2000 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name; 
, 
Please indicate your agreement 
or disagreement with each 
Group (as entered in Brandmaps) statement on the following scale: 
I= strongly disagree 
Age: Gender (M/Jý): 4= neither agree nor disagree 
Nationality: 7= strongly agree 
I. 23 45 
1. We had a clear view of the winning strategy do C3 
2. In our group there were one or two people who 
seemed to win all the arguments 
3. My team members and I shared similar goals and 
objectives 
4. There was a lot of pressure to be the best- 
performing group 
5. Everyone in our group had a good understanding 
of how the game works 
6.1 agreed with most of the decisions we took in the 
final quarter 
7.1 think the game is a good reflection of how 
businesses operate in real life 
8. The previous period's results had been completely 
unexpected 
9. Our decisions were what our instructors would 
expect us to do 
lo. There was no dispute about the decisions we 
finally took in the last quarter 
11. In our group, it was usually the most logical 
argument that won, no matter who put it forward 
12.1 found my business learning and experýence very 
relevant when working out what to do in the game 
13. The policies we use were based on successf'ul, 
real-life companies 
14. We had a long-term plan that guided our 
decisions 
Please tum over 
V, rBS MBA Semester Two 1999/2000 
15. Many in the group initially opposed the decisions 
that were taken 
16. There were influential people in our group with a 
. good understanding of how the game worked 
17. The other group members had a good under- 
standing of my role and the problems I faced 
18.1 understood the other members' roles and 
problems 
19. After seeing the previous quarter's results and 
market research, it was clear what we had to do 
20. We adopted our decisions because other groups 
had been succeeding with them 
21. Several of the group got together to press for our 
final set of decisions, although the rest were less 
sure 
22. Some team members had a view of what is 
needed to win the game that is different from 
mine 
23. Anyone in the group who could put forward good 
reasons for suggesting a particular course of 
action was likely to get their way 
24.1 treated our company in the game exactly like the 
last company I used to work for 
25.1 had no problem in making sense of the last set 
of results 
26. After previous period's results we needed to 
rethink our whole approach to the game 
1 
3, ci o ci c) c) ci 
ci c) Clo-i5--ci 
ci 0 cl ä'ý 0 
13 o cl 
efo o cl 
j/JJ 
c1'ri j" 
a-'o ooooo 
c1000cIM, b, 
JJJo 
13 cl 0 cl 03--ý 
Thank you for your co-operation 
Please return questionnaire to Adrian Haberberg (Room 201, Management Block, 
Marylebone Road) or to your BRANDMApS game co-ordinator). 
Please email any queries to Adrian on A. B- HabOrberg@wmin ac. uk 
WBS NIBA Semeker Two 1999/2000 
Adrian Haberberg 
Chapter 6 
PhD Thesis 
Results 
In this chapter, I summarise the study data and report on the results of the tests of the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. 
6.1 Nature of the decisions data 
Figures 6.1-6.8 give summary statistics for the distributions of the quarterly group data 
for numbers of isomorphic decisions and proportions of isomorphic decisions for each 
of the four datasets. The distributions of these variables in Dataset 1, and the 
distribution of proportions of isomorphic decisions for Dataset 3, do not differ 
significantly from the normal distribution, whereas the distribution of numbers of 
isomorphic decisions for Dataset 3 and of both variables in Dataset 2 and 4 are non- 
normal. 
Given that the distributions of the measures of concentration and uncertainty are also 
skewed away from the normal, standard statistical techniques of correlation, regression 
and analysis of variance are inappropriate for these data. However, hypotheses HI-H8 
do not require a demonstration that the dependent variables vary continuously with the 
independent ones. In order to verify these hypotheses, it is only necessary to 
demonstrate a much weaker association of high levels of isomorphic decisions with the 
passage of time, and with high levels of concentration and uncertainty. These 
associations can be adequately tested using non-parametric techniques that compare the 
rankings of reading of the two variables and do not assume them to be normally 
distributed. 
6.2 Hl: Effects on isomorphic behaviour of indusby age 
Table 6.1 summarises the trend in decision-making over time for dataset 1. The total 
number of decisions taken (which is of course the same for all datasets) is highest in the 
early quarters as new markets are entered and products launched, and then falls away as 
firms refine their product-market strategy. The number of isomorphic decisions taken is 
stable between quarters 4 and 7, and then dips in quarter 8. This appears to be the result 
of a fall in the overall number of decisions taken, which may be indicative of some end- 
gaming, or simply of fatigue, on the part of participants. The proportion of decisions 
classed as isomorphic rises steadily, including period 8. 
171 
Test Figure 6.1 Summary statistics and test for normality 
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Test Figure 6.2 Summary statistics and test for normality 
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Test Figure 6.4 Summary statistics and test for normality 
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Test Figure 6.5 Summary statistics and test for normality 
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A Kruskal-Wallace one way analysis of variance shows that period is significant as a 
source of variance in the proportion of decisions that is isomorphic (Kruskal-Wallace 
statistic 11.94, p=0.036) but not in the number of such decisions (Kruskal-Wallace 
statistic 4.78, p=0.440). 
Table 6 1: Decisions taken by type of isomorphism and time period, dataset I 
Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Quarter 5 Quarter 6 Quarter 7 Quarter 8 Total 
Total decisions 
taken 
No of isomorphic 
decisions 
-level/directional 
-partial 
-perpetuation 
Isomorphic 
proportion of total 
- 
level/directional 
-partial 
-perpetuation Thus for dataset 
659 654 602 537 525 487 3464 
138 216 206 215 214 187 1176 
100 135 106 99 66 44 550 
38 43 31 26 18 9 165 
0 38 69 90 130 134 461 
20.9% 33.0% 34.2% 40.0% 40.8% 38.4% 33.9% 
15.2% 20.6% 17.6% 18.4% 12.6% 9.1% 15.9% 
5. S% 6.6% 5.1% 4.8% 3.4% 1.8% 4.8% 
0.0% 5.8% 
-11.5% 16.8% 24.8% 27.5% 13.3% 1, HI, that the incidence of isomorphic behaviour is positively 
associated with industry age, is supported. However, inspection of Table 6.1 reveals that 
the whole of this rising trend is accounted for by isomorphic decisions perpetuated from 
earlier periods. Table 6.2 surnmarises the results for other datasets, showing that for 
dataset 2, industry age is a significant source of negative variation in isomorphic 
behaviour, rather than the hypothesised positive variation. Dataset 3 shows a declining 
trend in the proportion of isomorphic decisions from quarter 4 onwards, while in 
Dataset 4 the proportion rises to a peak in quarter 6 and then declines; in neither case is 
age significant as a source of variation in the incidence of isomorphic decisions. 
Table 62: Results ofone-way analyses ofvariance due to industry age on number and 
nrnnnrtinns of isomorDhic decisions 
Kruskal-Wallace Dataset I- Dataset 2- Dataset 3 Dataset 4 
statistics including unlimited distance distance: 5 12.5% distance 0 
perpetuations 
Numbers of 4.78 17.02H 10.76 6.38 
isomorphic 
decisions 
Isomorphic 11.94* 14.20! 8.48 3.72 
decisions as 
proportion of total 
= p<0.05 p<0.0 1 witti rising trencl (consistent wim H i) 
p <0.05 p <0.01 with falling trend (counter to HI) 
I conclude that HI is supported only insofar as isomorphism can be regarded as a 
result of inertia in organisational decision-making. Once inertial decisions are excluded 
from the set of isomorphic decisions, the relationship with industry age disappears or 
even runs counter to the hypothesis. 
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6.3 H2: Effects on isomorphic behaviour of environmental 
uncertainty 
Tahle 63- Correlations between volatilitv and nronortions of isomnrnhic decisions 
0 
Correlation Dataset I Dataset 2- Dataset 3 Dataset 4 
coefficient including unlimited distance distance: 5 12.5% distance 0 (Kendal tau); perpetuations 
n=35 
All decisions 0. l9f 0.34** 0.25* 0.12 
Marketing 0.03 0.28** 0.09 
-0.02 
decisions 
Activity decisions 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
(n--24) 
Compensation 
-0.09 0.24* 0.13 0.0 
decisions 
Effort decisions 0.29** 
1 
0.30** 0.35** 0.12 
fp<0.1 *= P<0.05 ** =p<0.0 1 ***=p < 0.001 
used the Kendall rank correlation coefficient to test H2 that there would be an 
association between enviromnental uncertainty and the incidence of isomorphic 
behaviour (Table 6.3). 
For the complete decision set, the coefficients were positive, as predicted by the 
hypothesis. For datasets 2 and 3, the coefficients for the complete decision set were 
significant at the 5% confidence level or better, and the correlation coefficients for all 
the sub-classes of decision carried the predicted sign and some were significant. I 
conclude that there is support for H2 
However, this conclusion is somewhat sensitive to the definition of isomorphism. If 
perpetuations of past decisions are included as isomorphisms, then the correlation 
coefficient is no longer significant at the 5% level, though it is still of the hypothesised 
sign and significant at the 10% level. This is unsurprising 
-a set of decisions of which 
over one-third are carry-overs from past periods will naturally show less sensitivity to 
enviromnental change than sets without this inertial ballast. However, if the definition 
of isomorphism is tightened still further, to exclude all but precise copies of other firms' 
decisions (dataset 4), then none of the correlation coefficients remains significant. There 
is no evident explanation for this. 
6.4 H3: Effects on isomorphic behaviour of industry 
concentration 
I computed Kendal rank correlations between the Herfindahl index for each market and 
time period and the proportion of isomorphic decisions taken in that market in the 
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following period. The correlations were positive, as hypothesised in H3, but were not 
significant at the 5% level (Table 6.4, first row). 
Examination of different types of decision, however, reveals that this overall result 
hides a number of countervailing outcomes. For two classes of decision, activity and 
effort, the correlation is positive and significant, a result which is robust against 
variations in the operationalisation of isomorphism (although the coefficient for effort 
decisions in dataset 4 falls just outside the 5% confidence interval). 
Table 64: Correlations between Herfindahl indices andproportions of isomorphic 
decisions ofdifferent tvves 
Correlation Dataset I- Dataset 2- Dataset 3- Dataset 4 
coefficient including unlimited distance distance: 5 12.5% distance 0 (Kendal tau); perpetuations 
n=42 
All decisions 0.09 0.15t 0.14t 0.08 
Marketing 
-0.14 -0.03 -0.11 -0.15 
decisions 
Activity decisions 0.28* 0.28* 0.28* 0.28* 
(n=3 1) 
Compensation 0.14t 
-0.07 -0.06 -0.12 
decisions 
Effort decisions 0.41*** 0.28** 0.25* 0.19t 
Pricing decisions 1 
0.09 0.06 0.07 
-0.06 
=P<O. l *= p<0.05 **=P<0.01 ***=p<0.001 
The proportions of isomorphic marketing and compensation decisions almost always 
show negative, but not significant, correlations. Within the marketing decision set, the 
proportion of isomorphic pricing decisions shows no correlation with industry 
concentration, although standard micro-economic theory would suggest that prices 
should converge around one, or at best a few, dominant models in concentrated 
industries. 
Overall, however, I conclude that H3 is not supported. 
6.5 H4: The effect of foreknowledge on isomorphic behaviour 
I compared the number of isomorphic and non-isomorphic decisions that occurred when 
groups had foreknowledge of the levels of competitors' decisions with the numbers that 
that occurred in the absence of such knowledge. The results for the various definitions 
of foreknowledge and isomorphism are given in Table 6.5. 
182 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
Table 65: The effect offoreknowledge on isomorphic behaviour, by type of knowledge 
and definition of isomorphism 
X2 statistics N= 3463 Degree of foreknowledge 
Dataset 
- 
Definition of isomorphism Precise Directional or 
better 
Vague or better 
Dataset I- including perpetuations(Note 1) 8.77** 20.30*** 17.73*** 
Dataset 2- unlimited distance 0.93 6.47* 2.07 
Dataset 3- distance: S 12.5% 6.83** 12.14*** 8.48** El 
Dataset 4- distance =0 8. 
j! l*ýý 13.47*** 10.40** 
Note 1: Observations in dataset I are not independent: X2 test not usable with these data. Results for 
information only. 
p<0.05** p<0.01 P<0-00 1, relationship in hypothesised direction 
For definitions of isomorphism apart from dataset 2 (no perpetuated decisions, no 
limitation on distance within which decision can be regarded as isomorphic) there was 
clear support for both H4a, that there is an association between foreknowledge and 
frequency of isomorphic decision-making, and H4b, that that association is consistently 
positive. For dataset 2, the hypotheses were supported only for the middle 
operationalisation of foreknowledge, where firms had either directional or precise 
knowledge of competitors' practices. 
On examining the individual types of decision, however, two opposing patterns 
emerge that are robust against different operationalisations of foreknowledge (Table 
6.6) and isomorphism (Table 6.7). 
Table 6.6. The effect offoreknowledge on isomorphic behaviour, by type of knowledge 
and category ofdecision, dataset 2 
X2 Statistics gree of foreknowled e 
Category of decision N Precise Directional or 
better 
Vague or better 
All 3464 0.93 6.47* 2.07 
Marketing 2400 10.39** 28.59*** 23.08*** 
Compensation 558 [5.051! [5.081! [6.691!! 
_ Effort 410 [4.30]! [5.08]!!! [52.38]HT-7777ý 
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Table 6.7. The effect ofdirectional or betterforeknowledge on isomorphic behaviour, 
by category ofdecision and definition of isomorphism 
X2 
statistics Definition o f isomorphism 
Category of decision Dataset I- 
including 
perpetuations 
Dataset 2- 
unlimited distance 
Dataset 3- 
distance: 5 12.5% 
Dataset 4- 
distance =0 
All 20.3*** 6.47* 12.14*** 13.47** 
Marketing 77.26*** 28.59*** 36.45*** 34.56*** 
Compensation If 12.431M f5.08]! f 1.261 fO. 14] 
Effort 1 [9.281!! f5.081! I If 18.151!! 1 [20.611!! 1 
Note 1: Observations in dataset I are not independent: X2 test not usable with these data. Results for 
information only. 
X2 statistics in [square brackets] indicate relationships in direction counter to hypothesis 
P<0.05** P<0.01 *** p<0.00 1, relationship in hypothesised irection 
I p<0.05 H P<0.01 111 p<0.00 1, relationship in direction counter to hypothesis 
For marketing decisions, the existence of foreknowledge is consistently and 
significantly related to a propensity to take isomorphic decisions, and this relationship 
obtains for all levels of foreknowledge. H4a and H4b are thus both supported for this 
category of decisions. On the other hand, for decisions relating to the sales force, 
whether numbers of salespeople or their compensation levels, the relationship is also 
present, but in the negative direction - i. e. knowledge of competitors' decisions renders 
a group significantly less likely to copy them. This negative relationship is significant 
for cffort, but not always for compensation, decisions. (Tbe relationship could not be 
tested for activity decisions, since in every case a group taking such a decision 
possessed at least one piece of market research showing which competitor brands were 
active in which markets. ) 
I conclude that there is clear evidence of a relationship between foreknowledge and 
isomorphic decisions, indicating support for H4a. However, the direction of the 
relationship differs for different types of decision, so that H4b is not supported. 
6.6 H5: Decision ambiguity and isomorphism 
I computed contingency tables comparing the numbers of isomorphic decisions taken 
for decisions in the three classes. In order to check that the outcome was not overly 
dependent on the allocation of decisions to classes, I also computed two further sets of 
contingency tables, for clear decisions versus ambiguous (moderately and highly) and 
for highly ambiguous versus moderately or unambiguous. The results are summarised in 
Table 6.8. 
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Table 68 Effect ofdecision ambiguity on proportion of isomorphic decisions 
ctntictinq in r-. qniiare hracket-fl indicate relationshinq in directinn rntinter tn hvnntheqiq 
X2 statistics N= 3463 Test of ambiguity 
Dataset 
- 
Definition of isomorphism Clear vs moderate I Clear vs 
(moderate+ high) 
I (Clear + moderate) 
vs high 
Dataset I- including perpetuations N/A (note 1) 
Dataset 2- unlimited distance 20.56***(note 2) - [-[1.23] 4.70* 
Dataset 3- distance., S 12.5% 16.64]! 11 [15.91]! Il [10.551H 
Dataset 4- distance =0 3.89 (note 2) [0.90] [0.15]_ 
P<0.05 P<0.01 *** p<U. OUI, relationship in hypothesised direction 
! P<0.05 11 P<0.0 I! 1! p<0.00 1, relationship in direction counter to hypothesis 
Note 1: Observations in dataset I not independent: X2 test not usable with these data. 
Note 2: These two contingency tables showed a U-shaped relationship with ambiguity: the proportion of 
isomorphic decisions was above expected levels for both clear and highly ambiguous decisions, and 
below expected levels for moderately ambiguous ones. 
Only one of the contingency tables shows a relationship that is unambiguously 
significant in the hypothesised direction. It is outnumbered by instances where the 
relationship is U-shaped, is in the direction counter to the hypothesis or is not 
significant. I conclude that H5 is not supported. 
6.7 H& Effects of combinatorial complexity 
Table 6.9 summarises the effect of increasing combinatorial complexity on the 
proportions of observed isomorphisms between strategic elements. I have been unable 
to identify a statistical test of the significance of these changes, but the results are highly 
indicative. 
Table 69 Proportions ofstrategic elements that are isomorphic between pairs of 
arnuns at different stages of combinatorial enmnlexitv- nerind 8 
Grouping Complexity 1 
(Price) 
Complexity 3 
Marketing mix 
Complexity 6 
Mix+salesforce 
Complexity 9 
Total strategy 
Region I 
1.1 100% 33.3% 27.8% 18.6% 
1.2 100% 44.4% 33.3% 25.9% 
1.3 100% 33.3% 33.3% 22.2% 
Rejzion 2 
2.1 100% 42.9% 42.1% 30.2% 
Region 3 
3.1 100% 61.1% 52.8% 35.2% 
3.2 100% 66.7% 66.7% 44.4% 
Reizion 4 
4.1 100% 55.1% 
. 
52.5% 38.0% 
Region 5 
5.1 100% 66.7% 44.4% 29.6% 
5.2 100% 66.7% 50.0% 33.3% 
Region 6 
- 6.1 1 OOFI. 44.4% 38.9% 31.5% 
6.2 100% 66.7% 50.0% 33.3% 
6.3 100% 33.3% 66.7% 55.6% 
Region 7 
7.1 100% 3% 33.3% 22.2% 
Wtd. fo-tal 100% 150.5% 1465% 33.2% 
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The proportion of isomorphic decisions falls by nearly 50% in moving from a 
combinatorial. complexity of I to a complexity of 3, with falls being observable in every 
single price grouping. The impact of the next increase in combinatorial complexity from 
3 to 6 is far smaller 
- 
only four percentage points, with one of the 13 groupings showing 
an increase and 3 showing no change. Increasing combinatorial complexity further, to 9, 
reduces the proportion of isomorphic strategic elements by a further 13 percentage 
points, to one-third, with every grouping showing a decrease. 
An analysis (Table 6.10) of the number of totally isomorphic strategies at each stage 
reinforces this message. Of the 84 pairings of firms that could be deemed to be 
following isomorphic strategies if only their prices were observed, only 8 could be 
deemed to have isomorphic marketing mixes. Of these, 6 pairings are within a single 
grouping in Region 4, which was the most evenly contested of the seven regions 
- 
the 
leading brand in period 7 had only 16% of the market by value, and there were a further 
five brands with whose share of the market were 3 points or less below that leading 
total. Only 3 of those 8 pairings, all from within that same regional grouping, are still 
isomorphic after their salesforce strategies are considered, and none if the full range of 
marketing decisions is taken into account. 
Table 6 10 Numbers ofmarketing strategies that are isomorphic between pairs of 
ornuns at different sta-ees ofcombinatorial comnlexitv. neriod 8 
Grouping Complexity I 
Price 
Complexity 3 
Marketing mix 
Complexity 6 
Mix+salesforce 
Complexity 9 
Total strategy 
Region I 
1.1 3 0 0 0 
1.2 3 0 0 0 
1.3 3 0 0 0 
Region 2 
2.1 21 0 0 0 
Region 3 
3.1 12 1 0 0 
3.2 1 0 0 0 
Region 4 
_ 4.1 28 6 3 0 
Region 5 
5.1 3 0 0 0 
5.2 1 0 0 0 
Region 6 
6.1 6 1 0 0 
6.2 1 0 0 0 
6.3 1 0 0 0 
Region 7 
7.1 1 0 0 0 
Total 84 8 3 0 
Although the sample is small, I conclude, in the absence of a statistical test to confirm 
the significance of the differences, that the data offer support for H6. 
186 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
6.8 H7., The effect of isomorphic pressures on isomorphic 
behaviour 
Table 6.11 gives the Kendal rank correlation coefficients relating the proportion of 
isomorphic decisions taken in a given period to the two measures, mean level and 
proportion (see 5.4.10) of the strength of perceived isomorphic pressures in the previous 
period. The data were limited to decisions taken in quarters 3,5 and 7, corresponding to 
the isomorphic pressures questionnaire data for quarters 2,4, and 6. 
Table 611: Kendal rank correlations between isomorphic pressures andproportion of 
isomorDhic decisions 
Dependent variable: Proportion of is morphic decisions 
Dataset I Dataset Dataset 3 Dataset 4 
independent variable: tau tau P Tau P tau 
Competitive isomorphic 
-0.07 0.33 -0 08 0 70 -0 01 0 54 -0 04 0 60 pressure 
- 
mean level . . . . . . 
_ Competitive isomorphic 0.18 0.14 
-0 04 0 60 0 06 0 36 0 12 0.24 pressure 
- 
proportion . . . . . 
Coercive isomorphic 0.20 0.89 
-0 30 0 97 -0 32 0 98 -0.27 0.96 r)ressure 
- 
mean level . . . . 
Coercive isomorphic 
-0.05 0.62 -0.26 0 94 -0 26 0 94 -0.15 0.82 pressure 
- 
proportion . . . 
Mimetic pressure from 
within industry - mean 0.02 0.46 0.08 0.32 0.08 0.32 0.07 0.33 
level 
Mimetic pressure from 
within industry - 0.49** 0.002 0.10 0.28 0.24 0.08 0.20 0.13 
proportion 
Mimetic pressure 
external to industry - -0-22 0.91 -0.21 0.91 -0.21 0.91 -0.18 0.86 
mean level 
Mimetic pressure 
external to industry 
- -0-14 0.81 -0.19 0.87 -0.07 0.66 -0.03 0.57 
proportion 
* P<0.05 -- p<u. u I *** P<0.001 
There is clearly little evidence that the incidence of isomorphic decisions is, as 
hypothesised, positively related to the strength of isomorphic pressures. There is a 
significant correlation, in the hypothesised direction, between the proportion of 
isomorphic decisions and the proportion measure of mimetic pressure from within the 
industry (i. e. perceived pressures to copy other groups). However, this is observed only 
for Dataset I (which includes inertial decisions) and is not robust against variations in 
definitions of isomorphism, although the coefficient for Dataset 3 is significant at the 
10% confidence level. None of the other correlation coefficients is significant at even 
the 10% level, and many indicate a negative relationship between pressures and 
outcomes, rather than the positive one hypothesised. 
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I conclude that H7 is not supported. There is also further evidence from these results 
that the different forms of isomorphic pressures behave differently, and may therefore 
separate phenomena rather than part of a single one. 
6.9 H8: The effect of performance on isomorphic behaviour 
I compiled a set of contingency tables (see table 6.12 for an example) comparing the 
numbers of isomorphic versus non-isomorphic decisions taken by groups ranked low 
against a given performance measure, to those taken by groups ranked high by that 
same measure in any given period. They relate decisions taken in quarter n to 
performance measured in quarter n-1, the latest information available to the group when 
compiling its decision. 
Table 612: Example ofa contingency table comparing decisions taken by high and low 
performing groupsfor dataset 2 
Decisions Value share rank l  l 
Isom 3 or less 4 or more Total 
Yes 339 376 715 
t(295.4 
(419.6) 
No 1092 1657 2749 
1135.6  .  (1613.4) 
Total 'I Aý21 '. ll 1431 2033 3464 
These tables were compiled for all six performance measures and for all six possible 
breakpoints between high and low performance, for decisions taken from quarter 3 (the 
first point in the game for at which groups had information on relative performance and 
other groups' decisions on which to base isomorphic decisions) onwards. 
The results for dataset 2 are summarised in Table 6.13. It is clear that if performance 
is measured by rate of growth, then H8, that isomorphic behaviour will be more 
common amongst poorly performing firms than in the population as a whole, is not 
consistently supported, although firms that ranked in the top half measured by stock 
price growth do seem to make relatively fewer isomorphic decisions than those ranked 
in the bottom half. However, if performance is measured in terms of level of stock price 
or market share, then a clear pattern does emerge supporting H8, with lower performing 
groups more likely to take isomorphic decisions than their higher performing peers. 
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Table 613: Significance ofdifferences between incidences of isomorphic decisions in 
hiah- and Inw-nerforminp, Prouns. dataset 2 
X2 statistics, n=3464 (all 
decisions) 
Definition of low performance (ranking by performance amongst 7 
groups) 
Performance measure Lowest 
ranked 
Amongst 
2 lowest 
Amongst 
3 lowest 
Amongst 
4 lowest 
Amongst 
5 lowest 
Not top 
ranked 
Stock price 5.59* 29.26*** 12.38*** 8.11** 18.9*** 18.3*** 
Market share by volume 5.6* 1.46 3.87* 7.13** 9.57** 2. 61 
Market share by value 16.39*** 10.01** 13.02*** 15.07*** 36.45*** 
ý 
Growth in stock price 0.76 030 3.62 13.94** 5.96* 6.14* 
E 
Growth in volume market share 2.76 0.01 0.09 0.01 3.08 4.34* 
[-Growth in value market share 0.03 3.61 0.43 10.67** 3.69 
* P<0.05 ** P<O. o I *** P<0.001 
This finding appears to be robust against the particular breakpoint used to 
differentiate high from low performance. It was also robust against changes in the 
definition of isomorphism, as demonstrated in Table 6.14 (in the interest of clarity of 
presentation, only stock price data are shown in this table). 
Table 6.14: Comparison across datasets of significance of differences between 
incidences of isomorphic decisions in hi-ah- and low-nerformint, 
-arouDs X2statistics, n=3464 (all 
decisions) 
Definition of low performance (ranking by performance amongst 7 
gro ps) 
Performance measure: Stock 
price 
Lowest 
ranked 
Amongst 
2 lowest 
Amongst 
3 lowest 
Amongst 
4 lowest 
Amongst 
5 lowest 
Nottop 
ranked 
Dataset I- including 
perpetuations (see note 1) 
0.01 11.36** 9.54** 10.08** 3.65 9.54** 
Dataset 2- unlimited distance 5.59* 29.26*"-- FI-2.38*** 
, 
8.11** 18.90*** 18.30*** 
Dataset 3- distance :5 12.5% 3.23 26.01*** 1 13.18***J 
_-A. 
341* 4.44* 8.56* 
Dataset 4- distance =0 1.60 25.49*** 1 13.56*** 1 5.83* 4.38* 5.08* 
Note 1: Observations in dataset I are not independent: X2 test not usable with these data. Results for 
infomation only. 
* p<0.05 ** P<0.0 I P<0.001 
It also appears to be robust against the precise measure of performance used, a 
phenomenon that demanded further investigation. It was possible that this robustness 
came from correlations between the performance measures, so that the same groups 
were emerging as high performers on all measures. However, an initial visual check 
indicated that, outside the early periods when it might be expected that one or two 
groups might seize an early lead on all three measures, different groups figured amongst 
the leaders depending on which measure was taken (Table 6.15). 
Tnhlp 615- TOD Derformers bv different measures 
Top erforming groups measured by 
Quarter Stock price Market share by volume Market share by value 
2 6,2 2,6 6,2 
3 6,2 6,2 6,4 
4 6,7 2,7 6,2 
5 6,5 2.3 3,4 
6 6,5 2,3 3,4 
7 5,3 2,7 3,4 
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Since these data are highly non-nonnal, standard correlations could not be used to 
verify the degree of association between them, and the standard non-parametric tests, 
which rely on ranking of observations, cannot be used to compare data across time 
periods, since rankings of observations in different time periods cannot be combined. 
However, I examined the Kendall rank correlation coefficients between each of the 
three performance measures in each period (Table 6.16). 
Table 616: Correlations between different nerfnrmance men. vure. v hv nerind 
Kendall rank Quarter 
correlation coefficients, 
two-tailed test, n=7 
Variables 2 3 4 6 7 
Stock price vs Tau 0.43 0.62 0.43 14 0.05 0.14 
volume share p 0.24 0.07 0.24 01.777 1.00 0.77 
Stock price vs Tau 0.43 0.14 0.24 
.2 
ý5 
'4 -0.24 -0.24 0.33 
value share p 0.24 0.77 0.56 56 
; 
0. 0.56 0.38 
Volume share Tau 0.81 0.33 0.43 0.52 0.52 0.24 
vs value share p 0.01 0.38 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.56 
p= probability that two variables are not correlated; low p= high correlation. 
In only two cases was there a probability of greater than 90% that two of the variables 
are correlated. In 8 of the 18 cases the probability was 50% or less. I conclude that the 
three variables are not associated and constitute distinct measures of performance. This 
I finding is slightly surprising in that volume market share is actually one of the factors 
that influences stock prices in BRANDMAPS (Chapman, 1994). 
In order to test further the strength of the association between isomorphic behaviour 
and performance, I computed for each period, beginning in quarter 3, the Kendall rank 
correlation coefficients between each of two measures of isomorphic behaviour, number 
of isomorphic decisions and proportion of total decisions that are isomorphic, and the 
six performance measures detailed earlier (each lagged one period). I tested number, as 
well as proportion, of isomorphisms to capture the possibility that groups, in seeking to 
emulate successful peers, might take more decisions than if they had no such impulse. 
Here I used a one-tailed test of the hypothesis that high performance would coincide 
with low incidence of isomorphism. The resulting correlations for dataset 2 are given in 
Table 6.17; results for the other datasets are similar. The data show that the relationship 
established earlier between isomorphic behaviour and performance does not extend to a 
correlation. Very few of the coefficients are significant, none is significant for a 
majority of periods for any single combination of independent and dependent variable 
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and for the final three periods the majority of coefficients are positive, indicating a 
relationship in the opposite direction to that hypothesised. 
Table 617., Correlations between isomorphic behaviour andprevious quarter's 
n,, rfnrmance. bv neriod dataset 2 
Kendall rank correlation Qu rter 
coefficients, one-tailed test, 
n=7 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent variable: No of 
isomorphic decisions 
independent variable: 
Stock price 
-0.49 -0.29 -0.49 -0.62* -0.78** 0.20 
Market share by volume 
-0.39 0.00 -0.29 0.14 0.10 0.49 
Market share by value 
-0.59* -0.29 -0.39 0.24 0.00 0.49 
Growth in stock price 
-0.49 -0.29 -0.29 0.14 0.00 0.39 
Growth in volume market 
share 
-0.39 0.49 -0.39 0.14 0.29 -0.2 
Growth in value market 
share 
-0.59* 0.10 -0.29 0.14 0.49 0.00 
Dependent variable: 
Isomorphic decisions as a 
proportion of total 
Independent variable: 
Stock price 
-0.71** -0.24 -0.14 -0.33 -0.71** 0.43 
Market share by volume 
-0.33 -0.43 -0.52* 0.05 -0.14 0.14 
Market share by value 
-0.52* -0.90*** -0.71 0.14 0.14 0.33 
Growth in stock price 
-0.71** -0.24 0.05 0.24 0.14 0.43 
Growth in volume market 
share 
-0.33 -0.14 
I 
-0.05 
I 
0.43 0.52 
I 
-0.52* 
I Growth in value market 
share 
-0.52 
I 
0.33 I 0.05 I 0.24 0.52 I ýý I 
* P<0.05 ** P<U. u I *** P<0.001 
I conclude that H8 is supported for a range of definitions of perfonnance and of 
isomorphic behaviour, but that the relationship between performance and isomorphic 
behaviour is non-linear. 
6.10 Influences on isomorphic pressures 
- 
H9., H10, Hlla and 
Hllb 
These final hypotheses, H9, H 10, HIIa and H 11 b, together fonn a study within a study, 
on which I report in this section. The methodology for operationalising the requisite 
variables, through questionnaires, is different from that used for the other data. The 
method of hypothesis testing, using least squares regression, is also distinct from that 
used elsewhere in the study. 
Table 6.18 gives descriptive statistics for each of the variables, together with Pearson 
and Kendall coefficients for the correlations between them and Pearson coefficients for 
the correlations between the study variables and the control variables. 
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The Kendal coefficients are shown because very few of the variables are normally 
distributed, and under those circumstances the confidence intervals for the Pearson 
correlation coefficient is not strictly valid. However, in almost every case here, the 
11 
Pearson and Kendal coefficients agree. 
I There are four instances where the two correlation coefficients have different signs; in 
three of these case (COMPI/MIMEX, COMPI/PB, MIMEX/PB) the correlations are 
close to zero, but there is one instance (MIMEX/MSHR) where the sign is different and 
the absolute value of the coefficient in each case is above 0.1. In no case does the sign 
differ where the coefficient is close to being statistically significant by either measure. 
With one exception, to be discussed below, the correlations shown as statistically 
significant by the Pearson formula are confirmed as such by the Kendall formula. 
The correlation matrix indicates poor levels of support for the hypotheses drawn in 
this chapter. None of the dozen correlations between the different measures of 
isomorphic pressures and those of performance is significant; many are close to zero 
and of those that are not, those relating MIMIN (mimetic pressures from within the 
industry) to market share (MSHR) and to stock price (SPR) are negative, rather than 
positive as hypothesised. H9 is therefore not supported. 
Of the correlations of strategic intent (SI) with the different measures of isomorphic 
pressure, only that with MIMIN has the hypothesised negative sign. The other 
correlation coefficients indicate a positive association between Sl and isomorphic 
pressures; those with competitive isomorphic pressures (COMPI) and externally driven 
mimetic pressures (MIMEX) are significant at the 5% level. H5 is thus not supported. 
The correlations of political behaviour (PB) with COMPI and MIMEX are close to 
zero. The correlation of PB with coercive isomorphic pressures (COERCI) is significant 
at the 5% level by the Pearson measure, but only at the 10% level by the Kendall 
measure (p=0.088). However, it indicates a negative, rather the hypothesised positive 
association (it is one of the pressures derived from legitimation). The correlation of PB 
with MIMIN is significant at the 5% level according to both Pearson and Kendall 
measures, but is positive when the hypothesis calls for a negative sign. Thus neither 
HIIa nor HIIb is supported. 
All control variables except the dummies for cohort identity are significantly 
correlated with at least one of the isomorphic pressure measures, and each of the latter, 
with the exception of MIMIN, is significantly correlated with at least one of the control 
193 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
variables. The control variables also show noteworthy correlations with some of the 
independent variables, in particular the positive correlation between share price and 
time period and the negative correlation between strategic intent and age diversity. 
Table 6.19 Bestfit OLS regressions of isomorphic pressure variables on control 
wariahlev 
Dependent variable COMPI COERCI MIMIN MIMEX 
Intercept 21.904*** 
-0.578 6.276*** 
Std. Error 4.996 1.303 0.313 
Age 
-0.490** 0.162** 
_ Std. Error 0.136 _ 0.058 
Age diversity 
-4.729* -6.093*** 
Std. Error 2.000 1.301 
Period 
-0.132** 
Std. Error No 0.037 
No of nationalities 
-0.252 significant 
Std. Error 0.189 regression 
All full time 
-1.384* models -0.688** 
Std. Error 0.496 0.196 
All part time 
-2.252* -0.821 
_ Std. Error 0.868 0.290 
R2 0.433 0.251 0.620 
Ad'usted RI 0.334 0.191 0.554 
F-statistic 4.393** 4.184 9.393*** 
p(F-statistic) 0.009 0.027 0.0001 
t p<0.10* p<U. U5** p<U. Ul *** P<U. 00 I 
Further investigation using ordinary least squares multiple regression analyses (Table 
6.19) shows that the control variables alone explain substantial proportions of the 
variance in competitive isomorphic pressures (43%), coercive isomorphic pressures 
(25%) and mimetic pressures external to the industry (62%). Pressures to copy other 
groups are, however, not apparently associated with any of the control variables. 
6.10.1 H9: Isomorphic pressures and performance 
Tables 6.20 and 6.21 summarise the results of regressions of the four isornorphic 
pressure variables on the two performance measures. They show qualified support for 
H9. 
Where market share is the independent variable (Table 6.20), the hypothesis is not 
supported. Where COERCI or MIMIN is the dependent variable the regression models 
are not significant. With COMPI or MIMEX as the dependent variable the models are 
significant, but the MSHR regression coefficients are not significant at the conventional 
5% confidence limit, though those coefficients are significant at the 10% confidence 
level when MIMEX is the dependent variable. 
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Table 6.20 Bestfit OLS regressions of isomorphic pressure variables on market 
share is 
Dependent variable COMPI COERCI MIMIN MIMEX 
Intercept 22.012*** 
-0.675 0.214 
Std. Error 4.780 1.822 2.261 
MSHR 0.063t 0.007 0.046t 
Std. Error 0.036 0.038 0.027 
Mean Age 
-0.517*** 0.162* 0.157* 
Std. Error 0.131 0.060 0.063 
Age diversity 
-4.777* 
-7.210*** Std. Error 2.057 1.850 
Period No _ 
-0.132** Std. Error significant 0.038 
No of nationalities 
-0.297 - 
models or 0.063 
Std. Error 0.182 coefficients - 0.125 
All full time 
-1.337* 
Std. Error 0.476 
All part time 
-2.464* 
Std. Error 0.839 
R2 0.504 0.252 0.617 ýE 
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.158 0.595 
F-statistic 4.463** 2.692t 7.075*** 
P(F-statis tic) 0.006 0.069 0.000 
T P-V-lv- P-v-v-)-- P-V-VI III PIC-U. U I
Table 6.21 Best fit OLS regressions of isomorphic pressure variables on stock 
nrice 
Dependent variable COMM COERCI MIMIN MIMEX 
Intercept 16.368*** 0.938 5.634*** 5.858*** 
Std. Error 3.423 1.604 0.707 2.377 
SPR 0.006* 
-0.005t -0.010** 0.005* Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 
Mean Age 
-0.373** 0.069* 
-0.015 Std. Effor 0.100 0.050 0.073 
Age diversity 4.750* 
-4.688** Std. Effor 2.068 1.430 
Period 
-0.130 
-0.112 0.275* 
-0.248*** Std. Error 0.083 0.092 0.110 0.060 
No of nationalities 
Std. Effor 
All full time 
-1.153* 
-0.573t Std. Error 0.472 0.139 
All part time 
-1.571 
-0.748 Std. Error 0.677 0.458 
R2 0.492 0.196 0.313 0.701 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.096 0.227 0.615 
F-statistic 4.256** 1.953 3637 8.195*** 
P(F-statistic) 0.007 0.148 0.027 0.000 
T P'-U. IU' P'U-UD " P'u-u I --- P--u. uu I 
" For the sake of brevity, only the associations with market share by value are shown here. The results for 
share by volume are similar. 
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However, Table 6.21 shows that stock price, as independent variable, features, with 
regression coefficients that carry a positive sign, as per hypothesis, and are significant at 
the 5% level, in regression models on COMPI and MIMEX that are significant at the 
0.1% level. Stock price, as the most visible indicator of comparative performance, is the 
most intuitively plausible trigger for isomorphic pressures. In both models, the 
association is after controlling for time period, so that the factor at work can be inferred 
to be the information conveyed by price movements, rather than some disguised inertial 
effect. 
The regression coefficients of SPR on COERCI and MIMIN carried a negative sign, 
counter to the hypothesis. However, neither the coefficient of SPR nor the best model in 
which it featured with COERCI as dependent variable were significant at the 5% level. 
The regression coefficient of SPR on MIMIN was significant, in a significant model, 
but that model, unlike the others featured in Tables 6.20-6.21, featured residuals that 
were not normally distributed (Jarque Bera statistic 8.317, p=0.016). This appears to be 
because MIMIN itself has an unusual distribution, with two peaks, whereas the other 
isomorphic pressure variables follow single-peaked distributions much closer in shape 
to the normal distribution. 
I conclude that there is limited support for H9, but that the relationship between 
performance and isomorphic pressure is not uniform across the different types of 
isomorphism, a finding I discuss further in the following chapter. 
6.10.2 HIO: Isomorphic pressures and strategic intent 
The regressions of the isomorphic pressure constructs on strategic intent fail to support 
H5 (Table 6.22). 
When COMPI and COERCI are the dependent variables, SI features with significant 
regression coefficients in models (Table 6.23, columns 2 and 5) that however are 
significant only at the 10% level, and also in models (columns 3 and 4) that are 
significant at the 5% level or better, but only with a non-significant regression 
coefficient. The regression coefficients in all cases are positive, whereas the hypothesis 
is of a negative relationship. 
The regression coefficients for Sl on MIMIN, on the other hand, carry a negative 
sign, as hypothesised. However, the best models feature SI with a coefficient that is 
significant at the 10% level in a model (Table 6.23 column 6) that too is only significant 
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with a 10% confidence limit, and with a regression coefficient significant at the 5% 
level in a model (column 7) that is however not significant even at the 15% level. 
Tahle 6.22 Best fit OLS revaressions of isomornhic nressure anstrale-air intent 
Dependent variable COMPI COE RCI MIMIN MIMEX 
Intercept 2.083t 27.127** 
-1.596 2.299* 6.252*** -12.065 14.644** 
Std. Error 1.110 8.035 2.008 0.896 1.657 11.389 4.052 
Strategic Intent 0.414* 0.334 0.199 0.384* 
-0.495t -0.581* 0.298* 
Std. Error 0.191 0.200 0.206 0.185 0.268 0.274 0.136 
Mean Age 
-0.692** 0.159* 0.524 -0.283* 
Std. Error 0.237 0.059 0.325 0.103 
Age diversity 4.877 
-3.602 -5.871 . 11.853* 
Std. Error 3.743 2.318 2.523 5.133 
Period 
-0.133** 
Std. Error 0.038 
No. of nationalities 0.177 
-0.517 0.187 0.793t -0.413* 
Std. Error 0.129 0.332 0.150 0.455 5". 146 
All full time 
-1.614** -0.412 1.045 -0.958* 
Std. Error 0.522 0.271 0.716 0.361 
All part time 
-3.126* -0.889* 2.612 -2.004** 
Std. Error 1.144 0.399 1.569 0.635 
R2 0.192 0.509 0.279 0.236 0.237 0.329 0.630 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.369 0.189 0.141 0.142 0.137 0.524 
F-statistic I 2.964t 3.628* 3.093 2.472 2.484t 1.716 5.963*** 
p(F-stat stic) 1 0.070 0.013 
. 
0046 0.086 0.085 0.167 0.0009 
t P<O. 10 * p<u. u5 ** P<U. o I*** P<U. uu I 
Finally, MIMEX features as dependent variable (column 8) in a significant model 
where SI has a significant regression coefficient. That coefficient is however positive, 
counter to the hypothesis. 
I conclude that there is no support for H 10. 
6.10.3 HI 1: Isomorphic pressures and political behaviour 
Table 6.23 summarises the results of least-squares regressions of the isomorphic 
pressure variables on political behaviour (PB). 
In the regressions of MIMIN and MIMEX, the two information-based forms of 
isomorphic pressure, the coefficients of PB are different from zero only at the 10% level 
of significance and in any case carry a positive sign. The best regression model 
featuring MIMIN is furthermore only significant at the 10% level. Hypothesis Hlla, 
which called for a negative association between these variables and PB, is therefore not 
supported. 
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TO hip K-? 7 
Dependent variable COMPI COERCI MIMIN MIMEX 
Intercept 32.365** 5.888*** 2.344** 3.016 
Std. Error 9.095 0.694 0.820 2.906 
Political behaviour 
-0.344t -0.307t 0.377t 0.248t 
Std. Error 0.197 0.170 0.218 0.135 
Mean age 
-0.764** 0.077 
_ Std. Error 0.251 0.082 
Age diversity 3.524 
-4.227* -6.492*** 
Std. Error 3.534 1.855 1.351 
Period 0.043 
-0.157*** 
Std. Error 0.056 0.038 
No. of nationalities 
-0.527 
Std. Error 0.338 
All full-time 
-1.698** -0.413 -0.543 
Std. Error 0.538 0.294 0.336 
All part-time 
-3.457 -1.084* -0.417 
Std. Error 1.209 0.413 0.510 
RI 0.518 0.337 0.103 0.674 
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.222 0.068 0.580 
F-statistic 3.066 2.923 7.222 
F-i)(F-statistic) 0.023 0.043 0.096 1 0.000 
f P<O. IU* P<U. U. ) ** P<U. U I ... p<u. uu I 
The regression coefficients of PB when the dependent variables are COMPI and 
COERCI, the constructs measuring legitimation-based isomorphic pressures, are 
similarly significant only at the 10% confidence level and carry the opposite sign to that 
implied by the hypothesis. Hllb, which hypothesised a positive relationship between 
these pressures and PB, is thus not supported. 
6.10.4 The impact of control variables 
It has already been shown (Table 6.19) that the control variables account for a 
substantial proportion of the variance of all isomorphic pressure variables other than 
MIMIN. All of the control variables emerged with significant coefficients in at least one 
statistically significant regression model (Table 6.24). 
The 'number of nationalities' variable was significant only in a few models for which 
external mimetic pressures were the dependent variable. All other variables were 
significant influences on at least two of the four isomorphic pressure variables, and age 
diversity on all four. The sign of the age and period coefficients varied between 
dependent variables, but the diversity variables were consistently negatively associated 
with isomorphic pressures. On the limited evidence of this study, increased diversity 
lowers sensitivity to isomorphic pressures. 
PhD Thesis 
Best fit OLS regressions of isomorphic pressure on political behaviour 
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Table 6.24 Control variables with regression coefficients significantly different 
from zero in reeression models with statisticaliv sienificant F-values 
40 
Dependent variable COMM COERCI MIMIN MIMEX 
Age + + 
Age diversity 
Period + 
No of nationalities 
All full time 
All part time 
A '+'or'-' sign in a cell indicates that the relevant variable appears, with a significant (p<0.05) regression 
coefficient carrying that sign, in at least one regression model whose F-statistic occurs with p<0.05. 
Analysis includes some regression models not shown in Tables 6.19-6.23. 
This study is thus consistent with others (see section 4.6.1) showing that TMT 
diversity influences teams' cognitive processes. Studies of isomorphic behaviour have 
not hitherto taken account of diversity or other TMT characteristics as either an 
explanatory or a control variable. The findings of this study indicate that future 
researchers in the area would be advised to control for such factors. 
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Chapter 7 
PhD Thesis 
Synthesis, Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I summarise the results from the previous chapter, discuss the individual 
and combined implications and draw the conclusions of my research. In section 7.1,1 
discuss the implications of the findings in relation to the individual hypotheses. In 
section 7.2 1 return to my original research question, and draw together the conclusions 
regarding the model of isomorphic decision making in firms which I developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. In sections 7.3 and 7.4 1 discuss the implications for theory and 
managerial praxis. After exploring the limitations of the study, I summarise the 
conclusions and end with suggestions for how this research might be extended. 
For convenience, I summarise the hypotheses that have been tested in this thesis, and 
the key findings, in Table 7.1 overleaf. 
7.1 Outcomes of tests of individual hypotheses 
7.1.1 HI: Effects on isomorphic behaviour of industry age 
HI: The incidence of isomorphic behaviour in an industry is positively associated 
with the time since industryfoundation. Supported if inertial decisions included as 
isomorphic. Not supportedfor other definitions of isomorphism 
I have found no association between isomorphic behaviour and industry age unless a 
definition of isomorphic decision is used which leads to the inclusion of large numbers 
of perpetuations of past decisions. 
Non-inertial isomorphic activity appears to peak around quarters 4 and 5 and then 
diminish. Emulation of opponents' decisions is most common early in the game, while 
participants are still developing their sense-making capacity. This phenomenon is 
compatible with the idea that early isomorphic decisions are the results of information 
cascades, when the value of information is still difficult to assess, and could also be 
ascribed to managers' using imitation as a means of reducing uncertainty in the early 
stages of the game. Once participants have learnt how their industry functions, they 
acquire the confidence to differentiate. There is no sign of the institutionalisation over 
time of heuristics based around the copying of competitors as a means of economising 
on search costs. 
200 
Adrian Haberberg 
Tahle 7.1 Summarv of hvpotheses and kev findinirs 
PhD Thesis 
Hypo- Dependent variable Independent Hypo- Finding 
thesis variable thesised 
association 
HI Supported if inertial 
Time since 
ýecisions included as 
industry Positive isomorphic. Not 
foundation supported for other definitions of 
isomorphism. 
H2 
Incidence of isomorphic Environ- behaviour in industry 
mental Positive Supported. 
uncertainty 
H3 
Industry Not supported overall. 
concen- Positive 
Differences in behaviour 
tration of 
different types of 
decision. 
H4a) Significant Supported. 
Proportion of isomorphic 
Knowledge 
f i 
in either 
direction 
H4b) decisions by firm strateg es o 
mimicked Not supported. Positive 
H5 Proportion of isomorphic Clarity of 
decisions by firm ends/means Negative Not supported. 
relationship 
for decision 
H6 Degree of isomorphism in Combin- 
market atorial Negative Supported. 
complexity 
of decision 
H7 Frequency of isomorphic Perceived 
decisions by firm isomorphic Positive Not supported. 
pressures 
H8 Frequency of isomorphic Supported where decisions Firm per- 
formance Negative performance is measured in terms of level. 
H9 
Firm per- 
Limited support, not 
Perceived isomorphic formance Positive uniform across different 
types of isomorphism. pressures 
HIO Strategic 
intent Negative Not supported. 
HI la) Isomorphic pressures from 
info on peer behaviour Political Negative Not supported. 
' HI lb) Isomorphic pressures based behaviour Positive Not supported. 
on legitimation 
201 
Adrian Haberberg PhD Thesis 
With only one run of the simulation with a single cohort, it is however necessary to 
be cautious about the external validity of the findings. It is not possible to be sure 
whether the pattern of decision-making over time seen in this study, including for 
example the fall recorded in the number of decisions in period 8, was a function of an 
eight period simulation or a more general phenomenon, or whether the elapsed real- and 
game-time were sufficient for realistic patterns of institutionalisation and isomorphism 
to emerge. 
7.1.2 H2: Effects on isomorphic behaviour of environmental 
uncertainty 
H2: The incidence of isomorphic behaviour in an industry will be positively 
associated with environmental uncertainty. Supported. 
The view of isomorphic behaviour as a means of reducing environmental uncertainty, 
which was supported by the findings in respect of Hl, gains further backing from the 
support found for H2. Imitation of other firms might be a mechanism whereby 
organisations may adjust to increased volatility in their environments, facilitated 
perhaps, in real life, by an increase in boundary-spanning activity as uncertainty 
increases, as has been observed in field studies (Leifer and Huber, 1977; Lang and 
Lockhart, 1990). 
In this context, it is interesting that the correlations between volatility and proportions 
of isomorphic decisions are, with only two exceptions, positive. They do not show the 
differences in sign between the different types of decision that are visible in the 
correlations between industry concentration and proportion of isomorphic decisions. 
This may be an indication that the use of isomorphic decisions is a general response to 
increased environmental uncertainty, whereas firms respond to increased concentration 
(H3) by a more intricate fine tuning of their strategies, emulating competitors in some 
elements but not others. 
7.1.3 H3: Effects on isomorphic behaviour of industry concentration 
H3: The incidence of isomorphic behaviour in an industry will be positively 
associated with industry concentration. Not supported overall. Differences in 
behaviour of different types of decision. 
This result must be treated with some caution; although, as argued in section 5.4.5, 
the internal validity of the measurements is quite high, it is necessary to be cautious in 
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generalizing from individual markets in a simulation to industries in the real world. That 
said, the lack of support for this old conjecture of DiMaggio and Powell's would, if 
substantiated by further research, throw into doubt the link that those two theorists 
assert between isomorphic decision-making and the degree of structuration in an 
organisational field, and has ramifications for the role of institutional theory which I 
discuss in section 7.3.1 below. 
In contrast to what was observed in testing H2, the directions of the correlations 
between proportions of isomorphic decisions with industry concentration are seen to 
differ between the different types of decision. The simplified nature of the business 
simulation means that one cannot extrapolate this result by, for example, saying that 
real-life marketing mix decisions will behave differently from sales force hiring 
decisions but similarly to compensation decisions. However, this observation does 
support Oliver's (1988) conjecture regarding the differential effect of isomorphic forces 
on different organisational attributes. 
7.1.4 1-14: The effect of foreknowledge on isomorphic behaviour 
H4q): In a given industry, the proportion of isomorphic decisions will vary 
significantly according to whether or not the emulator firm has knowledge of the 
strategies that it is mimicking. Supported. 
H4b): In a given industry, the proportion of isomorphic decisions will be greater when 
the emulatorfirm has knowledge of the strategies that it is mimicking. Not 
supported 
The clear support for found here for H4a reinforces the findings of earlier studies 
(Baron et al, 1986; Dobbin et al, 1993; Palmer et al, 1993) in indicating that 
economically rational reactions to the task environment are not the only factors 
stimulating isomorphic decisions. The contribution of this study is to have validated 
those findings by directly observing the knowledge available to the emulator firm, 
rather than adducing it from proxy variables. If all firms were reacting purely to the task 
environment, their foreknowledge of each others' behaviour would not have had a 
significant association with patterns of isomorphic behaviour. My finding that there is 
such an association indicates that the information available is significant in driving 
isomorphic decision-making, with the task environment setting the context within which 
the value of such information is assessed. 
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Perhaps the most significant result in the study, however, is the supplementary 
finding that different types of decision are correlated in different directions with the 
possession of relevant knowledge. This provides further support for Oliver's (1988) 
conjecture that isomorphic forces operate differently on different classes of decision. 
More importantly, it provides evidence of discrimination in participants' use of the 
information at their disposal: some types of information are used as the basis for 
imitation, others as the basis for differentiation. This observation is compatible with the 
view of isomorphism as based on the emulation of economic benefits perceived 
elsewhere. It is not compatible with views of isomorphic behaviour based upon 
legitimation, which would imply a more slavish imitation of target organisations' whole 
range of practices. 
7.1.5 H5: Decision ambiguity and isomorphism 
H5: The proportion of isomorphic decisions will be highestfor decisions where the 
relationship between ends and means is least clear. Not supported. 
I have failed to find an association between the degree of ambiguity inherent in a 
decision and the extent to which it is likely to be isomorphic. The absence of evidence 
for an association, positive or negative, between these two variables would support the 
idea that it is decision visibility, rather than decision ambiguity, which is behind 
Oliver's 1988 findings that any isomorphism. in the strategies of her Canadian voluntary 
organisations, was due to strategic choice. It thus lends support to Greve's (1998a) 
contention that decision visibility 
- 
the other unusual feature of the decisions studied by 
Oliver 
- 
is a driver of imitation. 
The finding in respect of H5 appears anomalous in the light of the positive 
association found between environmental uncertainty and the incidence of isomorphic 
behaviour. There is no evident reason why managers' reaction to uncertainty should be 
different for different aspects of that phenomenon. In an established firm, it might be 
argued that routines are developed to handle uncertainties inherent in the nature of 
different types of decision, which are a constant aspect of working life, but that less 
regular uncertainties, such as those attached to enviromnental change, invoke 
isomorphism as a defensive behaviour. However, these differences would be less 
prominent in the context of the present study, where decisions and environment are 
equally unfamiliar to participants. 
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It may simply be that further research with larger samples will come to more 
compatible conclusions for H2 and H5. However, the findings from this study as they 
stand indicate that there may be undiscovered subtleties relating to the way in which 
0 
decision makers respond to uncertainty from different sources. I pursue this point 
further in Section 7.3.3. 
7.1.6 1-16: Effects of combinatorial complexity 
H& The degree of isomorphism observed in a given market will diminish with the 
combinatorial complexity of the decision involved Supported. 
The finding that isomorphism diminishes with increasing combinatorial complexity 
provides an alternative or ancillary explanation for Oliver's (1988) finding to those 
discussed in relation to H3, H4 and H5. I believe that the constructs that she 
operationalised in her test of strategic isomorphism were far more combinatorially 
complex than those in any other study in the area. It is interesting to note that most of 
what is known about isomorphism. is based on studies of variables with very low 
combinatorial complexity. This must reflect upon the generalisability of those findings, 
an issue to which I shall return below. 
7.1.7 1-17: The effect of isomorphic pressures on isomorphic 
behaviour 
H7., Isomorphic decisions are more frequent in firms where the perceived strength of 
isomorphic pressures is high. Not supported 
The lack of association between isomorphic pressures and frequency of isomorphic 
practices (117) is a surprising finding. It may be that this arises from the problems in my 
operationalisation of the isomorphic pressure variables (see section 5.4.10), and one 
must be cautious in generalising from a mere 21 observations. However, the absence of 
even weak evidence of an association for three of the forms of isomorphic pressure 
across any of the datasets is striking. 
Insofar as there were any indications of an association, they were for the variable 
measuring pressures to mimic other firms in the industry, which is clearly the stimulus 
most directly related to the isomorphic outcomes being observed in this study. The most 
significant correlations with incidence of isomorphic decisions were observed for the 
'6proportion7' measure of this variable. Of these, only one was statistically significant at 
normally accepted levels of confidence, and that was for Dataset 1, where a significant 
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proportion of the decisions labelled as isomorphic were perpetuations of earlier 
decisions. There appears to be no evident reason why perpetuations should be more 
sensitive to isomorphic pressures than other forms of isomorphic decision, and it may 
be that this result is simply an aberration. 
The lack of support for H7 might be interpreted as evidence that isomorphism is no 
more than a coincidental response to the task environment, were it not for the clear 
support for H4a. In the light of that other result, however, it casts some doubt on the 
decision making model, implicit in neo-institutional theory, that shows individuals' 
subjective perceptions of the strength of forces leading towards isomorphism translating 
readily into isomorphic action. Moreover, this result has been obtained in a laboratory 
context, where political disruption to the decision-making process is likely to be less 
than in real life, a point that I amplify in section 7.1.11 below. This has broader 
implications for institutional and decision making theories, which I explore in section 
7.3. 
7.1.8 1-18: The effect of performance on isomorphic behaviour 
H8: Isomorphic behaviour will be more common amongst poorly performing firms 
than amongst better-performing ones. Supported where performance is 
measured in terms of level. 
The robust finding, from analysis of a substantial population of decisions, of support 
for H8, a positive relationship between poor perfonnance and isomorphic behaviour, is 
consistent with Deephouse's (1996) association of isomorphism with survival seeking, 
which in turn lends itself to a number of further explanations. The most obvious 
explanation in a real life context would be that poorer performers are more dependent 
than good ones on outside resources and so more susceptible to pressures based on 
resource dependency. 
However, in a simulated context from which resource dependency is absent, the 
explanation must be sought elsewhere. It may be that the desire for legitimation weighs 
more heavily on poor performers that on successful ones, although the investigation if 
H9 offered only limited support for this Proposition. Alternatively, it may be that poorly 
performing firms are more disposed to follow their peers because of a greater desire to 
avoid risk, but this would seem unlikely in light of findings from earlier studies on the 
risk preferences of individuals (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and organisations, 
(Greve, 1998b). 
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The final alternative is that that information regarding the strategies of other firms is 
worth more to poorer performers than to more successful ones. In real life, this might be 
because they have fewer resources to devote to researching and developing their own 
practices. In the present study, where such resource constraints are not binding, a more 
likely explanation is that underperforming decision makers lack confidence in their own 
competences and are more disposed to rely upon the decisions of others. 
7.1.9 H9: Isomorphic pressures and performance 
H9: The perceived level of isomorphic pressures within an organisation will be 
positively related to its past performance. Limited support, not uniform across 
different types of isomorphism 
Significant, positive associations were found between performance as measured by 
stock price and two forms of perceived isomorphic pressure: competitive pressures (to 
win the game) and externally driven mimetic pressures. The association with mimetic 
pressures internal to the industry was negative, although the problems with this 
regression model (see 6.10.1) mean that this result must be treated with particular 
caution. 
H9 was derived from prospect theory, and the partial support for that hypothesis 
appears at first glance to substantiate Greve's (1998b) extension of that theory from 
individual decisions to firm-level strategic decisions. However, a measure of caution is 
required here. The model of management behaviour implied by these results is one 
where success enhances decision-makers' sense of the importance of winning and 
stimulates them to look outside the industry for best practice to emulate, whereas poor 
performance encourages decision-makers to look inside the industry for models. 
Reconciling this model with prospect theory requires that established practices from 
outside an industry be seen by managers as less risky than successful practices within it; 
there is no obvious reason why this should be the case. 
A more plausible explanation would be that risk is less an issue here than pressures to 
make best use of the information available in the time available. Managers of poorly 
performing firms use their scarce allocation of time defensively to look for proven, 
workable models within the industry, whereas their higher performing peers, having 
already exhausted what the industry has to offer, are driven by pressures to win the 
game to look outside it for workable practices. This explanation is compatible with the 
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findings of Haunschild and Miner (1997) that different circumstances can induce firms 
to chose different targets to emulate. 
However, caution is needed in generalising from the differences between these single- 
item constructs. This explanation needs to be validated in a field study, to ensure that it 
is not unduly influenced by the artificial time pressures of the simulation. 
From the data in section 6.10.1 it is clear that the association of perceived isomorphic 
pressures with the stock price performance measure was considerably stronger than with 
market share. Of the two performance measures, stock price featured with regression 
coefficients significant at the 5% level where the dependent variable was competitive 
isomorphic pressure, mimetic pressure external to industry or (albeit in a flawed model) 
mimetic pressure from within the industry. This compares with a coefficient significant 
at, at best, the 10% level for market share. 
This cannot, of course, be translated directly into a real world context, by saying that 
stock market performance is more likely to impact isomorphic behaviour than other 
measures of firm success. However, it does imply that researchers looking for 
associations between mimetic behaviour and firm performance (e. g. Haveman, 1993) 
should select a measure, like stock price in the present study, which is clearly likely to 
both be easily visible to decision-makers within the mimicking firm and enable it to 
rank itself among its competitors. Visible, if imprecise, indicators such as prestige 
(Bums and Wholey, 1993) or size (Greve, 2000) are more likely to influence decision- 
makers than more objectively valuable performance measures such as return on assets 
(Haveman, 1993). 
7.1.10 HIO: Isomorphic pressures and strategic intent 
HIO: The perceived level of isomorphic pressures within an organisation will be 
negatively related to the strength of its strategic intent. Not supported. 
No support was found for HIO. It is possible that, with a larger sample and better 
designed instruments to improve the reliability of the measures of the dependent 
variables, a pattern of significant relationships might be established. However, the data 
from this study (see 6-10.2) indicate that such associations are most likely, for at least 
three of the four types of isomorphic pressure, to be positive: an increased level of 
strategic intent would imply an increased degree of sensitivity to competitive and 
coercive isomorphic pressures and to mimetic pressures from outside the industry. 
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An alertness to competitive pressures is not, in fact out of line with the picture 
painted by theorists. It is compatible, for example, with the manner in which Komatsu 
made the dethroning of Caterpillar the centrepiece of its strategy in the earthmoving 
equipment industry (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). However, the positive association 
between mimetic pressure external to industry and strategic intent, which is one of the 
few statistically significant relationships established in this part of the study, implies 
that strategic intent does not necessarily correspond with the individualistic urge to 
reinvent portrayed by Hamel and Prahalad, but perhaps instead to a drive to match 
standards set in other contexts. This would also explain a positive association between 
strategic intent and coercive isomorphic pressure, but only if the question used to assess 
this form of isomorphic pressure was viewed as a measure of non-native pressure to 
adopt best practices rather than of coercive pressures to obey the precepts laid down by 
tutors. The present research would have been enhanced had there been more questions 
and if normative and coercive isomorphism been measured through separate sets of 
questionnaire items. 
If the negative relationship between strategic intent and mimetic pressure from within 
the industry, possibly hinted at by the data in this study, were to be found in later studies 
to be significant, it would suggest that firms with high strategic intent, while sensitive to 
external isomorphic pressures, were more likely to ignore those from within their own 
industry. 
7.1.11 HI I: Isomorphic pressures and political behaviour 
HI1q): High levels of political behaviour within an organisation will be negatively 
associated with isomorphic pressures derived from information relating to peer 
behaviour Not supported. 
Hilb): High levels of political behaviour within an organisation will be positively 
associated with isomorphic pressures based on legitimation. Not supported. 
No significant relationships were found between isomorphic pressures and political 
behaviour, although, as with strategic intent, the possibility remains that they might be 
detected in a fuller study, with a larger dataset and better operationalisations, of the 
variables concerned. A with HIO, however, the data here suggest that any associations 
found would be in the opposite direction to those hypothesised. This would imply that 
political behaviour would enhance an organisation's sensitivity to information on its 
peers' practices, and be disruptive of outside legitimation pressures. The picture that 
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this paints of the effects of political activity, as a benign mechanism for promoting 
rational discussion within a firm and interfering with the influence of arguments based 
on individual rather than organisational welfare, is intriguing, but at variance with much 
of the research summarised in section 2.2.3. 
It may be safer to conclude, however that, with hindsight, this particular setting was 
inappropriate for the study of political behaviour. It may be that the teams were simply 
too small, and the stakes too low, for political behaviour to emerge. In the simulation 
context, for example, there was no reason for group members to seek the support of 
outside stakeholders for use in political bargaining, as has been observed elsewhere 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981). Outside stakeholders exercised no power 
within the organisation - the only one that might have exercised such power, the 
module tutor, would certainly have declined to intervene in any group conflicts. There 
were also no resources for group members to use as bargaining counters (Buchanan and 
Boddy, 1992). 
7.2 Synthesis: towards an integrated theory of isornorphic 
behaviour in organisations 
Let me now return to my research question, "Which factors influence the propensity of 
organisations to copy the strategic decisions of others? " and set out an integrated theory 
reconciling the findings of the earlier studies, summarised in Chapters 2 and 3, with 
those of my own research. 
Figure 7.1, a development of Figure 3.1 from Chapter 3, summarises my findings and 
conclusions, integrates them with the findings or earlier researchers and sets out the 
final model of isomorphic decision making. I review each of the elements of the figure 
in turn. 
7.2.1 The effect of the business environment 
Two facets of the environment have emerged as likely to affect the probability of an 
isomorphic rather than a differentiated decision: its dynamism and its munificence. This 
study has found a positive relationship between isomorphic behaviour and 
environmental dynamism, which I have imputed to managers using isomorphic 
decisions to limit their uncertainty exposure to acceptable levels. 
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Figure 7.1 Isomorphic strategic decision-making 
- 
summary of results 
-- ----- --- sl .tuati on 
EPoliticisation 
ElStrategic intent 
ZLink bptween 
isgorfnnicýpressures 
and ac io 
. 
--------------------------------- 
Business 
environment 
M-u ini fi ce nee --- - ---------- : 
Z Uncertainty 
-Z-ln-dustry-malurity ---------- 
11111) Thesis 
Vle_g ai -an d -st-a-be Pressures --- ------- 
vResource rewards/penalties 
2Replication of economic benefits 
Value of the 
)_21Legitim_ac_y 
-------------------------------- acbce 
'21-rallor7: 9 " 
pensity to 
v strat i. c T py eg 
deasion 
Properhes of 
the dedsion 
ProperUes of 
organisaffonal 
field 
- 
------------- i ------ --------- Professiona isation 
-Density of links 
VLocal links 
ZStructurýtion (Industry 
concentration) 
------------------------------------- 
------------------------ 
? [Visibility] 
ElAmbiguity 
gComplexity 
Key: 
-v/ Linkages established from prior empirical research 
z Linkages hypothesised by earlier researchers and supported by this study 
z Linkages hypothesised by earlier researchers but not supported by this study 
9 [New linkages not tested directly during the current research] 
F, ý New linkages tested and supported during the current research 
Z New linkages tested but not supported during the current research 
The el , feet of the munificence of the environment has been established through earlier 
studies. It has been shown to interact with the quality of organisations' institutional 
relationships in determining performance (Oliver, 1997a) and it is logical to infer that it 
will also interact with those same relationships in affecting the decisions taken. In 
munificent environments, the availability of resources from institutional stakeholders 
will have less weight in directing an organisation's decisions than where resources are 
scarce, so that incidence of isomorphic decisions in pursuit of scarce resources is likely 
to decline as environmental munificence increases. 
Although flofer (1975) has invoked the industry life cycle as the source of a 
multitude of contingent influences on business strategy, my research offers no support 
for industry maturity as a causal factor in isomorphic decision-making. On the evidence 
of this study, indeed, the proportion of isomorphic decisions within those that are 
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actively reconsidered in each period actually declines over time 
- 
the practice of 
isomorphism does not itself become institutionalised and inertial. On the basis of my 
findings in respect of HI, it is the inertial perpetuation by organisations of past 
decisions that appears to contribute to the convergence of practices within an industry. 
Inertia leads to a reduction in the proportion of decisions that are actively 
reconsidered over time. If to this inertial base is added a small proportion of newly 
isomorphic decisions, this serves to reduce the proportion of decisions that come up for 
reconsideration and, potentially, to increase the proportion of firms that have adopted 
the most common practices, as observed by Eisenhardt (1988). Inertia thus contributes 
to an increase in the proportion of isomorphic outcomes as an industry ages but. as 
Donaldson (1995) has remarked, it is more a description of patterns of decision-making 
than a theory of their causes. It does not explain why managers, at any given moment, 
may opt to copy another firm's practices, rather than some home-grown alternative; for 
this, one or more of the other causal factors must be invoked. Inertia, like industry 
maturity, does not therefore figure in the final model of propensity to imitate. 
In view of the indeterminate results of my investigation of the link between 
isomorphic behaviour and decision complexity, I do not feel justified in postulating any 
relationship with environmental complexity, the one dimension of Dess and Beard's 
(1984) typology that has not been considered here. 
7.2.2 The effects of the properties of the field 
Three properties of the organisational field have been shown, by other researchers, to 
affect the incidence of isomorphic behaviour: professionalisation, density and local 
intensity. Increasing professionalisation f the relevant functional staff has been shown 
to be a factor in the transmission of isomorphic practices (Baron et al, 1986; Dobbin et 
al, 1993). By establishing acommon language and frame of reference, it makes it more 
likely that professionals in different organisations will pick up the relevant information, 
evaluate it similarly and arrive at similar decisions. The density of contacts between 
managers in a field has been established as a significant independent variable, positively 
associated with the incidence of isomorphism, in many studies (e. g. Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman, 1989; Davis and Greve, 1997; Westphal et al, 1997). 
The influence of local networks has been established, but its precise nature is less 
clear. Managers are more likely to imitate competitors in their locality (Greve, 1998), 
but regional networks disseminate isomorphic practices less quickly than interlocking 
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directorates (Davis and Greve, 1997). 1 conjecture (see 7.2.3 below) that local networks, 
because they are more likely to foster close social ties, may also give rise to isomorphic 
decisions based on the desire for legitimation or on role models within the social 
network (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). 
This study finds no support for the conjecture (M) of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
that field structuration, as evidenced by industry concentration, is a driver of isomorphic 
decision-making. 
7.2.3 The perceived value of the precise practice 
My findings support the idea that a highly significant factor in the decision as to 
whether or not to copy another organisation's practice is the availability of information 
as to the value of the practice in question. The value of two types of information have 
been established in prior research: firstly, the degree of legal or state pressure to adopt 
that practice and the magnitude of the resource penalties for non-adoption (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983; Baron et al, 1986; Dobbin et al, 1993); secondly the existence of resource 
penalties for non-adoption and/or of incentives for adoption, deriving from non- 
governmental sources uch as stock markets (see Table 3.2 for examples). 
One of the main contributions of this study is to clarify the respective contributions 
made by information relating to the relating to the likely economic benefits from 
adopting a practice and the legitimacy conferred by so doing. This study has found 
several phenomena that can be explained by the decision makers' desire to emulate 
economic benefits perceived elsewhere, but not by the desire for legitimation. In 
particular, the findings in relation to H4a and 1-14b, where the relationship between 
foreknowledge and frequency of isomorphic decisions was positive for some types of 
decision and negative for others, can easily be explained if in terms of managers 
digesting the different types of information and making conscious strategic choices as to 
whether to emulate or not. 
It fits much more awkwardly with the view of isomorphic behaviour as fuelled by the 
desire for legitimation. In order to explain these results, one would need to postulate 
that certain types of decision conferred more legitimacy than others, and were therefore 
more likely to be imitated, whereas imitation of other types of decision diminished 
legitimacy. There are, however, absolutely no grounds for believing that, in the 
BRANDMAPS simulation, marketing mix decisions differed in any way from 
salesforce effort or compensation decisions in terms of importance or conferred 
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legitimation 
- 
indeed, part of the didactic purpose of the exercise was to show how 
every type of marketing decision was important. 
There are no findings for which the reverse is true i. e. that they are better explained 
by legitimation than by a search for economic benefits. The support for H8, which 
shows isomorphic behaviour is more common amongst poorer performing firms, is 
equally explicable in terms of the managers of those firms deriving legitimation from 
imitation of established practices or information from the success or failure of those 
practices. The lack of association between isomorphic, pressures and isomorphic activity 
is, if anything, more pronounced for pressures based on legitimation (pressure to be the 
best performing group and to confonn to instructors' expectations) than it is for 
pressures based on information (pressures to emulate other groups or successful real-life 
companies). 
My review of empirical studies of isomorphism in Chapter 3 found no studies in 
which behaviour attributed to the desire for legitimation could not equally be explained 
by reference to resource dependency and the desire for replication of economic benefits. 
These two causes, particularly the second, are also consistent with isomorphism's being 
a conscious strategic choice, as was concluded from the empirical work of Oliver (198 8) 
and Kraatz and Zajac (1996). 
Thus, my findings, taken in combination with earlier empirical work, suggest that, at 
least for certain types isomorphic behaviour, such as the pre-institutional marketing 
practices simulated in this study, the role of legitimation has been overplayed by 
theorists. This conclusion is compatible with recent empirical work on 
institutionalisation (Greenwood et al, 2002; Sherer and Lee, 2002), which has shown 
how, even in highly institutionalised fields such as accountancy and law, legitimation of 
a practice by a prestigious organisation, while certainly acting as an enabler of that 
practice's wider adoption, does not necessarily lead to its becoming universal. The 
desire for legitimation within one's immediate community may well figure as an 
element to be maximised in the personal utility function of certain organisation 
members. Individual managers may thus feel themselves subject to isomorphic 
pressures, as reported in the tests for H9-H 11. However, such pressures at the group 
level are disrupted by cognitive and political processes within the organisation, 
particularly since different organisational members may form conflicting views as to the 
likely role model (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Thus, in the absence of resource 
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dependency or economic efficiency grounds for action, isomorphic pressures may not 
play a role in determining whether or not a decision is isomorphic with that of a 
competitor (1-17). 
The concept of legitimation retains some power in explaining how industries grow 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). For example, the entry of IBM, with all its might and 
prestige, into the PC industry in 1981 gave the cachet of respectability to that product in 
the eyes of consumers and producers alike. The transition of the PC industry from the 
introductory to the growth phase can be dated almost precisely to that event. But this 
simply removed a barrier to the purchase of the PC from the minds of consumers. 
People felt content to buy a PC now that IBM had signalled that the product was to be 
no mere toy or fad. However, they did not buy PCs to gain legitimacy with IBM or their 
peers 
- 
they bought them because they wanted to run Lotus 1-2-3. 
The desire for legitimation is most plausible as a motivating factor when it relates to 
practices that are to be enacted within the community which confers legitimacy. It may 
be a factor, therefore, in determining how practices spread from one part of an 
organisation to another, or which top managerial initiatives are adopted at lower levels 
in an organisation (Haberberg, 2002). Legitimation, however, may play only a minor, 
enabling part in the spread of practices between organisations unless, I conjecture, the 
following three conditions are met: top managers are part of a close-knit, probably local, 
community, such as local Rotary Clubs or regional elites (Davis and Greve, 1997); top 
managers are powerful enough to enforce their views upon the rest of their organisation 
without political interference (implied by the findings of Westphal and Zajac, 2001); 
and the practice has high visibility and low combinatorial complexity, so that the TMT 
can easily monitor its implementation. 
The perceived economic benefits to be derived from the practice in question, on the 
other hand, figure more prominently in the final model of isomorphic decision-making. 
Strong information, indicating the practice will be effective across a broad range of 
organisations and contexts, is likely to lead to its widespread adoption, as with the M- 
form organisation. Weaker information will have unpredictable effects, depending on 
the nature of the decision being taken, and may stimulate either widespread imitation or 
the development of differentiated alternatives (Deephouse, 1999). 1 discuss the effect of 
the nature of the decision in more detail in section 7.2.4. 
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7.2.4 The effects of the properties of the decision 
Three aspects of the nature of the decision appear to influence isomorphic behaviour: 
combinatorial complexity, visibility and the type of practice involved, although the 
evidence for the second of these is only indirect, and development of a theory to 
understand the last poses considerable difficulties. 
The present study provides initial evidence that isomorphism becomes less likely, the 
greater the degree of combinatorial complexity within the practice. Sufficient 
similarities may be observable between small numbers of firms across particular 
combinations of practices for cluster analysis to establish the existence of strategic 
groups (e. g. McGee, Thomas and Pruett, 1995; Flavidn, Haberberg and Polo, 1999, 
2002). However, as I shall discuss in more detail in section 7.3.1, the findings of this 
study indicate the degree to which total isomorphism at the level of a business strategy 
is improbable. If it does not occur in a simulated situation where decision-makers can 
(and do) gain near-perfect knowledge of a competitor's marketing mix, then it is surely 
improbable in real-life situations where the information is less precise, less 
comprehensive and more difficult to obtain. 
For reasons to be discussed in section 7.5.1, it was not possible in this study to test 
the effects of the visibility of a decision to top management. Isomorphism has been 
observed in earlier research for both decisions with low visibility (Levitt and Nass, 
1989) and those with high strategic prominence 
- 
see Table 3.1 for examples. There is 
thus no clear evidence as to the extent to which it will affect the relative frequency of 
isomorphic versus non-isomorphic decisions, although I have argued, following Greve 
(1998a), that high visibility will promote isomorphism. The contribution of this study 
has been to offer indirect evidence in this area; as I as discussed in section 7.1.5, if 
decision ambiguity is excluded as a possible cause of the anomalous findings of Oliver 
(1988), as my findings in respect of H5 suggest they should be, then low decision 
visibility remains as the most plausible cause. But it should be noted that isomorphism 
did occur between the organisations observed by Oliver in her 1988 study; she merely 
found that it did not correlate significantly with measures of embeddedness. The 
implication is therefore that lack of visibility in a decision interferes with the effect of 
embeddedness in the institutionalisation of practices within an organisational field. 
Lack of visibility is also likely to affect the motives for opting for an isomorphic 
decision. For mundane operational decisions, such as the majority of those analysed 
during the BRANDMAPS exercise or in Levitt and Nass' (1989) study of the choice of 
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textbook content, the desire to emulate benefits seen elsewhere is likely to be the prime 
motive for imitation, with economies relating to search costs (Rao et al, 2001) also a 
relevant factor. Because there are so many of these decisions and the decision process is 
not exposed to the same level of scrutiny as those taken by the board, it will be rare for 
them to affect the allocation of resources to the organisation and so resource 
dependency considerations are unlikely to loom large. These same factors, together with 
the possible desire to minimise search costs, means that such decisions are unlikely to 
be reopened without good reason, so that inertia will have a strong influence on the 
degree of isomorphism found in them. 
High profile transitions (see section 3.6.4.1) with low combinatorial complexity will, 
on the other hand, be susceptible to close scrutiny and monitoring by both top 
management and interested external stakeholders. Resource dependency and, where 
other conditions are met, legitimation considerations are thus likely to be strong 
influences on the degree of isomorphism in such decisions. These may add force to 
information cascades (Rao et al, 2001) and pressure top managers into adopting 
practices for whose effectiveness there is scant evidence, resulting in the faddish 
adoption (Strang and Macy, 2001) of initiatives like TQM (Westphal et al, 1997) or 
imitation of market moves (Haveman, 1993; Greve, 1998a) that are later abandoned 
(Greve, 1998a). Consultants (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Abrahamson, 1996) may 
also stimulate such information cascades and isomorphic behaviour. 
The preliminary evidence from this study, in particular the findings in respect of HO, 
is that there do exist certain decisions, or classes of decisions, that are unlikely to be 
imitated 
- 
where the reaction of decision-makers to information regarding a practice is 
the seeking of a non-isomorphic alternative. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to date 
as to which attributes render a decision more rather than less likely to be imitated. This 
study does not offer evidence that the ambiguity inherent in a decision is one such 
attribute. 
It is possible that no simple cause and effect relationships exist, or that attributes that 
influence imitation will be context-specific. The theoretical dividing line between what 
can be copied and what cannot is extremely thin. Some scripts (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997) coalesce into institutions that spread from organisation to organisation, while 
others coalesce into routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) whose tacit nature renders them 
inimitable. Further research is needed to clarify this issue. 
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7.2.5 The effects of the organisation's situation and internal 
properties 
This research has consistently failed to find support t1or hypotheses relatHig to tile 
impact of cultural factors on isomorphic pressures or of isomorpl-iic presstires oil 
isomorphic decisions. I discuss the implications of this for strategic dccisioll making 
theory in section 7.3.2. For the purposes of the model proposed here, there is evidence 
only for the organisation's situation, in terms of its performaricc, as an MI'lliclice oil 
isomorphic decision making, with poor performance in an organisation renderilig its 
members more likely to make isomorphic decisions. The possibic reasons Ior this Ilave 
been discussed in section 7.1.8. 
7.2.6 Theoretical conclusions 
In this sub-section, I surnmarise the main conclusions from this study, in the I'Orni of a 
final model of isomorphic decision-making, set out in Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 Isomorphic strategic decision-making 
-a model 
---------------------------------- ----------------- Legal and state pressures 
Resource rewards/penalties 
Replication of economic benefits 
Value of the 
Legitirn-ac-y 
----------------------------------- pI racticý)e 
Business 
environment 
----------------------- Uncertainty 
Munificence 
---------------------- 
all ýý4. 
Prop 
. to 
it 
I 
copy strategic 
decision 
Properties of 
organisational 
field 
----------------------------------- Professional isation 
Density of links 
: 
__L_ocal_lin_ks --------------------- : 
- ----------- 
_Comp_lexi_ty 
Decision makers derive information about a practice from within their organisational 
field. Earlier research has established that the degree of professional isation of that field, 
the density of linkages within it and the extent of local linkages are all positively 
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associated with propensity to copy a strategic decision observed within that field. This 
study has failed to find support for a link between that propensity and field 
structuration, expressed as industry concentration. 
The value of the practice will affect the decision as to whether or not to adopt it. Prior 
research has established that the degree of state and legal pressures to adopt and the 
resource incentives or penalties for so doing will influence the decision. This study 
suggests that, in the absence of those influences, legitimation plays a lesser role in the 
isomorphic decision than prevailing, neo-institutional theory holds to be the case, and 
more economically rational considerations a greater one. These latter derive from the 
likely economic returns from adoption, as deduced from returns believed to have been 
achieved by earlier adopters, and the saving in search costs from isomorphism. 
Prior research has suggested that a munificent environment will reduce incentives to 
adopt a practice insofar as it reduces resource constraints upon an organisation. The 
study suggests that increased dynamism in the environment will result an increased 
propensity to emulate decisions seen elsewhere, as organisations seek ways of adjusting 
to the concomitant uncertainty. I have failed to find an association between propensity 
to copy and industry age, although the findings of this study, taken in conjunction with 
earlier research, suggest that as the industry matures the degree of observed 
isomorphism will increase as a result of inertia in decision-making. 
The degree of isomorphism observed in a strategic decision diminishes, this study 
suggests, with the degree of combinatorial complexity of that decision. The visibility of 
the decision at senior management, I conjecture on the basis of past studies, influences 
the underlying reason for an isomorphic decision, with economic considerations 
diminishing and legitimation consideration increasing in importance with increased 
visibility. I found no evidence that the ends-means ambiguity inherent in different types 
of decision influenced the incidence of isomorphism. in that decision. 
The organisation's situation will influence the extent to which its managers are likely 
to emulate decisions seen elsewhere, with isomorphism being most likely amongst 
poorly performing firms. I found no support for any association between the 
organisation's cultural attributes - its degree of politicisation and its strategic intent - 
and isomorphism. 
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7.2.7 Methodological conclusions 
This study has shown that laboratory-based quasi-field studies based, like this one, on 
business-like simulated environments, can make a valuable contribution to the 
investigation of strategic decision making in general and isomorphic behaviours in 
particular. The simulated environment has demonstrated its value in permitting a 
particular decision to be associated unambiguously with a given time period and/or 
contingent condition. It has enabled the examination of 42 discrete industry situations 
(seven industries in six separate time periods) in the context of a single, compact study; 
it is doubtful whether H I, H2 or H3 could have been tested in any other way. 
The simulated environment also enables the researcher to control certain 
environmental contingencies, such as munificence, and to conduct simultaneous tudies 
of decision making under different industry and market conditions, and for different 
types of decision. This has enabled me to investigate conjectures regarding the effects 
on isomorphic behaviour of industry concentration and uncertainty between ends and 
means that have remained unvalidated for two decades since the publication of 
DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) paper. 
It has also permitted an examination of decision-making in a new industry without 
any of the normal problems of left truncation of data. The method used here to examine 
patterns in isomorphic decision-making over time could equally be employed, in an 
appropriately designed simulation or game, to see how other facets of managerial 
decisions, such as product and process innovation, evolve over time, and whether they 
do follow the patterns laid down in commonly used life cycle models. 
One caveat is that this study should be replicated with other groups of students. A 
number of frequently cited results in areas such as consensus research have as their 
basis experiments, performed on quite small samples of university students, which do 
not appear to have ever been validated by other researchers in other universities, or even 
with other cohorts from the same establishment. Chemists or botanists would never be 
satisfied with such a state of affairs. 
7.3 Implications for theoty 
7.3.1 Implications for institutional views of isomorphism 
Since the publication of DiMaggio and Powell's seminal (1983) paper, institutional 
theory and isomorphism have been strongly linked in the literature: isomorphism is 
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widely viewed as an institutional phenomenon, and the most prominent set of testable 
propositions emerging from institutional theory are those relating to isomorphism. 
More recently, however, institutional theorists have begun to place less emphasis on 
isomorphism as the phenomenon of interest (Dacin et al, 2002), and the findings of this 
study support this change in emphasis. My findings from this study, if they can be 
substantiated, challenge DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) view of isomorphism between 
organisations in a number of ways. 
DiMaggio and Powell begin their celebrated discussion of the topic by asking "why 
there is such startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices. " (1983: 148). 
1 have already argued, in section 3.6.4, that this homogeneity is illusory, based upon a 
simplification of the phenomena under review to high level of generality and a low level 
of combinatorial complexity. The findings of this study, that isomorphism decreases as 
combinatorial complexity increases, support this view. 
Isomorphism can be seen in isolated, high level practices. For example, large firms 
tend have adopted the multi-divisional form, although there are some notable and 
successful exceptions, such as Canon (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998), and other firms, 
such as IBM, have moved beyond the M-form to newer, more flexible forms of 
organisation (Galbraith, 1998), which have yet to be widely emulated. But the 
investigation of H6 has clearly illustrated how unlikely it may be for such similarities to 
be perpetuated across more than one or two practices. Isomorphism. is not to be 
observed in the combinatorially complex, richly interwoven fabric of practices that 
make up an organisation's cultural web (Johnson, 1987) or its marketing or business 
strategy. GE, Marconi and Siemens, Amazon, HP and Dell all have, or had, multi- 
divisional structures 
- 
but it is highly doubtful whether this contributes even a marginal 
degree of homogeneity to the way in which those organisations, or their products, are 
experienced by their employees, suppliers or customers. Indeed, differences in the 
implementation of the multi-divisional structure by competing computer manufacturers 
were clearly manifested in the design of their finished products (Christensen, 1997). 
Secondly, the data from this study throw some doubt on the extent to which 
isomorphic decisions are predominant or predictable 
- 
in other words, the existence of 
an "iron cage" constraining organisational decision-making in every context. By the 
most generous definition, approximately one-third of all decisions taken in the final six 
periods of the BRANDMAPS simulation were isomorphic. If one removes the 
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perpetuated decisions and considers only "newly minted" isomorphisms, the proportion, 
still using a generous definition, falls to one-fifth, and that proportion diminishes over 
time. This is, admittedly, a munificent environment, but it is one where participants are 
confused, under time pressure, aware of what their tutors want 16 and under pressure to 
17 do well 
.I know (from one of its members) of a group from another cohort on the same 
programme, which "played" another business game by copying exactly the moves made 
by a group that had come out on top in an earlier exercise. In short, there is every reason 
to suppose that the BRANDMAPS participants would deploy isomorphic decisions 
where they found utility in so doing 
- 
but they did not. And, as has already been argued 
in section 7.1.4, for certain types of decision they were more likely to deploy 
information regarding competitors' practices to differentiate themselves than to copy 
them. 
While it would not be possible, without further research, to identify specific examples 
of types of practice that are unlikely to be the subject of inter-organisational imitation, 
this study constitutes preliminary evidence that such types of practice exist. Or it may 
simply be that, in any given context, there will be one group of practices that are likely 
to be emulated, and a second group where knowledge of competitors' actions is more 
likely to lead to differentiation than to imitation, but that as the context changes 
practices may move between those two groups. 
Thirdly, the mechanism postulated by neo-institutional theory for the spread of 
practices between organisations is not supported by this study. As I have shown above 
(7.2.1), in this synthesised environment, legitimation does not appear to play an 
essential role in provoking managers to copy their peers, and economic rationality is 
more fundamental to isomorphic behaviour than Meyer and Rowan (1977) or DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) would allow. The lack of support for H2 casts doubt on whether 
isomorphic behaviour varies with the degree of structuration of a field, as DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) propose, and the lack of clear support for H7 also means that there is, 
as yet, no evidence that isomorphic pressures, be they based upon legitimation or any 
other motive force, actually play any role in determining , which decisions are 
isomorphic. 
16 50% of the class gave at least one score of 5 or above to the question "Our decisions are what our tutors 
would expect us to do" 
17 88% of the class gave at least one score of five or above to the statement "There is a lot of pressure to 
be the best-performing roup" 
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Taken together with the evidence reviewed in section 3.6.4.1 to the effect that 
isomorphism is observable for a wide variety of practices at differing stages of 
institutionalisation, the findings of this study therefore lead me to challenge the idea that 
isomorphic decisions are predominantly a manifestation of institutionalisation. I 
conclude, rather, that for a wide variety of phenomena, the spread of practices through 
an organisational population occurs for reasons other than those postulated by 
institutional theory 
- 
principally, the economically rational desire to emulate benefits 
perceived elsewhere whilst containing search costs. As I have pointed out in section 
7.2.1, imitation for those reasons, together with an inertial disinclination on the part of 
managers to revisit past decisions, would lead gradually to the same convergence in 
practices between firms postulated by institutional theory. However, the mechanism is 
somewhat different to that suggested by institutional theorists, and implies no 
substantive difference between the objectification and sedimentation phases other than 
the number of adopters. 
My findings also suggest one further refinement to institutional theory. Much of the 
discussion in subsections 7.1.9-11 is predicated upon the observation that the different 
types of isomorphic pressure behave as separate constructs rather than facets of a single 
phenomenon, as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Evidence for this lies in 
their different sensitivities to the various control variables (see 6.10.4). Furthermore, the 
regression coefficients of the five independent variables used in this part of the study 
take different signs depending, on which of the four isomorphic pressure variables is the 
dependent one. In short, each of the four variables behaves individually and has 
different influences. Again, a definitive conclusion along these lines would have 
required a larger number of readings and better oPerationalisations of the constructs. It 
is possible, for example, that the differing behaviour of MIMIN and MIMEX is an 
aberration stemming from a rogue set of readings for MIMIN which, as already noted, 
follows an unusual distribution. 
7.3.2 Implications for strategic decision making theory 
The findings of this study, taken together with prior research, have implications for the 
relationship between perception and behaviour in SDM. 
One strand of SDM theory places a considerable emphasis upon the limitations of 
human perception and their implications for managerial and organizational cognition 
(e. g. Cyert and March, 1963; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Eden and Spender, 1998). A 
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related strand emphasises the uncertain relationship between decision and action 
(Weick, 1979; Mintzberg and Waters, 1990; Hendry, 2000). A third strand, discussed in 
section 2.2.3, emphasises the role, for good or ill, of the political process in 
organizational decision making. Researchers have presumed that a better understanding 
of cognitive and political processes will lead a better understanding of SDM. The 
inconclusive findings of other researchers, such as those investigating the link between 
consensus and performance (West and Schwenk, 1996), pose a challenge to this 
presumption. My study, in its failure to find a clear connection between perceived 
pressures to act isomorphically and isomorphic action, offers reinforcement to that 
challenge. 
Preconceptions about rationality in decision making appear to lie at the heart of this 
issue. Theorists considering political and cognitive factors in strategic decision making 
(including, hitherto, this author 
- 
see Haberberg and Rieple, 2001) have often concluded 
that it was correct to downplay or even completely discount the role of economic 
rationality. My observations in this study, however, are not supportive of such a 
conclusion, but rather of a view that those unpredictable and imperfect processes may, 
over time and viewed across a population of organisations, converge upon predictable 
and rational outcomes. 
Economists have observed that, while not all individuals may behave consistently as 
profit maximisers, the profit maximisation model retains a high degree of predictive 
power (Hirshleifer and Hirshleifer, 1998). Similarly, the empirical studies supporting 
contingency theories of organisation (Hofer, 1975; Pennings, 1975,1987; Bourgeois, 
1984) indicate a level of predictability of behaviour across populations of organisations, 
in directions that can be justified by performance gains from greater efficiency and/or 
superior ability to react to particular environments. The support found in the present 
research for an association between industry dynamism and isomorphic behaviour (H2) 
is a case in point. 
The results of the present research are compatible with managers reacting heedfully to 
a given context even in the absence of conscious cognitive links between that context 
and a particular reaction. In this case, although there were no evidence of a relationship 
between performance and perceived pressures pressures to mimic behaviour in the 
industry (the MIMIN variable in the test of 1-19), there was a statistically significant 
association between performance and isomorphic action (118). Weick's famous dictum, 
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"how can I know what I think until I see what I do? " has usually been taken to imply 
that decision-makers will not necessarily, or even typically, act rationally even in the 
aftermath of rational analysis. The implication of what I have observed here, however, 
is that the reverse may sometimes be true 
- 
that they may act rationally in the absence 
of even boundedly rational cognition. 
One explanation would be that, even in a small organisation such as these student 
groups, the differences between individual and organisational perceptions are coming 
into play. These have been observed in other contexts, including differences between 
individual and organisational learning (Hedberg, 1981; Kim, 1993) and between 
intended and realised strategies (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). In order for isomorphic 
pressures to translate into isomorphic action, group members must agree, not just upon 
the need to emulate another group, but also on which practices to emulate and which 
firm constitutes the appropriate role model. However, different models present 
themselves (Haunschild and Miner, 1997), and in the absence of effective consensus 
about the appropriate target, isomorphism may not occur other than through accidental 
imitation. 
Managerial intuition may thus be inherently more rational than the underlying 
decision processes. The spectacular case studies of decisions distorted by groupthink 
(Janis, 1982), politics and power (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1992) may not, after all, be 
completely typical of organisational decision making. Burgelman's (1994,1996) studies 
of Intel's exit from the computer memory business are examples where commitment to 
an established business and intensive political activity failed to prevent, and may have 
contributed to, a firm's taking a correct, but difficult, decision, and gaining the broad- 
based consent needed to implement it successfully. 
7.3.3 Isomorphism, risk, uncertainty and ambiguity 
Although their interpretation poses difficulties, a number of the results extend our 
understanding of the role played by risk, uncertainty and ambiguity in stimulating 
isomorphic behaviour: the findings on the relationship of perceived isomorphic 
pressures (H4) and of isomorphic behaviour (H7) with performance; the positive 
association between environmental uncertainty and isomorphic behaviour (M) and the 
lack of association between decision ambiguity and proportion of isomorphic decisions 
(HIO). 
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If isomorphic, behaviour is a means of reducing risk, then the lack of association 
between performance and isomorphic pressures, and the clear positive association 
between poor performance and the incidence of isomorphic decisions, are both difficult 
to reconcile with the findings of researchers in behavioural economics (e. g. Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) and strategic management (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Greve, 
1998b). Those findings indicate that people are more inclined to take risky decisions to 
retrieve a loss and tend to avoid them where there is a danger of dissipating gains. 
There are two possible explanations. One alternative is that underperformance was 
not experienced as a loss, and so did not trigger the risk-seeking behaviour expected by 
behavioural economists. Since there were only two instances of quarterly net losses 
among the 28 observations used for this study, it was not possible to test whether loss- 
making groups behaved differently from the sample at large. However, the finding of 
Greve (1998b) 
- 
that risky change is more likely when performance falls below 
aspirations, even when this does not involve actual losses 
- 
renders this explanation 
unlikely. 
A second, and more likely, alternative is that the participants did not, in fact, 
associate isomorphism with risk reduction, but with uncertainty reduction. The 
association between poor performance and isomorphic decisions could then be 
explained as simply a reaction by members of underperforming groups to the 
information that competitors' decisions were producing superior outcomes, so that by 
mimicking them they could increase the likelihood of improving the results from certain 
practices. It may be that no high-payoff options presented themselves for these 
practices, or that risk-seeking behaviour will be favoured for other practices where such 
options are available. 
The copying of competitors' strategies thus becomes a means of reducing the 
uncertainty associated with the adoption of a particular practice, but does not affect 
choices between risks, whose assessment involves both uncertainties and anticipated 
performance outcomes. This theory is supported by the association found (H2) between 
environmental uncertainty and the proportion of isomorphic decisions. Managers react 
to increased uncertainty in the environment 
- 
manifested, in this case, through increased 
variability in market size - by taking action to reduce uncertainty inherent in the 
decisions taken, and they do so across the range of their decisions. This implies an 
upper bound on managers' total appetite for uncertainty. 
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Viewed in this light, the lack of evidence of association between decision ambiguity 
and proportion of isomorphic decisions (1-15) can be explained. At first sight, it appears 
to be an anomalous result. The tests of hypotheses H3 and H4 have shown that 
managers treat varying types of decision differently when it comes to isomorphic 
decisions. In the light of the conclusions of the previous paragraph, the degree of 
uncertainty or ambiguity inherent in different types of decision would seem to be a 
logical axis along which to discriminate between decisions for which isomorphism 
would be favoured and those for which it would be eschewed. 
One possible explanation is that uncertainty and ambiguity are handled by increasing 
the proportion of isomorphism. across the full range of decisions. However, when it 
comes to determining which particular types of decision are more likely to be copied 
than others, uncertainty is not the determining factor. Rather, it is dominated by other 
attributes, perhaps including the expected payoff associated with different types of 
decision, which then come into play. 
7.4 Implications for praxis and public policy 
The number of instances in which a manager specifically wishes to encourage or 
constrain isomorphic behaviour within their field is limited. It is rarely clear whether 
isomorphic behaviour is objectively preferable to non-isomorphic (Deephouse, 1999). 
What my research also implies is that for a given practice, it may not be possible to 
predict whether advertising an organisation's decisions within its field will lead to 
imitation or to the direct opposite. Thus, there will be few occasions when decision 
makers have both a clear need and a clear opportunity to incite imitation of practices by 
their peers. 
7.4.1 Emerging industries 
One such occasion arises during the introductory phases of an industry, when the 
existence of common standards and practices can assist the industry in achieving 
legitimation in the eyes of customers and of suppliers of capital and other key inputs. 
However, such standardisation is in conflict with the natural tendency of entrepreneurs 
in new industries to seek out innovative and distinctive products and practices. 
Differentiation is seen as the natural path to competitive advantage in this phase of the 
life cycle (Porter, 1980). 
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My model of isomorphic decision making implies that a far-sighted manager, looking 
to cultivate the preconditions for industry growth, should be looking to stimulate some 
measure of intervention in the industry. This might come from limited state intervention 
a 
to set legally enforceable standards, or from a powerful sponsor with substantial 
financial resources and the desire to use them to shape an emerging industry. For 
example, Kleiner Perkins, a Califon-tian venture capital firm, committed resources to 
bringing management practices in internet start-ups to acceptable standards (Warner, 
1998). 
The far sighted manager might also highlight the uncertainty-limitation benefits of 
isomorphic strategies in a dynamic environment. Such arguments would be unlikely to 
find favour with entrepreneurs in a risk seeking community, but they would be listened 
to by providers of capital anxious to limit their avoidable risk exposure. 
Finally, it would be advantageous to express the practices to be emulated in the form 
of easily understood initiatives of low combinatorial complexity, to enable monitoring 
or policing by the sponsoring authority and by the management of the adopting firms. 
7.4.2 Mature industries 
Within a firm in a mature industry, on the other hand, the managerial challenge would 
be the opposite one of sustaining innovation in processes (Porter, 1980) and products 
(Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992). This implies discouraging isomorphic decisions 
taken solely on the grounds of inertia and search cost limitation, and encouraging, even 
forcing, people to consider a broader range of options. Initiatives such as Business 
Process Engineering (Hammer and Champy, 1993) are directed at doing precisely this, 
but have a high failure rate (Economist, 1994) and may be difficult to sustain over long 
timescales. 
One appropriate move would be to expand the network within which decision makers 
are embedded, thus giving them a wider range of role models. Such measures are 
already advocated as a way of enhancing absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Managers might also devote resources to increasing the availability of 
information regarding the organisation's own practices and, in a large firm, making best 
practice widely available. Such recommendations are compatible with recent thinking 
on best practice in knowledge management (Davenport, De Long and Beers, 1998; 
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998). It would also be appropriate to enhance the organisation's 
capacity to test new ideas, by streamlining procedures and installing appropriate 
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software, in order to reduce the search costs associated with new internal practices vis a 
vis those for other firins' established practices. 
7.4.3 Public policy implications 
The model in Figure 7.1 has a number of practical implications for policymakers who 
will, from time to time, wish to disseminate practices, such as those relating to equal 
opportunities and corporate governance, into both public and private sector 
organisations. 
The most important point is that measures that appeal only to the desire for 
legitimation are unlikely to succeed. Exhortation, the "bully pulpit" or public sector 
beacons of good practice or centres of excellence are unlikely to succeed unless they are 
backed up with either legal sanctions, resource rewards for adopters or the credible 
threat of withdrawal of resources, such as public sector contracts, from non-adopters. 
Even where they are backed up with credible information as to the economic value of 
the practice, such legitimation based measures may be insufficient, as is shown by the 
slow take up of e-business practices by the UK public and private sectors, in the face of 
repeated government exhortations. 
Secondly, professionalisation of the field will assist in dissemination of practices. 
However, professional legitimation cannot be relied upon to outweigh the effects of 
resource dependency, and in particular perverse incentives deriving from resource 
allocation algorithms. Recent cases in point from the UK public sector include: teachers 
assisting primary school pupils with tests whose outcomes will determine schools' 
positions in published league tables, and so influence pupil intake and school income 
for the following year; and health service departments hiring co-ordinators and other 
staff that they do not regard as necessary, in order to capture the associated funding. 
A final point is that, as with the emerging industry practices considered in section 
7.4.1, the practices in question need to be of low combinatorial complexity for ease of 
monitoring. While there are some precedents for isomorphism being imposed at high 
levels of detail 
- 
in the French education system, famously, identical lessons take place 
at identical times in schools throughout the land 
- 
these occur only at considerable costs 
in terms of central administration and loss of freedom and initiative at the level of the 
individual organisation. 
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7.5 Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations, some of which relate to imperfections in the 
execution and some of which are inherent in its design. 
To begin with the problems resulting from execution, the internal and external 
validity of the study suffer from its having been executed with a single, small sample 
from a single cohort. The sample size in terms of groups is at the very lower limit of 
what can be judged to be acceptable from papers published in good quality refereed 
journals. The study would clearly have benefited from having been repeated with one or 
more cohorts, preferably spanning more than one institution, to gain a variety of data 
points and guard against bias introduced by the idiosyncrasies of a single sample, albeit 
one spanning two MBA cohorts that are taught largely separately. It would also have 
gained from having been run with several games of different durations, to gain a better 
picture of the effects of industry age and to see whether the effects observed in period 8 
of the simulation reported upon here were due to endgaming or were the beginning of a 
new phase in groups' decision making. 
The small sample size also left the results susceptible to bias from the actions of a 
single team. If one of the seven groups had consistently behaved in a manner that 
rendered its decisions trivial or perverse, or if it were simply composed of such 
idiosyncratic individuals that they were totally unrepresentative of the managerial 
population at large, then some 15% of the data from this study would have been 
compromised 
- 
enough to distort the findings. The analysis I have undertaken in 
establishing the internal validity of the study variables (section 5.4), together with the 
observations I undertook of groups' decision processes, offer reassurance, however, that 
such distortion has not occurred. 
The availability of more data points would also have allowed tests of the sensitivity 
of the outcomes to variations in the ways in which the variables are operationalised. For 
example, it would be desirable to see whether looking at the coefficient of variation of 
market size over four or more periods, rather than three, affects the outcome of the test 
of the association between isomorphic behaviour and environmental uncertainty. 
A further possible limitation of this research comes from the use of X2to test H4 and 
H8. In order for this test to be valid, the decision to copy or not copy another group in 
any period must be independent of similar decisions taken in earlier periods. This 
clearly is not valid for dataset 1, where certain decisions are the perpetuations of earlier 
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ones. However, I have already argued (5.3.4) that there is considerable evidence that 
groups approached each quarter as a separate event. Thus, for the other datasets, in 
which all isomorphic decisions are deliberate changes of direction, the independence 
assumption is likely to be valid. 
A fiirther limitation is that it was not possible to discover who it was that the laggard 
firms were emulating. My attempts to operationalise this were stymied by the fact that 
in many cases there were several possible candidates for the originator of a particular 
practice. Several of these might be counted as successful, depending upon the 
performance measure used and whether success was measured in terms of the overall 
game or the market in which the practice in question was being emulated. This 
observation is consistent with the findings of Haunschild and Miner (1997) that firms 
managers may draw upon a variety of role models. However, it also implies that there is 
a danger that earlier studies (Haveman, 1993; Bums and Wholey, 1993), which 
measured just a single characteristic, such as profit or prestige, of the organisations that 
emerged as models, may have over-simplified the situation. 
The reliability of the findings regarding H9-H IIb, as already mentioned, is hampered 
by the small number of data points and the use of single item measures for the key 
constructs. These are likely to have contributed, for example, to the irregular 
distribution of the MIMIN variable, which limited the validity of the only significant 
regression model in which it appeared and may have contributed to the paucity of 
significant associations found between that variable, in particular, and the independent 
variables in this part of the study. Any replications of this study should naturally address 
these flaws. 
With hindsight, I would have been better advised to have focused the questionnaire 
earlier on a smaller number of constructs, each with a greater variety of items, to 
improve internal validity. It might also have been advisable to have shortened the 
questionnaire to a point where it could have been administered weekly, rather than 
fortnightly, in order to increase the number of data points. I should have used an earlier, 
test run of the questionnaire to improve the agreement within the different scales, rather 
than focusing, as I did, simply on ensuring that discriminant validity was adequate. 
The small sizes of the participant groups must be taken into account when reviewing 
the measurements of political behaviour, since politics may only be properly observable 
where resource dependency considerations come into play and in larger groups. 
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Simulations such as BRANDMAPS provide "a realistic group-decision making context, 
but not a realistic organization contexf' (Keys and Wolfe, 1990: 324) and it may be that 
observing and measuring political interactions in such a context was never a realistic 
aim. 
Subject self-presentation effects may also have hindered the measurement of this 
political behaviour variable. When, during a pilot study, I attempted to operationalise 
variables relating to power asymmetries and leadership styles within groups, I was 
unable to gain a sufficient range of responses to achieve adequate discriminant validity. 
Although power asymmetries were clearly visible when I observed the groups at work, 
no respondent was prepared to concede, even anonymously, that their group procedures 
were failing to match the egalitarian and participatory democracy that the students 
appeared to perceive as the ideal. Similar desires to appear democratic and fair may 
have influenced students' responses to the political behaviour questionnaire items. 
The compressed time frame of the simulation enabled a large number of observations 
to be taken in a relatively short period but, like Oliver (1988), 1 have to record the 
possibility that the study time-frame was not long enough for true isomorphic behaviour 
to emerge. It may be that true institutions and patterns of isomorphism do not emerge 
until years of real time have elapsed. By observing behaviour in a benign environment 
in which there were no binding state, legal or resource constraints, I have gained some 
insights into the influence of such constraints on isomorphic behaviour, but it is possible 
that patterns of behaviour observed in their absence would not occur in real life. 
This leads naturally to the general issue of interactions between the study variables. 
This research has been the first to study certain variables and relationships, including 
the effect of environmental contingencies on isomorphic behaviour, isomorphic 
pressures and their effect on behaviour, combinatorial complexity, and the effect of the 
nature of the decision on the outcome of the decision. Accordingly, I have limited the 
scope of my investigations to simple pairwise associations between constructs. It is 
quite likely that there will be interactions between these constructs 
- 
indeed, the 
integrated theory of isomorphic behaviour set out above implies this. Sometimes these 
were observable in the data, as was the case with the correlation between environmental 
uncertainty and industry age, although this in the end does not appear to have distorted 
the result. It may also be, for example, that the relationship between isomorphic 
behaviour and decision type varies according to the dynamism of the market. There may 
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also be interactions between the different variables 
- 
performance, political behaviour 
and strategic intent 
- 
analysed in the tests of H9-HI 1.1 have left the investigation of 
these interactions for subsequent research. 
I have also limited my investigation of the relationships between firm situation and 
isomorphic behaviour (118) to the simplest possible test of association between the 
variables. I have not sought to build detailed regression models, and have thus foregone 
the opportunity to controlling for attributes such as political behaviour and group 
diversity. 
Finally, this is a laboratory rather than a field study, and there are necessarily 
limitations on its external validity. Although the participants in this exercise had 
significant real-world business experience, the management challenges they were 
confronted were only a subset of those that exercise real managers. The students were 
not called upon to build consensus outside the confines of their own small team, as 
would have been necessary in a real corporation, and it will take further research to 
establish the broader external validity of the findings reported upon here. 
That said, Chapter 5 will have made it clear that, in my view, the commonly 
expressed doubts as to the validity of well-designed laboratory studies are overblown, if 
not downright spurious. As regards this present piece of research, I contend that, by 
using a sample of mature students and a realistic simulated business context, I have 
come as close to a real life situation as it is possible to do while retaining the capability 
of controlling for variables such as environmental munificence, and of recording 
precisely the content and timing of decisions and the information on which they were 
based. 
7.6 Suggestions for further research 
Aside from simple replications of this study to validate its results, there is scope for 
similar studies in which duration and other contingent variables are varied to assess 
their effect. In particular, other studies might assess the effects of differing degrees of 
environmental munificence, both as a constant background condition and to assess the 
effect of varying it over time and between markets. A more deliberately experimental 
approach to the relationship between isomorphic behaviour and industry concentration, 
in which groups were systematically exposed to industries with different numbers of 
players and concentrations with other factors held constant, might also yield interesting 
results. 
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Studies might also be conducted with different group sizes, to see the effect of larger 
groups on political behaviour, isomorphic pressures and frequency of isomorphic 
decisions. Ideally, these would be carried out under conditions in which group 
V 
deliberations could be watched, so that questionnaire responses regarding group politics 
could be validated through observation of actual interactions. 
The link between isomorphic pressures and isomorphic activity needs to be 
investigated in more detail, with controls for environmental contingencies and also 
firm-level contingencies such as TMT diversity and degree of TMT consensus. It needs 
to be seen whether the link between pressures and action is moderated through hitherto 
uninvestigated intermediate variables, or whether the two constructs are truly as 
decoupled as my results have suggested. 
Future studies might usefully seek to operationalise independent or control variables 
for other idiosyncratic aspects of an organisation that have been demonstrated to have 
some impact on strategic decision making. These might include planning style (Hart and 
Banbury, 1994; Bailey and Johnson, 1995), leadership styles (Farkas and Wetlaufer, 
1996; Goffee and Jones, 2000; Collins, 2001) organisational learning (section 2.2.2) and 
degree of entrepreneurship (Dess and Lumpkin, 1997; Kuratko, Ireland and Hornsby, 
2001; Hitt, Ireland, Camp and Sexton, 2001). It was not possible to operationalise any 
of these variables during the present study: leadership styles because of subject self- 
presentation effects discussed in the previous section; learning because, in the absence 
of improvement objectives set by the groups, measures of organisational learning such 
as those suggested by Garvin (1993) could not be applied to gauge if learning had taken 
place; entrepreneurship because of lack of differences in group behaviour on this 
dimension in the simulated environment in which all were starting from scratch; 
planning because my observations revealed that the absence of the use by groups of 
strategy techniques was almostis universal, meaning that a variable based upon this 
would have insufficient discriminant validity 
The relationships between the nature of the decision, decision process and decision 
outcome surely merit further study. An operationalisation of the construct of decision 
" in my role as the teacher of the techniques in question, I found this a little distressing. in my role as 
researcher, I could take some comfort in this, as evidence that my presence was not influencing the 
groups' decision processes. I also attempted to impute rationality to group decisions post hoc, but could 
find no robust way of distinguishing between irrational decisions, speculative moves, intentional 
disruption of competitors or information gathering decisions aimed at testing customer preferences or 
price elasticities. 
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visibility would be desirable, in order to test the conjectures made in section 7.2.4. 
Research to verify the existence of practices not naturally susceptible to isomorphism, 
and to identify their distinguishing characteristics, would also enhance understanding of 
the balance between sameness and difference in decision-making (Deephouse, 1999). 
Lastly, the model in Figure 7.2 needs to be validated and refined through empirical 
studies, but I believe that these need to deploy more qualitative and ethnographic 
methods than previous research in this field. The basic idea that embeddedness and 
isomorphism are connected is surely no longer contentious, and the need for new 
statistical studies of large populations of organisations, to demonstrate that this result 
holds for some hitherto uninvestigated species of decision, is slight. Future studies will 
need to involve some qualitative elements to ascertain the reasons why managers choose 
to copy or not to copy their peers, how they choose their models and the kinds of 
decision for which imitation is and is not contemplated. Ideally, they should include 
some decisions, such as those relating to corporate social responsibility, for which the 
economic payback is debatable, to see whether isomorphism actually occurs in the 
absence of economic incentives. 
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Appendix I- The BRANDMAPSTM Market Model 
Extracted from Chapter 6 of CHAPMAN, R. G. (1994b) 
BRANDMAPSTm The competitive marketing strategy 
game, 3rd edition; Instructor's Manual. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall) 
Note: This material is copyright and is included only for 
the personal use of the examiners in assessing this 
thesis. It appears in their copies only. 
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